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FOREWORD .
In his preface to "Appearance and Reality," F.H.Bradley 
says that "Metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what 
"we "believe upon instinct, but to find these reasons is no 
"less an instinct." If this pregnant observation is true 
then it follows that instinct which produces belief is even 
more fundamental to human nature than the instinct which lies 
at the root of metaphysical enquiry. It also follows that 
the beliefs themselves are not dependent, except to a slight 
degree, upon the success or failure of philosophy to explain 
or justify them. A third conclusion can also be drawn. It
•
is that the beliefs he refers to concern the ultimate Reality 
with which the Science of Metaphysics deals. We can therefore 
assume, without doing violence to Mr Bradley f s meaning, that 
the beliefs in question are, in a comprehensive way, religious 
beliefs, for religion seems to be largely a matter of belief 
and its-main interest lies in a realm above and beyond the 
physical and the natural.
Belief therefore, according to him, is a matter of 
instinct, and it neither grows out of reflexion nor is it 
dependent upon the reasons that can be produced in its defence,
21.
In view of this it would seem somewhat remarkable that so 
much that passes as philosophy of Religion should handle 
religious beliefs as if they were a, product of man's per: 
plexity and the result of the problems which the facts of 
his earthly life thrust upon him. We would expect the 
treatment of Religion to begin rather from within the world 
of belief and not from without. Though he may be a meta: 
physician by nature yet man is first of all a creature of 
beliefs and his beliefs seem to have had a great deal to do 
with the rise of the problems themselves. For it looks as 
if rational reflexion does not spring directly even from 
beliefs but rather from practical problems which themselves 
presuppose the existence of instinctive beliefs. It so 
happens, however, that when philosophy undertakes the 
justification of religion, it almost invariably takes up the 
position that man's religious beliefs are themselves a 
result of his reflexion upon the conditions of his life 
and the nature of the human struggle. Nowadays man's interest 
is supposed to be made up of, and comprehended altogether 
by, the three sets of vAues that have appeared in his life, 
viz: the scientific, the moral and the aesthetic. He is 
supposed to be in possession of these realms of worth ante: 
cedently to that higher interest involving belief which we 
call religious faith. Religion is interpreted as if it were
Ill
a conscious attempt to find some sort of a modus vivendi 
in face of the contradictions and conflicts within natural 
experience. Man is supposed to have fashioned his religion 
on the same ground as he built his metaphysic. When he 
raised his altars he was beginning to reason his way through 
his experience, as the metaphysician might do. He was 
finding reasons, or looking for help, not expressing a belief 
He was in possession of certain 'values' which he wished 
to conserve. All the elemental powers of his mind were 
already functioning. His handling of the world of things, 
his life as a member of society, his attempts to body forth 
his natural feelings towards the world and his fellow-men 
in artistic productions, brought into play all the categories 
or principles of knowledge and action and feeling of which 
his nature was capable. In these directions all that was 
implied in his self-consciousness was adequately and fully 
expressed. When he came to have beliefs at all, beliefs 
that went beyond the limit of his 'natural 1 reaction to his 
environment,, he formed them, as it were, deliberately, that 
is, after deliberation, because his experience was incoherent 
and he felt the need of some unifying conception that would 
bring a little more harmony among the incongruities and the 
warring elements of life. But when he was at this business 
he was only a little metaphysician employing the same ideas 
those he already employed in his 'natural* dealings with
IV
the world, and perhaps manufacturing a few new ones. His 
religion was in fact a hypothesis, similar in nature to 
that which he indulged in when he went out hunting in the 
morning or was laying a snare to catch his prey. His religious 
"beliefs were 'thought out, f planned with conscious purpose, 
and in all this no more was expressed of his true self, of 
the constitution of his mind, than was already involved in 
his natural experience.
An illustration of this way of regarding religion 
is provided by these words of Dr Selbie's, "Belief in the 
"existence of God and a spiritual world can be at best but 
H a working hypothesis, but it is an hypothesis which meets 
"the facts of the case, and to man's intelligence makes 
"sense of the universe better than any other." !)—. '
Needless to say religion has a character which 
makes it something very different in all its workings and 
expressions from a scientific hypothesis. A theology may 
be a hypothesis, but a religion is always an experience and 
a faith.
The present essay takes its rise from the conviction 
that the nature of religion and the beliefs for which meta: 
physics finds f bad reasons,' can never be adequately explained 
on this presupposition. Religious beliefs are not only
1) Selbie: Psychology of Religion, p.298.
logically prior to the metaphysical quest and involved 
already in every 'natural' dealing of man with his world, 
but they express a unique principle of evaluation of the 
world and a ground of self-conscious experience which under: 
lies and informs all human activity whatsoever. Man's 
science and morality and art are controlled and inspired 
from an a priori epistemological principle organically 
determining these, yet never fully expressed in all of them 
together. Whether as Scientist, Moralist, Artist or Meta: 
physician, man is "by the constitution of his mind and the 
nature of his self-consciousness a religious creature, and 
his beliefs, for which philosophy seeks a reason and can 
find only bad ones, are with him as a native heritage with 
which he must come to terms in all the natural relationships 
of his life. The philosophy of Religion therefore must take 
its stand not outside religious experience and beliefs and 
consider them as if they were of the same order as the three 
main 'values' of life, and seek through these to understand 
the religious consciousness, but rather within religious 
beliefs themselves as the central light of all human seeing, 
the spiritual fount of all human striving and the root 
principle which has ordained from the dawn of self-consciousness 
the conditions and framework of all man's greatest beliefs.
•
Though we shall find occasion to disagree with 
Professor Hdffding the following quotation from his
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Philosophy of Religion expresses not inadequately this 
point of view. "Faith must always "be the object never the 
"product, of philosophy; it can only "be the latter in so 
"far as philosophy is able to prove the psychological 
"possibility of a certain faith under certain spiritual 
"conditions of life. The philosophy of religion investigates 
"the epistemological, the psychological and the ethical 
"conditions to which this kind of faith is subjected. But 
"it cannot construct a faith; it can only describe, analyse 
"and evaluate the faith which is evolved by life itddlf from 
"different standpoints." ^
The metaphysician must never forget that he is 
himself a religious man all the time. In obeying a meta: 
physician's instinct he is also obeying a deeper one, the 
instinct which has created his beliefs. He must not, in 
his approach to his problem, look at that problem from the 
outside, for it is already within him. In obeying one instinct 
he must not disobey the deeper instinct for the sake of 
which his metaphysical labours are undertaken. Religious 
value is not a species among others, but the genus, and
«
even philosophical speculation itself is but one species 
of knowledge seeking to comprehend more of the wider hold 
upon Reality which is already a possession of the religious 
consciousness. Religion provides the major premise of life's
1) P-2J1.
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syllogism. When it appears in the conclusion we must not 
forget that it is there because it is already our great 
universal affirmation.
The three »eternal orders, » as Baron Von Httgel 
calls them, Truth, Goodness and Beauty, are 'within* the 
world of man's religious beliefs. He lays hold of them as 
separate 'values' only by abstraction from concrete experience. 
The unity of self-consciousness is a religious unity, so that 
all 'values' are at bottom religious values. Religious faith 
and experience is not a synthesis of 'orders' which were once 
separate both in origin and development. It is itself creative 
of the values and it lives in them all, though it never itself 
disappears or breaks up in the process. Religion remains 
religion still and no interest in the 'values' will ever 
provide a substitute wherein man's whole self can find full 
and satisfying expression. The service of Truth, Goodness 
and Beauty does not and cannot bring the Soul to its final 
rest, though these may help him upon his way. His rest and 
peace are in God in whom man knows by instinct that he lives 
and moves and has his being. Religion has always assumed 
that communion with God is life's greatest fact, and from 
this centre the power has come which has sent man to pursue 
his career unceasingly along the channels of the three 
Orders. When Saint. Augustine wrote "Thou hast made us for 
"Thyself and our heart is inquiet until it finds its rest
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in Thee, w it was not ftnly the Saint in him that was crying 
out, but the deeper voice of man's rational and fundamental
Self.
The method and viewpoint of this essay is then, the 
opposite of that adopted by Hflffding. Though we agree with 
him, as well as with Bradley, that religion is never the 
product of philosophy we do not, like him, make it the 
object and nothing more. For we dispute the sovereign right 
of the metaphysician to make himself the judge of faith. He 
is but a vassal in the Kingdom of the Soul, a vassal who 
may, it is true, claim some jurisdiction over the world of 
values but little or none over the Realm of Ends. He does 
not wield the sceptre expressive of all the forces of the 
whole country of the human mind. The final authority must 
remain with the more comprehensive and far reaching interest, 
and the most solemn affirmations of personality. There can 
be little doubt that such final Court of Appeal is found in 
the sphere of religious faith and belief. By the philosophy 
of Religion, then, we understand H a mode of thinking which is 
"prompted by religion and takes religion as its foundation," 
and not, as H6*ffding prefers, "a mode of thinking which makes 
"religion its object." 1 ^
The latter method has its place and its value, but
1) Philosophy of Religion, p.l
until justice is done to religion's own 'mode of thinking' 
or its logic is shown, by some inner contradiction, to be 
inadequate for metaphysical inquiry, we should not abandon 
its claims as a source of knowledge, and fly away, whether 
to Pure or Practical or Speculative Reason.
The keynote of what follows may "be struck in the words 
of Professor Pringle-Pattison where he crystalises the inten: 
tion, if not the exact meaning, of Descarted? doctrine of God. 
"This idea," Descartes reminds us, "is not just an idea, which 
"we happen to find as an individual item in the mind, lite 
"our ideas of particular objects. It is innate," he says, in 
his old-fashioned misleading terminology. He means that it 
is organic to the very structure of intelligence, knit up 
indissolubly with that consciousness of self which he treated 
as his foundation-certainty, "so that our experience as 
"self-conscious beings cannot be described without implying it." 
"The idea of God .... originates along with the idea of self 
"and is innate in the seme sense as the latter." ^'
Religion, then, is based neither on a hypothesis- nor 
an inference but on an experience, immediate and intuitional. 
Not being a hypothesisf its nature is not amenable to scientific 
methods or tests; not being an inference, philosophical  
1) "The Idea of God," pp. 246-?.
treatment of it is inadequate to its full interpretation. 
As an experience, its essential nature and the revelation 
of reality which it provides refuse to yield up their 
secrets to ordinary concept&aikul thought. The only concepts 
adequate to its interpretation are those fashioned from the 
religious consciousness itself, which mufct always ba its own 
interpreter. The one adequate and profitable method for the 
philosophy of religion therefore is an enquiry into the 
character of religious knowledge itself and the conditions 
implied in the valuation of the world end life given in what 
religion affirms to be direct communion with God. That there 
is such a -valuation, original and sui generis, 'jgivdn in
i
religious experience is widely admitted, and yet the problem 
of religion is, for the most part, handled on the assumption 
that it is entirely based, like science and philosophy, on 
hypothesis, or on inference from natural experience. Thus 
Professor Whitehead says that "The final principle of religion. 
M is that there is a wisdom in the nature of things from 
"which flow our directipn of practice, and our possibility 
Mof the theoretical analysis of fact." And with the same 
breath he proceeds, - "It grounds this principle upon two 
"sources of evidence, first upon our success in various 
"special theoretical sciences, physical and otherwise; and 
"secondly, upon our knowledge of a discernment of ordered
"relationships, especially in aesthetic valuations, which 
"stretches far beyond anything which has been expressed 
"systematically in words." ^
Here the deliverance of the religious consciousness 
provides the final principle of science and morality and 
yet itself is grounded upon "two sources of evidence." 
But is the principle of religion fcftgically prior or subse: 
quent to the evidence? This is the omciai problem of the 
religious a priori. "The importance of rational religion 
"in the history of modern culture," we are told, "is that 
"it stands or falls with its fundamental position, that we 
"know more than can be formulated in one finite systematized
"scheme of abstractions, however important that scheme may
2) "be in the elucidation of some aspect of the order of things." '
Professor Whitehead insists that religious experience 
contains something more in its insight than can "beput into 
any "scheme of abstractions."
"The formulations are the froth upon the surface. 
"Religion insists that the world is a mutually adjusted 
"disposition of things, issuing in value for its own sake. 
"This is the very point that science is always forgetting." 3)
And he admits that this insight into Religious truths
1) "Religion in the Making," p.128.
2) p. 128.
3) pp. 128-9
is intuitive rather than inferential or hypothetical. 
The inspiration of religion "is to fee found in the primary 
"expressions of the intuition of the finest types of 
"religious lives.*1 And these expressions, which are not 
formulae, "elicit in us intuitive response which pierces 
""beyond dogma." ^'
Although Professor Whitehead does not seem to be 
decided in his own mind whether religious faith is at 
bottom a hypothesis, an inference or a direct experience - 
his doctrine admits all these factors as contributing to 
the total outlook - he clearly admits the presence in 
religion of an original insight which controls all other 
ways of knowledge, and which contains a kind of valuation 
that goes beyond the power of. conceptional thought to express, 
It provides an "intuition" which is "not the discernment 
"of a form of words but of a type of character. It is 
"characteristic of the learned mind to exalt words, yet 
"ttotherg can ponder many things in their hearts which their 
"lips cannot express. These many things which are thus
"known constitute the ultimate religious evidence, beyond
2) "which there is no appeal." *'
The real problem of the philosophy of Religion is 




which religious intuition provides, and of the conditions 
of its emergence in experience. We shall find that it is 
a character not only "inherent in things," "but in self: 
consciousness, not merely a principle of wisdom in the 
world to guide practice and theoretical enquiry, but the 
very presence of God who alone relieves the essential 
'solitariness' of the soul. We shall find that although 
religious experience is enriched and purified and deepened 
by the advance of science, the development of philosophy 
and the progressive morail sation of life, its nature is 
such that it alone provides the ground of the unification 
of personality and the only sure key to the final interpre: 
tation of the world and life. In other words the only true 
philosophy of religion is the philosophy which religion 
itself provides; it is religious philosophy.
PART I - CRITICAL
Chapter I• 
INTRODUCTION
When the psalmist of old looked up and beheld the stars 
he sew much more than his natural eye revealed. His mind, 
outstripping his eye, took a leap beyond the farthest orb and 
caught sight of the Divine presence. "The heavens declare 
"the glory of God, and the firmament revealeth his handiwork." 
For him the stars were rich in meaning; they spoke of a reality 
beyond themselves, which they partly concealed and partly 
revealed. The heavens were not self-explanatory and so the 
mind which beheld them in order to find satisfaction and rest 
pressed on "beyond the physical object to the discovery of a 
yowert of like nature with itself to explain them. This it
%^'--:^
found when it beceme aware of the Divine Architect behind the 
glittering orbs and an eternal glory underneath the order and 
beauty of the firmament. When the psalmist wrote his immortal 
couplet to express what he experienced as he looked up, the 
presence of God in that experience was quite as real a factor 
in it as the physical objects studied by astronomy. God was 
ciB real as the stars. Both were perceived together so to speak, 
in one moment of apprehension. If we were to institute a
1.
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comparison "between the two elements we would probably not err 
if we gave the predominance to God. In the total reaction of 
his mind to the firmament God was, to the psalmist, the greater 
reality. Indeed it could scarcely be otherwise. God must be 
greater than his works. In the vision of God even the world 
itself falls away or is swallowed up by the light. What we 
now would wish to explain, however, is not the relative impor: 
tance of God and the stars, but only the reality of both as 
factors in the psalmist's experience. And as factors of exper: 
ience both were facts. In so far as experience, taken at its 
face value, so to speak, is our first no less than our last 
arbiter on questions connected with matters of fact, we must 
allow both to the physical bodies we call stars and to the 
spiritual reality we call God, a place on an equal footing in 
the world of existence.
But though the psalmist saw so much - a great deal more 
than some are able to see - he did not, as a religious man, 
experience all he might have- seen or heard. His mind moved 
along two avenues only - the cosmological and the aesthetic. 
He saw God as the Creator, and the Creator's glory a$$«ttpedt& 
through his handiwork. From the earliest beginnings the 
religious mind has been familiar with these highways of the 
spirit as it strikes out from the world towards God, passing 
from the physical to the spiritual, from the temporal to the 
Sternal, the seen to the unseen. We may never reach a satis: 
factory explanation why mah has journeyed thus, but that he
has taken this path ever since he became the possessor of his 
particular "brand of consciousness and still finds it the 
natural thing to do, seems beyond question. That is now acknow: 
ledged to be a matter of fact.
In order to find another example of the religious mind 
at work upon the v/orld, let us turn again to the Old Testament, 
this time to a richer experience even than that of the psalmist. 
When, on a hot afternoon the sun was scorching the brushwood
on the slopes of Horeb, Moses, we are told, had a wonderful
/
experience. "An angel of the Lord appeared unto him in a
"flame of fire out of the midst-of the bush, and he looked and
"behold, the bush burned with fire and the bush was not consumed."
i
"And Moses said, I will turn aside now and see this great 
"sight why the bush is not burnt. And when the Lord saw that 
"he turned aside to see, God called unto him out of the midst 
"of the bush and said, Mo seal Mosesi And he said. Here am I. 
"And he said, Draw not nigh hither; put off thy shoes from 
"off thy feet for the place whereon thou standest is holy ground."
"And Moses hid his face for he was afraid to look upon 
"God. And the Lord said, I have surely seen the affliction of 
"my people which are in Egypt and have heard their cry by reason 
"of their taskmaster?, for I know their sorrows, and I am come 
"down to deliver them out of the hand of the Egyptians ......
"Come now therefore, and I will send thee unto Pharaoh." (Ex.III)
In this classic passage, whether we read it as history or
4.
as a deliverance of the religious mind by a later generation 
working upon traditional data, we get expressed not only all 
that the psalmist experienced - God through the reality and 
the beauty of the natural world - but a sense of God's interest 
in the prophet, and the fortunes of a nation in captivity. In 
other v/ords, the religious mind finds God not only through 
nature in its fact and its beauty, but also in terms of the 
nib9&i life. God is to Hoses more than the Creator and the 
source of Beauty. He is also Lord of the moral life. God 
is found "by him in terms of the moral consciousness, and 
tribal life. Jehovah is the law giver and it is his voice 
which speaks in the region of the conscience and the moral 
passions. God is not indifferent to the fate of-nations or 
to the experiences of men. The cry of the oppressed reaches 
up unto Him and the prophet is summoned as the instrument of 
the divine redemption.
In these two passages we have discovered three aspects 
at least of the meaning the world has for the religious con: 
sciousness. Hoses and the psalmist together would teach us 
that the mind moves easily from the world to God as its 
Creator, from the order and beauty in it to the spirit whose 
glory it reveals, and from the voice of Duty and the urge of 
tribal passion to God who is the Lord of life, and to whom 
human conduct and experience, whether individual or tribal, 
matters.
In order to draw out still further the character of the 
religious view of the world, we will venture on a reference to 
another significant experience recorded in the Old Testament. 
This time it will be from the story of Jacob who, after destroy: 
ing through personal ambition the domestic felicity of his home, 
becomes a fugitive from an angered brother. He arrives one 
night at the edge of the trackless desert. Behind him is the 
tragedy of his misconduct, in front the country of the unknown 
and the untrodden. Under the silent stars he goes to sleep with 
his mind marooned between guilt and fear. When he wakes up he 
experiences a great peace. During sleep he has seen angels 
ascending and descending the ladder whose top reached unto 
heaven, linking the changing world with the abode of the immortal 
Jehovah. "How dreadful is this place; this is none other than 
"the house of God, and this is the gate of heaven." He is aware 
of the divine presence, in whose light the world and his own 
life take on a new significance. He gains the hope of a safe 
journey and of ultimate reconciliation with his brother and a 
peaceful return to his now broken home. Jacob has reached God 
not by an intellectual or aesthetic intuition, like the psalmist, 
or under the stress of tribal feeling as in the case of Moses. 
He reaches him on the angel wings of a vivid imagination released 
in sleep, whose twin pinions were the elemental emotions of 
guilt and fear. The complete experience he gains is one which 
make a him the citizen of two worlds simultaneously.
Within him is engendered the most characteristic of all 
religious feelings, that of awe passing into reverence.
To illustrate still further the nature of religious experi: 
ence let us turn to Isaiah's account of his Vision in the 
Temple. As the man nearest the throne his mind was deeply 
stirred "by the death of King Uzziah. He felt that outward 
power- and worldly authority were shaken, and fully aware of 
the moral degradation of the nation, he turns his mind wistfully 
towards God. The vision granted him was of the Holy God, who 
could have no fellowship with Sin, and could not therefore save 
the people from moral ruin except through a general conversion 
and change of heart. Becoming conscious of his own mission to 
preach the gospel of a new righteousness Isaiah, now face to 
face with the Holy God, is stricken "by a sense of his own guilt.
t
He gains the assurance of success only "by undergoing an experi: 
ence of inner purification through the Divine forgiveness. 
"Then flew one of the Seraphim unto me, having a live coal in 
"his hand, which he had taken with the tongs from off the altar:
"and he touched my mouth with it, and said, Lo, this hath
f 
"touched thy lips; and thine iniquity is taken away, and thy
"sin purged." (Isaiah Ch.6).
Unlike Jacob, Isaiah's communion with God is achieved 
not along the path of mystic ascent through fear and the sense 
of utter loneliness, "but in the light of his moral responsibilities 
and the vision of the righteous character of God. Isaiah's
experience is completely moralised and his fellowship with 
God is in terms of personal life in the fullness of all its 
relationships "both to Society and to the world. His is a 
mysticism shot through and through with the highest personal 
idealism and the profoundest sense of the need for redemption 
by the Divine Spirit,from moral corruption.
These deltr/rances of the religious consciousness are 
specimens of what the reiigious attitude towards the world 
and life essentially is. They shall serve us in place of a 
definition of religion. The definitions usually proposed 
are for the most part either barren or else beg the whole 
problem.to be solved. A few concrete classical expressions 
of religious experience are more valuable than the most careful 
definition, -Were a definition of so complex and varied a 
phenomenon indeed feasible. The main characteristics of the 
content-* of religious thought are given in these passages, and 
we will let them serve as our terms of reference in place of 
a definition. A philosophy of religion which ignored the 
elements of religious experience embodied here could not be 
taken seriously, but if these were faced and the attitudes
»
here expressed justified,then, we would be well on our way to 
a general solution.
One way, and perhaps the simplest way, of formulating the 
problem of the philosophy of religion is to ask how comes it 
that man has, from the earliest beginnings of which we have any
record, viewed the world in a religious setting and linked 
his individual and tribal life with an invisible divine Being? 
That he has done this and continues to do this is a matter not 
of surmise but of fact. Religion is of the texture of life 
and a primitive product of human self-consciousness. Religioa*
/
b§tfe as a system of ideas and as a type of experience must be 
classed with matters'of fact. Man, it would seem, is religious 
by nature and not by civilisation. He developed religious 
practices before he began to reflect on what they might mean, 
at any rate in their detail. Religion is before the philosophy 
of religion and the religious attitude to the world is older 
than the scientific, and it has persisted right down the course 
of civilisation as the most powerful single factor, whether for 
good or for evil, which has determined the course of history. 
ETow why is man a religious creature at all ? Why has he 
believed in God and worshipped invisible Spirits at bleeding 
altars ? Why has he linked his little life with powers not 
seen by the naked eye, and thought of the physical world as 
but the counterpart of a spiritual ? Why has he thought that 
God was interested in him and for that reason was willing on 
conditions to help him and to succour him in life's conflicts? 
There are at least five main lines along which this ques: 
tion has been answered.
(a) In the first place it has been maintained that man was 
taught religion. He was taught it t?y God Himself through
acts of direct revelation long ago in the infancy of 
the race. Man was able to receive the instruction 
because God appeared to him in human or semi-human 
form, either as an angel or as a still small voice, 
or through some transformation of physical phenomena^; 
This, which is the traditional view, solves at once 
the problem of the origin of religion and a good many 
things besides. It implies that God visits man, as it 
were, from the outside, objectively, and His existence 
and His nature are known directly as a matter of immediate 
experience. There jsam no longer be any question regard: 
ing the objective reality of religious ideas. Our know: 
ledge of God takes its place alongside our knowledge of 
any and every objective reality-which comes to us through 
the senses and the exercise of the ordinary processes 
of thought. Doubts and misgivings may arise when we 
come to enquire into the extent of this knowledge by 
revelation, for the errors of inference may have crept 
in at various points in the process, but of the object i/e
reality of God and of the spiritual world there can be
t 
no question at all. The God of revelation must at least
exist and the transcendent world must at least be real. 
Men have not, then, according to this theory, found God 
by searching for Him. Indeed apart from revelation no 
shadow of His presence would, for all we know, fall upon
•10.
the human mind. The initiative in this matter had to 
rest with God; for man could not, unaided, attain to 
any knowledge of Him or even guess that such a Being 
existed.
With the truth of this theory in its extreme forms 
we cannot now deal, except to point out that it rests 
entirely on evidence, the evidence of history and of 
personal experience. Its acceptance sets up religion 
as an interest and as an experience, not only different 
from, but largely independent of and almost entirely 
unrelated to ordinary life. Religion will have its own 
Science of Theology to examine and correlate the revela: 
tional acts of history and will take precedence over 
both the philosophy of religion and the psychology of 
religious experience. And Theology itself will be largely 
of the dogmatic type for it will profess to be an expoai: 
tion of the character of God as revealed directly to the 
world through chosen peoples, prophets and saints.
•
(b) Another way of explaining the origin and nature of 
Religion is to attribute it to the character of self- 
conscious mind, which by virtue of its constitution is 
able to discover God in the midst of life as a presence 
that disturbs, either 'with the joy of elevated thought' 
or with abject fear and trembling, Man is religious by
/
nature and rises to knowledge of God as. thegp&rks fly
11.
upwards. He cannot help viewing the world as expressive 
of a spiritual reality which is God whose power upholds 
and controls the physical universe. At first his idea 
of God,or Gods, was crude and childish, and his religious 
emotions primitive, "but they were there in germ ;f rom the 
"beginning, and from them have grown all the great religions 
of history. The awareness and the experience of the 
divine and the spiritual sprang from the nature of mind 
itself which, in its growing contact with the world evaluates 
that world in terms of its own nature and finds in it 
a meaning that gives rise to the religious reaction. 
The explanation of religion is therefore to "be found "by 
an analysis of the way experience and knowledge of the 
world is "built up, a knowledge which has always included 
a religious apprehension and evaluation of the real. On 
this epistemological theory the development of self- 
consciousness implies a religious object and a divinely 
ordered world. The key to the religious problem is, 
therefore, to be found in the mind quite as much as, if 
not more than, in any revelational action.*.' on the part 
of God. In origin religion is essentially anthropocentric. 
A religious reason is a feature of mind, and a critique 
of that reason,if adequately carried out, would explain 
the origin and nature and also the validity of all 
religious ideas. Religion implies and grows out of
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particular categories of thought predetermining all 
rational beings to view the world sub speele di//initat i s. 
Religious experience and the spiritual interpretation 
of the world and life are possible on the strength of 
some innate capacity of self-conscious mind which 
lightens up the world and gives it a divine meaning and 
significance from which for a rational mind there is no 
escape. This theory does not rule out the possibility 
nor even the necessity of revelation from the God-side 
of reality. But assuming this viewpoint to be correct 
religious experience is itself, as a valuation of the 
world, revelations!, "because it yields direct knowledge 
of divine and supersensible realities. Our knowledge of 
God is then & priori in character for it grows out of an 
immediate apprehension, coincident with and conditioning 
all self-conscious experience. It is not derived, however, 
from 'innate 1 ideas in the sense of the rationalists, 
that is, previous to ell experience and from which-by 
deductiva   inference, thet knowledge of God is elaborated. 
Religious a priorism is an epistemological, not a meta- 
physical, explanation of religion and religious ideas. 
What the mind provides from its own side, is not full- 
fledged notions concerning God from which ontological 
deductions could be made, but a power to appreciate 
reality in the specific way we call reljgious. It makes
us aware of something spiritual, invisible, divine, 
"behind all phenomena. Implied in this awareness is a 
distinct category of thought which, in centra-distinction 
to 'innate' ideas, can only yield knowledge through 
experience of the world, and not antecedent to that 
experience. This religious category determines experience 
itself and enters therefore into the constitution of 
the objective world as it is known to self-consciousness.
(c) Another method of explanation is that which might 
be described as the idealistic. Religion arose, it is 
alleged, from a sense of bondage to the finite world and 
to the facts - the conflicting facts - of everyday life.
i
In his pursuit of knowledge, and other values of life, 
man became aware of an ideal, both of knowledge and of 
Goodness; he arrived at Kant's Ideas of Reason, theoreti: 
cal and practical and made the demand on the ultimate 
Reality that it should conform to those idea* and ideals. 
In other words, he thought himself into reHigion through 
the awakening of the ideal elements within his experience. 
A thinker, a moralist, an artist, in the first place, 
he passed on later to the business of unifying and har: 
monising his ideals and came to think of God ajnd a 
spiritual world wherein his values should he conserved 
&nd enhanced. He gained his belief in heaven on the 
wings of his idealism. He may have subsequently verified
14.
the truth of his venturesome ascent through direct and 
immediate experience, "but in the last resort his religion 
must remain a problem for his speculative reason working 
on his ideal constructions. Although the philosophy 
of Religion admits that religion is something much too 
primitive to be explained in this way, it persists in 
dealing with it as if it provided no organ of knowledge 
but only a certain type of natural experience. The whole 
of this essay is a protest against this handling of 
religion.
(d) A fourth way of explaining religion is to say that 
the Gods were made by man in his own image. The ideas 
of religion are but man's ideas about himself and his 
own needs thrown out upon objective reality. The Gods 
were created and are kept alive by man's elemental fear, 
a fear which is nothing more than the natural reaction 
to what is unfamiliar or unknown, handed down from our 
animal ancestors. In this work of God-making, the creative 
imagination has also been at work until the xvorld outside 
is made to re-echo all the subjective feelings and 
desires of the human heart, a deity being created to 
preside over each distinct department of human interest 
and every distinguishable power of Nature.
When religion is thus understood it need have no 
objective validity, because, arising from desire and
imagination, it is purely subjective both in origin 
and character. Though natural, as grovdng out of 
man's need in his conflict with the facts of the world, 
it carries within it no objective necessity as a valu: 
ation of ultimate reality. Religion may be studied as 
a psychological phenomenon but it cannot yield of itself 
any ground for valid conclusions regarding the nature 
of God or the Absolute. Religion must then submit to 
the judgment of a higher tribunal. It must be brought 
to the bar of Reason, - of Science and Philosophy, - 
where man is more sure of himself. If Reason can find
*
a justification it will also claim authority to correct 
all that seems irrational in religious thought and prac: 
tice and will in the long run, as with Hegel, substitute 
philosophy for faith, and dialectic for devotion.
(e) There is still a fifth way to account for religion. 
It is the explanation offered by the School of Psychology 
which took its rise from Freud. This theory is different 
and is to be clearly distinguished from the last we have 
noted. The Gods have arisen - not by objectification 
of fear or desire, nor by imaginative construction or 
reflexion upon the facts of ordinary experience. Man, 
whether as a fretful child, an imaginative poet, or a 
speculative philosopher, did not make his Gods in his 
own image; he begat them rather, only he did not suspect 
them to be his own offspring until Freud and his School
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discovered their parentage. Though still in a sense 
the creatures of fear and desire the Gods are not direct 
but only indirect object ifications of these subjective 
feelings. They arise from fears and desires driven 
first of all into the unconscious and then from there 
projected on to the real world. The Gods are not 
objectifications but projections. They are objectifi: 
cations via the Unconscious and in the process & certain 
transformation of ideas and emotions takes place which 
makes it almost impossible to trace the connection 
between waking thoughts^from which projections originally 
arise r and the projected objects themselves. The process 
is something like this. When desire is baulked and the 
vital urge of life is dammed up in any channel.it is 
turned back upon itself, introverted or inhibited, with 
the result that it finds expression in another way to 
compensate for the defeat. Projection is this alternative 
way of gratifying desire or need, or some vital urge 
behind these, and it takes the form of a reversion to 
primitive or infantile forms of satisfaction which 
symbolically appear in religious ideas and practices.
"In lEligion the expressive reanimation of the 
father and mother-image is organised into a system. 
The benefits of religion are the benefits of parental 
hands; its protection and its peace are the rsults of 
parental care upon the child; its mystic feelings are
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the unconscious memories of the tender emotions of the 
first childhood." ^
Religiously man is therefore the victim of a 
psychological illusion. The Gods and the whole system 
of religious thought and practices as well as the gamut 
of his religious experience are but his own natural 
self driven into the Unconscious and projected from 
there. Life's religious setting is but the shadow 
cast, not by the Almighty, but by man's own unconscious 
self, a shadow which is the result of an almost inevitable 
psychological process incidental to the unfolding of 
his rational and moral nature, and colouring all his 
experience of the eternal world- The light which he 
thinks streams from the throne of God turns out to be 
the flicker from the lamp of his own mundane consciousness, 
reflected on to reality through the Unconscious. The 
voice he imagines to come from the mouth of the Eternal 
is simply the echo of his own feeble cry of long ago 
for an earthly parent or for his mate, reverberating 
from sacred grove or ancient rock.
We shall deal with this theory in a separate 
chapter, We will only remark here that thifc projection 
theory is a much more formidable weapon to attack religion 
with than that known as anthropomorphism, from which it 
mii«t be distinguished. For if psychological analysis of
Jung: Psychology of the Unconscious,
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the genesis and nature of human experience proved 
that the main ideas of religion were projections of 
the Unconscious, then it would appear as if religion 
were a sort of nightmare, the product of a kind of 
psychical indigestion, so to speak. If, for instance, 
the idea of God is but the idea of an earthly parent 
or of some one else^metamorphosed by the alchemy of 
the unconscious,and then projected along with its 
attendant emotional tone, on to the screen of reality, 
the sooner the bubble of our illusion is pricked the 
better. For this theory with its kindred and supporting 
process known as rationalisation, attacks religion at 
its most vital point. It brings into suspicion the 
mind itself which is the source of all ideas and the 
only instrument of knowledge, and makes Self-conscious:
ness the dupe of its own distinctive characteristic ,
of, 
which is its power of critical interrogation/and
• ,
reflection upon its own experience. The projection 
theory condemns the religious outlook more emphatically 
and more completely than the theory of biological 
Evolution could ever do. The Evolutionist who professed 
to trace the development of mind and of moral and 
religious ideas from small beginnings find thought he 
had, by showing its humble origin, undermined the 
validity of religion, could be answered by the reflexion
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that the validity of ideas is in no way dependent on 
the manner of their birth and growth. For although 
the mind of man in its intellectual, moral and spiritual 
functions has had a history and has grown and developed 
we may still hold that the mind is healthy and that 
tfarough it reality is revealed. But when we are told 
that the origin and development of the icLigious mind 
is a disease and that the religious Soul is essentially 
a sick Soul, and self-consciousness is self-deluded in 
its greatest affirmation, then the discovery of the
*
origin of religion brings about its undoing, for its 
validity as an instrument of truth concerning the nature 
of the world is undermined. When psychology attacks 
religion by bringing against it the charge of insanity 
we are, however, justified in entertaining some suspicion 
that the enquiry has taken a wrong turning,and a retracing 
of steps is necessary.
These then are the five main types of theories regarding 
the nature of religion as viewed from the standpoint of origins. 
The first, which is the traditional view, may be held simul: 
taneously with the second. It is possible to admit a native 
ability or a power of the mind which is able to gain immediate 
knowledge of God, and at the same time hold to the fact of 
divine interference in human life, a tutelage of man directly
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effected by special intervention or revelation. On the 
other hand, and conversely, if we accept the fact of divine 
revelation we seem to be driven to assume a human capacity 
to recognise the divine as such even if we are not prepared 
also to admit that that capacity could unaided have gained 
any knowledge of God at all. At any rate there seems to be 
no essential opposition between belief in divine revelation 
as the source of our knowledge of God, and the theory that 
religious experience is possible by virtue of the nature of 
the mind as a self-conscious reality.
The fourth way of interpretation surrenders religion 
altogether into the hands of the reflective reason*!. 
Religion if it has no more secure a foundation in itself 
than the activity of psychological factors, like fear and 
the desire for life, must renounce forthwith its claim to 
be creative or expressive of any original experience of a 
supersensible world. The God of religion is a shadow of 
man himself, and heaven a reflexion of earth a little trans: 
formed and refashioned to satisfy the heart's deeper desires.
>
Of the last theory - the projectionist - we shall sub: 
ject it to independent examination. Here we will only add 
that, although both the third and the last theories - the 
anthropomorphic and the projectionist - may have to be rejected 
we shall still be free, once religion is vindicated on other 
grounds, to admit that both objectification of human fears
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and wishes and hopes, and the projection of complexes 
have entered largely into religious life, and in many 
ways determined the character of religious experience. 
We shall also "be able to say that philosophical reflexion 
on the 'Values' of life has played a most important part 




It is important, when facing the issue raised by such 
a theory as the projectionist, to see clearly where it presses 
most heavily on the assumed truth of religion and at what 
point it overthrows the religious edifice* That it may yet
be possible to put in a plea that religion even after the
j 
projectionist has done his worst, can still on certain terms
be permitted to live, we must of course concede. In the 
very realm of the unconscious where the religious illusion 
arises,and the religious object is given verisimilitude, 
the psychologist may, after all, discover a slumbering tribal 
or racial consciousness,or else a sense of an inexhaustible 
reservoir of psychic power surging there, something we might 
call, after Professor Leuba Ha cosmic gregariousness", which 
may be the original psychological origin of the object of 
religious worship. God may be just another name, though man 
never knew it, for the "Creative Energy^ or "the centre of Psychic 
"Power" as this energy makes itself felt at the basis of life. 
Professor Leuba would have us believe that religion owes its
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"birth to this psychological factor,and that God and the ideas 
and practices of religion are due to the conscious projection 
of this actire principle of cosmic life as it is known and 
felt by the indiridual.
"Actiye Religion" says Professor Leuba "may properly 
"Be looked upon as the portion of the struggle for life in 
teLch use is made of the Power we hare roughly characterized 
"as psychic and superhuman and for which other adjectires, 
"'spiritual* 9 'dirine', are commonly used. In this biological 
"yiew of religion, its necessary and natural spring is the 
"same as that of non-religious life, i.e. the 'will to lire' 
"in its multiform appearances, while the ground of 
"differentiation between the religious and the secular is 
"neither specific feeling nor emotions, nor yet distinctire
"impulses, desires or purposes but the nature of the force
2) 
"which it is attempted to press into serrice".
Without this "conception of the Source of Psychic 
"Energy" he adds, "no religion can exist", (p.94). This is 
the single root, the common denominator of all religion, the 
idea thrown up from the unconscious of a "psychic Power" 
actire in human life.
Dr. Valentine ("Modern psychology and the ralidity 
"of Christian experience" p. ^7) rightly points out that this
1) "Psychological study of Religion". p.
2) " The psychological origin and nature of Religion" p.
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protectionism of Professor Leuba, is not quite the same thing 
as that of the Freudians. It is not the result of repression 
on the part of the individual. Vfoat is here projected is 
the "primary unconscious" which we will explain further on. 
The religious object thus expressire of the racial consciousness 
or "cosmic gregariousness" though subjectlye and unconscious 
in origin, is not however necessarily an illusion* It may be 
a reality,however indefinable in character. But /whosoever 
thus attempts to rehabilitate religion must show that this 
divine object is not only not an illusion but an objectire 
reality, a difficult task indeed where it is only given through 
the unconscious and projected from there.
We may howerer say to the projectionist that he prores 
too much, that if his theory is true not only will religion 
go but his own theory will go too, for it also may rery well be 
due to the presence of a complex which may account not only 
for the theory itself but also for its plausibility as truth. 
If man creates gods unconsciously to correct his own psychological 
abnormality and to come to terms with life, then he may be in- 
Tenting religious theories to explain away religion to the same 
end* We might show the projectionist that he is but another 
Sir Ralph the Borer who comes to grief on the very rock which he 
has made silent and dangerous for other mariners by cutting 
down the warning bell. To do this would not, however, vindicate 
the truth of religion. It would only establish a tu Quoaug f 
and both projectionist and the man of faith would be found
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like the two thieres, in the same condemnation*
Passing by then, these subsidiary arenues along which we 
might storm the enemy's castle y let us seek the point or 
points of greatest rulnerability. The idea of God, says the 
theory is not one derired from experience of the objectire 
world of reality* Were it derired from there man would be 
able to point to some eridence of its origin in the objectire 
world* "Brery man, "says Jung, "has eyes and all his senses 
"to perceire that the world is dead, cold and unending, and he 
"has nerer yet seen a God, nor brought to light the existence 
"of such from empirical necessity"* And yet in spite of this 
we are told that "should it happen that all traditions in the 
"world were cut off with a single blow, then with the succeeding 
"generations the whole mythology and history of religion would 
"start orer again"* Although the idea of God was not fashioned 
nor arose from anything in the External world, still man 
is an incorrigible creator of dirinities and will always hare 
his way in this work in suite of all the evidence that he is a 
rictim of an illusion created by the character and urge of the 
libido at the root of his psychic life. One charge against 
the validity of the idea of God, is ,then,that our experience 
of the External world does not supply it* And because it is 
not derived from there, then, if it pretends to any objectire 
reference at all, the reference must be illusionary and the 
product of unconscious projection. The author of the 
fourth Gospel, who admitted the failure of sensuous experience
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to find God - "no one hath seen God at any time" - got over
V
the difficulty by his belief that the "only begottsa Son 
"who is in the bosom of the Father" had revealed Him. He 
thus retained his belief in the reality of the supreme 
religious object. The theory of the projectionist employs 
another method. Because no one has seen God, God, he concludes, 
is not there at all. His existence as religion understands 
him, is a creation of repressed desire or longing. He is 
a projection of the spirit of revenge which is in the bosom 
of the libido. Our assumed inability to derive the idea of 
God from empirical sources is deemed to be in itself a reason 
for doubting the existence of God. Needless to say this 
theological negativism is obviously based on psychological 
dogmatism regarding the nature of what determines our per­ 
ceptual outlook and experience. It assumes' that the pure 
in heart do not and cannot see God.
This theological doubt becomes open denial however, when' /
the projectionist claims to prove "by a study of the unconscious 
that the idea of God is due to psychological illusion. 
"I believe", says Freud, "that a large proportion of the 
"mythological conception of the world,which reaches far into 
"the most modern religiona,ig_nothing but psychology projected 
lf into the outer world. The dim perception of psychic factors 
"and relations of the unconscious was taken as a model in the 
"construction of a transcendental reality, which is destined to 
"be changed again by science into psychology of the unconscious.
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"It is difficult to express it in other ' terms * the analogy 
"to paranoia must here come to our aid* Be renture to explain 
"in this way the myths of paradise and the fall of man, of
"of good and eril, of immortality and the like - i*e* to
1)
"transform BifttafrvgiQB into metaavchelngv1* ..
Psychological analysis of dreams, and particularly 
of abnormal psychic states, we are told, has rerealed the 
mental mechanism by which religious ideas are generated, 
a mechanism that appertains to the unconscious part of personality. 
The real origin of these ideas is the ordinary natural 
world of physical and social relationships. Their specifically 
religious character is giren to them, howerer, not by self-con­ 
sciousness but by the unconscious* But since they take their 
rise as religious ideas from the unconscious and are in erery 
case transformations and combinations of images and ideas 
taken from natural human environment, they cannot hare, aa 
g^igioua ideas r any object ire ralidity whatsoerer. Object ire 
reality corresponding to images and ideas can only be ascribed 
to the content of consciousness whose contact with a real 
world enables it to gain knowledge of existent realities* 
The only true ideas, ideas which hare real entities corre­ 
sponding to them, are those which are supplied by perceptual 
experience* when the mind is in possession of ideas like those 
of God, or of conscience, or of a spiritual world, these are 
deemed/
l) "Psychopathology of Ereryday Life", p. ^10.
(Quoted by Selbie in "The Psychology of Religion").
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to be due to elaborations and extensions of natural ideas. 
They are achiered by the alchemy of the unconscious t whose 
chief characteristic is that it retails, by a symbolism peculiar 
to itself, suppressed natural desires in the form of fantastic
•
e-nies of the imagination, and ideas which proride the satisfact­ 
ion denied to desire in experience*
The material upon which the unconscious processes work 
their miracles of projection may be derired also from the 
unconscious mind itself where, it is supposed, the psychic- 
inheritance of racial eyolution is concerned for the 
indiridual. This "primary" unconscious, as Tansley calls it, 
to distinguish if from the Freudian unconscious which is the 
creation of introrersion on the part of the individual, may 
itself be a source of ideas, for this "primary" region of the 
mind is the nebulous hinterland of self-consciousness, the 
region whence or through which the libido emerges or flows* 
But eren when the libido itself, along with its racial urge, 
is supposed to account for certain elemental notions or myths 
universally found, these racial myths must themselres hare 
grown out of conscious human experience. The t>ro.1ectionist
theory of religion malces lesa use,howerer of this racial 
mind than it does of the Freudian unconscious which admittedly 
is made responsible for the creation of religious ideas no 
less than of the mythologies and wonder tales of gods and heroes. 
The first question that suggests itself regarding the
0
unconscious origin of religious ideas in this; if the unconscious
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itself,so far as its mental furniture of ideas and desires, of 
images and emotions, are concerned, is built up from floor to 
ceiling of materials drawn from the individual's own experience, 
on what ground is it inferred that no religious ideas have 
gone into the make up of the unconscious? The materials
*
of all projections, of dreams and phantasies no less than 
of myths, is confessedly sought for in the waking life 
of the individual. The wealth of the unconscious 
is the creation of the conscious mind. Vvhere else could the 
unconscious derive its materials seeing that complexes are 
formed by repression and introversion in conscious life? The 
images and ideas used by the libido, - or elan vital, or 
whatever else we cai^ the urge of life - are all derived from 
personal experience. That is why they have objective signi­ 
ficance as images and ideas. They were born through conscious­ 
ness reacting on a real world. In the case of the idea of 
God however»it is assumed that this cannot have had its origin 
in the mind's conscious life and awareness of the world in con* 
crete experience. Its origin is accounted for by the activity 
of the unconscious working upon the one time conscious images, 
and ideas, desires and emotions driven from consciousness by 
inhibition and repression. The symbolical method, we are told, 
so characteristic of the working of the unconscious accounts 
for the transformation and transference of the material supplied
to it by conscious experience. This symbolism is the method 
the 
libido to gain its own end through the unconscious when the
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conscious channels are blocked up. It creates, through 
projection, the object it needs for its satisfaction* Indeed 
the object thus created by libido is just a representatire of 
libido itself, although to the self-conscious indiridual, the 
object seems to be objectirely real, thus proriding the required 
satisfaction*
"Since, psychologically understood", says Jung, "the dirinity 
"is nothing else than a projected complex of representation 
"which is accentuated in feeling according to the degree of 
"religiousness of the individual, so God is to be considered 
"as the representatire of a certain sum of energy (libido)", 
p.^8. God, then is just the creation of the libido, the obr 
jectire representation thrown on the screen of reality to 
satisfy the demand of life which has been refused it in concrete 
experience. It is this creatire work of the libido which 
accounts not only for the projected illusion but also for the 
subject's belief that God is within him. "Psychologically, 
"howerer, God is the name of a representation - complex which 
"is grouped around a strong feeling, (the sum of libido). 
"Properly the feeling is what gires character and reality to 
"the complex. The attributes and symbols of the divinity 
"must belong in a consistent manner to the feeling (longing,
"lore, libido and so on). If one honours God, the sun or the
i
"fire, thenone honours one's own Tital force, the libido.
"it is as Seneca says* God is near you, he is with you, in you".
"God is our own longing to which we pay dirine honours 11 .
l) "Psychology of the Unconscious" p.52).
This projected object, is, let us note, whether God, sun or
>
fire, an object not to libido itself but to the individual 
who holds it in waking, conscious life. We can understand 
why the object may become for him the sun, or fire, for these 
are already objects of natural experience. But why should the 
urge of libido give rise to the idea of God to satisfy any 
longing at all? Would we not expect, assuming projection from 
the unconscious to be a fact, to find the kind of object into 
which the libido translates itself for tiie individual in all points 
answering to some physical reality or situation known already 
in his experience? If the libido, baulked of its natural 
satisfaction,must find a substituted object which it creates 
for itself, why should that object take a superhuman, and 
supersensible form when its real satisfaction is only attain­ 
able in the natural and human world? We can understand the 
sexual impulse driven to the unconscious creating in dream or 
phantasy a human situation to gratify its craving, but why 
should it create a God for that purpose? We can understand 
the parental emotion, defeated in actual experience by the 
loss of an offspring, dreaming of new human surroundings where 
the child is found again, but why should that new situation 
take the form of a spiritual invisible realm forming the back­ 
ground of the world? Remember that it is for the consciousness 
of the individual that the projected object exists, and in a 
form which he believes to be objective. Even if libido
had a conceptually creative function to ptrfa«a the conscious
mind could not "become aware of the unconsciously projected 
idea or image unless it already was familiar with it in ex­ 
perience. Were it otherwise, the world would be richer than 
it is in phantasies more grotesque and unnatural than all
»
the mythologies of antiquity. The Imagination would no longer
•*-v ^
"be subject to the constraint of the real world.''
Accepting the fact of projection, we must nevertheless 
remain dubious of the ability of the unconscious to present 
for the acceptance of conscious life images or ideas which 
are not already familiar to the concrete experience of the
individual. In sjpite of the supposed creations of the'.*
projecting activity of the unconscious there is no eanclusiY* 
proof that ideas of existent realities or supposed existent 
realities have been generated in that way. The unconscious 
is not an original source of ideas. Its stock in trade is 
provided by the conscious mind interacting with the world of 
real things. When and if the idea of God is a projection 
to satisfy the longings of the heart t it is only because that 
idea is already present to self-consciousness, before it ever 
appears as a projection. It was a sound saying that nothing 
is found in conception which was not first of all present in 
perception. The imagination can construct freely, whether 
symbolically as in dreams, or more realistically as in w ak ing 
phantasy or by conscious effort, but its images and ideas are
i
all provided from the world of concrete experience. Religious 
ideas emerge from the unconscious in projection only because
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they were supplied in the first instance by the conscious 
mind. Were this not so,not only would their psychological 
origin be a mystery unfathomable, seeing that they would 
proceed from some a priori root in the unconscious, but 
the self-conscious individual would not be able to grasp 
their meaning. We have no reason for the assumption under­ 
lying the projectionist theory of the origin of the ideas 
of religion, that ideas not generated by self-consciousness 
can yet be grasped by it and accepted, as ideas of existent 
realities. The ideas of religion are employed freely by the 
unconscious to satisfy the libido, the urge of life,and pro­ 
jected by it only because those ideas,, &jre familiar alreadyfi*
to the mind of man. The reason they are so often found as 
projections of the libido is because in conscious life the ideas 
of religion are neglected, they are not used to solve the 
antagonisms and problems of moral and personal relationships, 
were they employed with zeal and consistency to harmonise and to 
sublimate the libido of consciousness itself, their appearance 
as projections would be less frequent and less vivid. It is 
significant that their discovery in the form of projections has 
been made^ot in normal human beings who have found a 
solution to their moral problems even before those problems 
became pressing but in the morally abnormal*who*for some
cause have failed to solve the problem of ethical discipline
the 
and spiritual XX integration. If religion is due to/projection
of complexes we would expect that psychoanalysis would put an end
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to a patient's religious faith and life, and we would arrire 
at the queer rule, "no complexes, no projection;no projection, 
"no religion". Experience doe not howerer rerify this 
anticipated result of mental therapy. "One would expect 
"according to this theory", writes Br. William Brown, "that 
"deep analysis would leare the patient less religious than he 
"was before. My own experience has been the exact opposite...., 
"The analysis had indeed a purifying effect UT>on my religious 
"feelings, freeing them from much that was merely infantile 
"and supported by sentimental associations or historical 
"accidents. But the ultimate result has been that I hare 
"become more conrinced than erer that religion is the most 
"important thing in life, and that it is essential to mental 
"health..... although mere emotionalism and religiosity is
"diminished, the essentially religious outlook on life remains
l) 
"unimpaired".
The fact is, the theory of projection as an explanation 
of the origin and nature of religion and religious ideas 
leares its adrocates in a troublesome dilemma. On the one 
hand the theory is supposed to account for what is distinctire 
and original in religious thought - the idea of God, and of 
a spiritual world. On the other hand the projectionists' main 
argument is to show that these religious ideas are the creation
l) "Mind and Personality" p.268.
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of tlie life energy working exe^uaiTely upon pifr^firia.1 drawn 
from Qftfflflonp^Laee human enTiT*fln»|ent and human experience. 
Although the ideas of religion are admittedly of a different 
order from the ideas of finite human relationship, yet erery 
religious idea and erery religious experience expressed in 
myth and ritual and religious practices generally are made to
correspond almost point to point with huuan experience and
/-- 
relationships* This is done in order to show that the origin
of the one series, the religious, is traceable to the other, 
the symbolic transformation alone being attributed to the 
actiTity of unconscious libido. But this endearour to establish
•
a point to point correspondence between the human and the 
dirine, the secular and the sacred, assumes some direct rital 
relationship between the two series. It also leares the 
libido impotent to originate anything in the way of the stuff 
of experience, whether ideas or feelings. Its creatire 
actirity is confined to its power of proriding new symbolical 
dress for human ideas and feelings already prorided by experience. 
The illusory nature of religion is arrired at on two contra­ 
dictory grounds. On the one hand, because religion appears to be 
due to the actiTity of the unconscious it can hare no rital 
relation as religion with the facts of the real world and of con­ 
scious rational life; on the other hand because i$ is prored in 
spite of its symbolism, to answer almost point to point with real 
and rational human life, it cannot as religion lay claim to ob- 
jectire reality. In other words religion is illusion,both because it
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is not concrete human experience, and because it is nothing else. 
But the projectionist cannot have it both ways. Either religion 
is the expression of true and real human experience and needs,or
it is not. If it is not, then it will be a vain quest to
£or
search, by a study of religious ideas and practices/their
underlying human interests*because,ex-hypothesi> there is no 
necessary connection between them. If it is, if religion is 
the expression of true, human experience and needs,then it 
cannot be pronounced an illusion because,ejfJaypothesi, its claim 
to reality, subjectively and objectively -,is on a par with 
conscious human experience itself.
From this dilemma there seems to be no escape. If the 
world of religion is built up from human material it cannot, 
were it only for that reason, be pronounced illusory. If on 
the other hand, as is supposed, all that gives this material 
its specifically religious character and significance comes 
from outside conscious experience altogether,no reason is 
given why the religious world so created should provide so 
fitting a solution to life's problems seeing that it grows 
out of a region - the unconscious libido - where there can 
be no knowledge whatsoever of conscious life with its discords 
and antagonisms.
It is not difficult to see why the projectionist's theory 
arrives at this debacle. « In his anxiety to prove 
religion to be an illusion, having no objective validity, h«., 
seeks its origin in some sphere outside human experience - in
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some psychic power "beyond conscious experience, in any 
realm, in fact, where the test of reality provided by experience 
will be lacking. This he finds in the activity of the libido - 
the life energy which is at the root of our instinctive natures 
and the vital principle of every living organism. But to 
attain his purpose he must find the specific origin of 
religion*not in libido in its wider meaning,which of course 
would cover consciousness as well as the unconscious, but in 
its more limited sense as the energy that resides only in the 
unconscious and works only there. This unconscious part of 
•libido*, having been hypostatised into an independent energy 
and sharing not at all in the results of conscious experience 
of which it can of course, by definition, know nothing*is made 
solely responsible for the symbolism of dreams and myths 
and religious fancies. -Life is then dichotomised into 
consciousness, experience, reality on J. the one hand, and 
unconsciousness, religion, illusion, on the other. But 
although libido as life-energy is supposed to work in and to 
express itself along both these channels»it is now divided* 
and the libido of the one has no relation to the libido of 
the other. But this division in the libido itself is quite 
arbitrary and wilful. The libido which works in the unconscious* 
or is the unconscious,is a mere hypostatised abstraction. 
It does not exist apart from the libido within consciousness. 
The former shares throughout in the experience of the latter 
and cannot work independently of it, with the latter quite cut
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off. Complexes arise in experience, and they take the fruit of 
experience - cognitive, emotional and conatire - with them into 
the unconscious. Indeed they are the unconscious. If 
religious ideas do appear as projections - and no doubt they 
sometimes do, it is only because they were first of all in 
conscious experience, and if expressire of libido, then of 
libido in consciousness and not blindly and illusory through the 
unconscious* It is by means of this splitting up of libido into 
two distinct sources of ideas and emotions, the one working in 
consciousness, the other in the unconscious, that it becomes 
possible to pronounce religion and every other side of life 
which is suseptible of projection, to be a de-rice of the 
unconscious and therefore an illusion. Once we resolve to 
keep to the unity of life, a unity, underlying the distinction of 
conscious and unconscious we escape the danger of pronouncing 
one whole side of life or one great interest or system of 
ideas as illusory and another, in opposition to it, as real* 
If and when there is illusion through projection,the illusion is 
partial only. Even illusions arise from real experience and 
are therefore not without some objective significance and
*
validity. There is so much that is human and real in religious 
ideas - as indeed the Freudians have shown us to our lasting 
benefit, that we cannot easily believe that there is not after 
all much that is religious also bound up with the human. There 
is much evidence that this is so, and that it has always been 
so, and that the reason for it is that religion belongs to the 
texture of life and is a natural growth within conscious
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experience and therefore the expression of our rational natures 
in the widest sense. If this be admitted religion, although 
still subject to occasional projection, is no longer open to 
the charge of illusion.
It may "be objected, however, to this argument that it 
assails only the Freudian theory of projection as due to 
complexes which admittedly are the creation of individual 
concrete experience, but that it does not touch the other 
meaning of projection which makes it afiinction of the whole 
urge of life, or the racial psychic Power which is the 
whole libido itself felt by the individual as the current of 
his own energies, when this 'ieuban 1 unconscious, let us call it 
this elan vital, is supposed to give rise to religion through 
projection it is not possible to answer this theory, so it may 
be contended,by pointing out that nothing can be in the 
projection which was not first of all in conscious experience. 
Yet, as we have already hinted even a cosmic gregarious feeling 
must have been gradually built up through racial experience. 
If so, this unconscious is not unassociated with or unrelated 
to, the world of concrete life. Its materials may still be 
thought of as derived, in the last resort, from individual ex­ 
perience. .Like habits of thought,they may have become fixed
and capable of acting outside the field of consciousness; but
this fact . 
even so/does not make them arise from the unconscious pure and
simple. Their origin must sti^.1 be in the conscious life. 
But how do we stand, if it were urged against us ; that
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by the unconscious is meant the-whole psychic world underlying
all life - the cosmic soul, so to speak, the elan vital in
and
Bergson's sense,/that this psychic reality does create the
objects of its own satisfaction,just as it is responsible 
for the emergence of needs and longings an-d cravings which we 
know as instinctive forms of behaviour^ If instincts express 
the nature of this psychic energy because they derive their 
specific line of activity from it,we know then that the uncon­ 
scious does give rise to the feeling of need and of longing,and 
it is an easy transition to the belief that it can also un­ 
consciously give rise ,through projection to the fitting objects 
that can satisfy that same need.
Our reply to this is two-fold. Firstly, if the vital 
force can do both while yet remaining unconscious,then it is 
difficult to see why consciousness should have arisen at all. 
Consciousness according to this view becomes a useless accretion, 
a spurious offshoot upon the tree of life. We are driven 
back upon Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann.
In the second place it is surely a misreading of 
instincts and instinctive behaviour to think of them apart 
from conscious awareness. Desire, need, longing, craving 
are aspects of consciousness not of the unconscious. They are 
moments of waking life for the amoeba as well as for man and 
it is as such moments that they imply purpose or a dim awareness 
of some end, some object, that will satisfy them. It is only 
within consciousness that we find experience in these terms and
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the psychic power which we are led to postulate is merely a 
hypothesis by which we try to explain these facts. when, 
however, we call that power unconscious,we are setting up 
again a hypostatised abstraction, which, by the choice of 
terms frequently contradicts the very facts which we are 
trying to explain. We are committing again the same logical 
blunder as we did before,where the Freudian unconscious through 
projection was thought to create its own objects independently 
of the results of experience. The same answer must therefore 
be made to Freud and ieuba. Their unconscious,when it is made 
creative of illusory objects to satisfy natural desire in 
complete independence of conscious experience,is a iiypostatised 
abstraction which can only explain by explaining away. Our 
conclusion must be,here as elsewhere, that the creative Force 
of the world,the libido, the elan vital,or whatever else we 
call it, must be interpreted at any rate in terms which gives 
consciousness its rightful place as the sine qua non of
experience and, therefore, of ideas and purposes. On this
also
interpretation religious ideas must/be given their rightful
place, not as projections to satisfy an unconscious need,whether 
arising from the primary or the Freudian unconscious, but as 
ideas appearing in consciousness and associated with desires 
and longings and needs also coming into being as moments of 
experience within conscious life itself.
It is important to note that the projectionist theory is 
based mainly on a study of abnormal psychic phenomena. Its
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chief inductions were made from pathological data. But what is 
true of the psychology of the abnormal need not also be valid 
when we come to deal with the healthy and normal. Because 
projection and illusion play a part in the religious life of 
those who have developed complexes in their souls, and have 
become neurotic ,it does not follow that all men of faith owe 
their religion to projection. Even on the assumptions of 
strictest orthodoxy it is still possible to believe in spurious 
religious ideas and illusions due to projection. It is 
however a false logic to pass from the fact of projection in 
abnormal cases to the judgment that all religion is likewise 
pathological and a projection by the unconscious. "It is 
"argued by some", says Dr. Brown, "that belief in God is a
V
"'projection 1 upon the universe of man 1 s inner feelings. In 
"answer to this I would point out that, while the phenomenon 
"of projection is an undoubted fact which can be verified in 
"certain cases, these cases are all pathological". 
"By analysis we can discover how they arose: and in every 
"case we find that they are due to some definitely abnormal 
"process. Hence to generalize and use the pathological 
"conception of projection in dealing with normal psychology is 
"an illegitimate use of the concept. The normal mind is one 
"thing, the abnormal'mind is another, and the mere fact that 
"abnormal tendencies may be present in any man however 
"apparently normal, does not alter that distinction".
1) "Religion and Life" auoted by Dr. Selbie in "Psycholoev 
"of Religio'n". p. 296. **
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Still, in suit* of its false logic when it tries to 
orerthrow faith in God and the supernatural, the psychological 
theory of projection is not without its contribution to the 
study of religion. Its reading of human nature points to the 
presence of needs which somehow religion alone can satisfy* 
The psychology of the unconscious as tauoht by the followers of 
Freud especially by Jung, is a rerelation of the way the 
problems of the moral personality all tend towards a religious
solution* That indeed is its chief lesson. The unconscious
the
is the receptacle of all knots/which the indiridual cannot 
undo in conscious life. When he fails to act along the 
lines of his instinctire tendencies because he is obliged 
to accomodate himself to social custom, he sinks his inner 
conflict into the unconscious. If he does find that some relig­ 
ious ideas are born to help him out, eren if they proceed from 
the unconscious itself, it is a proof that moral problems are 
only resolred in the light of religion. The way from moral 
conflict to inward peace is admittedly the way of religion. 
Buti:^he unconscious shows us that way, it is only because 
the conscious part of our personalities is already acquainted 
with it. For of more normal perso ns than of abnormal can it 
be said that religion solres the problems of moral trial and 
failure, proriding delirerance from defeat, and power to sublimate 
the raw materials and impulses of life. Religion proceeds, 
then, not from the unconscious but from self-consciousness, and 
instead of being a principle of moral and spiritual salration
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supplied by the former, is rather a provision of the latter 
to solve the very problems which,but for it,would not be 
here to be solved, whether by the unconscious or any other 
aspect of the human mind.
CHAPTER 3» 
XA PRIORISM AND VALIDITY IN KANT.
When the central ideas of religion are called in 
question as regards their objective validity we are con­ 
fronted with precisely the same problem as that which con­ 
fronted Kant when the results of Hume*s enquiry roused 
him from his dogmatic slumbers* Hume's problem was the 
ability of the mind in knowledge to reach the necessity 
which science assumed to belong to the sequence of events 
in nature. Science always proceeded in its investigations* 
and formulated its conclusions, so it appeared to Hume, on the
./
assumption that it was discovering necessary connections 
among phenomena* The ideas employed so freely in scientific 
generalisation were taken to represent reality and there­ 
fore relations in nature. What experience provided however,
i
was merely disparate matters of fact or sense data, and ideas 
were built up and laws formulated on the fragile basis of 
association* As for universality and necessity no clue to 
these characteristics of knowledge could be discovered in 
the realm of nature. If necessity was assumed to
operate within the causal nexus, the mind could never gain
45.
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it objectively or prove it from experience. If science 
employed the notion of necessary connection.and therefore 
of universality, it was derived from analogy drawn from sub­ 
jective experience. The idea of necessity in regard to 
causal connection among events was arrived at by objectifying 
the mindte own sense of agency when it initiated changes in the 
world around. Its source was psychological and had therefore 
no objective reference except through analogy. Even the 
principle of causation itself, the axiom that every event must 
have a cause, was> according to Hume, non-rational in 
character. "It is an instrument useful for the organisation 
"of experience, and for that reason nature has determined 
wus to its formation and acceptance. Properly viewed it 
"expresses a merely instinctive belief, and is explicable 
"only in the naturalistic manner of our other propositions 
"as necessary to the fulfilling of some practical need.
Hl Nature has determined us to judge, as well as to breathe
1) 
"'and feel 1 ".
The principles therefore of Causation and of the Uni­ 
formity of Nature were not subject to rational proof. They 
were characteristics of the way in which the human mind did 
its work in organising its experience for practical ends 
and were not susceptible of proof, because in any proof their 
validity would have to be assumed. All knowledge was merely 
synthetic in character revealing no necessary interconnection
1) Kemp Smith: "Commentary to Kant" - p, XXVI.
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among ideas* Inference and custom-bred expectation were 
indistinguishable. And what was true of formulated sequences of 
cause and effect was true also of empirical judgments. "They 
"(empirical judgements) may correctly describe the uniformities 
"that hare hitherto occurred in the sequences of our sensations, 
"and may express the natural expectations to which they 
"spontaneously gire rise; but they must nerer be regarded as 
"capable of serring as a basis for inference", p. XXVII,
Hume's analysis of the nature , of so-called scientific 
knowledge resulted in scepticism in so far as no rational 
proof could be forthcoming of the principles uvon which 
scientific method rested. As no proof could be giren of the 
principles of causation and unif ormity^ of the concatenation dis- 
corerable in nature, whether between erents or ideas, or 
resemblance among sensations and perceptions, all inference, 
deductire as well as induetire, rested on subjectire grounds and 
could not therefore be shown to hare objectire yalidity. TO 
Kant it became clear that philosophy could not rest here* If, 
as Hume concluded, the principles of causation and uniformity 
were neither self-erident nor capable of rational proof, and yet 
were employed by science as if they were ralid objectiyely, 
though they were in truth derired, like erery other propensity, 
from the mind itself, then in order to Tindicate the unirersality 
and necessity which we attach to laws of nature, these principles 
must be critically examined. "How are synthetic, a priori judge­ 
ments :\f .possible?" In other, words what are the conditions in
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knowledge which must be fulfilled if we are to arrive at 
judgmente about^ events in Mature which shall have the two 
characteristics of Universality and necessity?If the source 
of these features of a valid judgment is not in the world of 
objects, how do they enter the act of knowing from the mind it­ 
self? In pursuing his enquiry Kant came to put his problem in
*
another way. He asked what is the nature of objectivity? How 
does the world of objects arise at all,seeing that the mind 
starts with a bare manifold of sense data? The problem of the 
nature of knowledge resolved itself into an enquiry into the 
character of objectivity* One feature of knowledge is that it 
is always knowledge of objects»and it was the objective necessity 
which the principle of causation assumed which Hume's results 
had called in question.
Kant's conclusion was, that an analysis of knowledge reveals 
the fact that, determining our experience, there are operative 
certain powers of the mind which control the organisation of 
reality as it appears within experience. Sense data can be­ 
come constituents of experience only by taking on the 
appropriate forms prescribed by the mind itself. These forms of 
thought were the source of the a priori elements in scientific 
knowledge. Judgments were valid objectively, and possessed the 
characteristics of universality and necessity, because the cate­ 
gories of the understanding imposed their own forms upon the 
matter of all experience. The world of related: objects which 
constituted experience was, in consequence, a co-operative 
society inline mind, as well as sense data, was a partner.
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There could be no longer therefore any question of the objective
it- 
validy of scientific judgmentsf for all knowledge gained through
experience of objects possessed an objective reference from the 
first. The objective world as it appears in experience would 
not be what it is had there not gone into its constitution 
synthetic elements aupplied by a knowing mind. If objectivity
within experience is itself organically related to the subjective
otfly 
mind, if the latter is one of the pivots Afhat support, the
structure of experience,then we have gone a long way to establish 
the objective validity of knowledge. Only on the basis of 
objective necessity can the world of organised experience be made 
possible. In this way the charge of subjectivism is met, for 
knowledge, like experience itself, is objective in its very 
nature>for the t:w& factors, the subjective and the objective, 
are linked up and are mutually involved from the first. 
Scientific judgement* °^e their objective validity and universal 
necessity,then ,to the conditions imposed upon sense data in
their organisation as factors of experience. The mind through
e.g. cause and substance 
the categories/legislates in the kingdom of experience,and for
that reason secures universality for scientific judgments. The 
subjective and objective factors in knowledge are therefore 
organically and indissolubly united in the building up of 
experience and subjectivism is ruled out forthwith.
In his objective deduction of the categories Kant takes us 
a step further in the same direction. Starting from the unity 
of self-consciousness he asks how the awareness of this
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unity can "be accounted for* His answer is that this unity of 
self-consciousness is a necessary condition of all knowledge. 
Every act of self-consciousness implies an awareness of the 
unity and identity of the self, as the bearer of experience. 
Every act of knowledge attainable through the .combining of 
the manifold of sense, every presentation or idea must be accom­ 
panied by the pure logical form of self-consciousness, - "I 
"think 11 or "I am conscious". Without this self-conscious 
reference the ideas would not become part of my experience. 
This awareness of the self along with the consciousness of 
objects is then essential to knowledge. It follows, *> , 
that "all the contents of acts of knowing which fall together
"in my experiences must be accompanied by the same consciousness
ap- 
"of self - by the same unity of/perception?. But this awareness
of the self, this realisation of self-consciousness necessary 
to all knowledge, arises only in and through the activity of 
the mind.in combining the given manifold of presentations and 
bringing them,by means of the categories,into objective unity 
and order. The unity of the combining faculty can only become 
aware of itself, the transcendental unity of apperception 
can only become the unity also of self-consciousness through 
its activity in unifying the given manifold of sense. The 
analytical unity-of self-consciousness, the M I think", or "I 
"am I*J implies the synthetic unity of the manifold of pre­ 
sentations. It is only by the disparate elements of sense being
brought together and steadied,as it were in the object,that
self-consciousness is possible. While then the unity of the 
manifold in the object is possible only by virtue of the unifying 
activity of the mind, at the same time the awareness of the 
mind's own unity - the unity of self-consciousness is only 
realised through the objective unity thus achieved. Objectivity 
is then essential to self-consciousness. These condition 
each other, and cannot, within experience, be sundered without 
destroying knowledge.
But knowledge is attained through the faculty of judgment, 
and according to Kant all judgments are objective. They affirm 
not a relation between ideas viewed subjectively ,but an essential 
objective relationship constituting the unity of the object. 
This unity of the object attained through the combining activity 
of the categories,and affirmed in a judgment having objective 
reference is nothing else than the objective unity of self- 
consciousness. It is as the counterpart of this objective 
unity that self-consciousness arises. The transcendental unity 
of all objectivity is also the transcendental unity of self- 
consciousness. They are indeed one and the same. Thus from 
different viewpoints Kant drives home his nails into the coffin 
of subjectivism. All knowledge must be objective in character 
because objectivity is a constituent feature of self-conscious 
experience without which experience would not become possible. 
That' Kant was forced later on to admit also, that^ although he had,
by his analysis, saved the objectivity - the necessity
yet 
universal!ty-of knowledge/the knowledge which the scieri
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mind gained, was knowledge of the phenomenal world only and not 
of things-*in-themselves,does not invalidate his contention that 
the mind does impose its own conditions on experience, and 
contributes certain elements to knowledge which gives it a sure 
objective character and validity. It is important to note that 
an idealistic theory of knowledge does not necessarily force 
us as it did Kant|to separate appearances and things in them­ 
selves. A legitimate development in one direction of Kant 1 s 
epistomology has issued in a doctrine of idealism where 
scientific knowledge itself becanes knowledge of things in them­ 
selves*
When Kant passes from the analytic to the Dialectic in 
the Critique of Pure Reason,he suddenly makes the discovery 
that the ideas of Reason - the Unity of the self, the unity of 
the World, and God the unconditional, although a priori in characte; 
fulfil a function in knowledge different from that of the 
categories of the Understanding, and the Unity of self-conscious­ 
ness* Unlike the latter the ideas of Reason are not con­ 
stitutive of experience. They are merely regulative. They 
do not stand for real objects but are only sign posts to show 
the way to the scientific quest. Kant distinguishes- 
between representing an object absolutely and neptmtaLiJag an 
object in the idea.
"In the former case our concepts are employed to determine 
"the object, in the latter case there is in truth,only, a schema 
"for which no object, not even a hypothetical one, is directly
53-
"given, and which only enables us to represent to ourselves 
"indirectly other objects in their systematic unity, by means 
"of their relation to this idea". A. 670=B69&« Prof. Kemp
f
Smith comments as follows:- "An idea is only a schema whereby 
"we represent to ourselves, as for instance in the concept of a 
"Highest Intelligence, not an objective reality but only such 
"perfection of Reason as will tend to the greatest possible
"unity in the empirical employment of understanding". "We/
"must view the things of the world as if they derived their 
"existence from a Highest Intelligence.""' That idea is 
"keuristic only, not~expository.^" Its purpdse"is riot"to 'enable 
"us to comprehend such a Being,or even to think its existence 
"but only to show us how we should seek to determine the con- 
"stitution and connection of the objects of experience. The 
rt tha?ec transcendental Ideas do not determine an object corre- 
"sponding to them,but under the presupposition of such an object 
"in the Idea, lead us to systematic unity of empirical knowledge".
Kant's own critical position breaks down then at the very 
point where one would expect help from him regarding the ob­ 
jective validity of the ideas of religion, The Idea of God is 
regulative only. It does not,like the categories of the 
understanding, enter into the constitution of experience. It 
represents no object and plays no part in the constitution of 
actual experience. Neither is it an indispensable condition of 
self-consciousness. Kant's critical position yields then no
1) "Commentary"- p. 553 •
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ground upon which to base the object ire ralidity of the idea of
God, "The ideas are mere ideas* They yield not the slightest
"concept either of the internal impossibility or of the necessity
'•!&"
"of any object corresponding to them** p«555, "As ideas 
"they are then without real meaning; but they can be employed by 
"analogy to define an Ideal which serves an indispensable 
"function in the extension of experience. From this point of 
"riew the transcendental deduction of the Ideas is radically 
"distinct from that of the categories. The proof is not 
"that they are necessary for the possibility of experience but 
"only that they are required for its perfect, or at least more 
complete, development. And as Kant is unable to prore that 
"such completion is really possible the objectire validity of the 
"Ideas is left open to question"* p* 5&0* Prof. Kemp Smith, 
howeyer, points out that Kant warers "between the Idealistic and 
"the merely sceptical yiew of the scope and powers of pure 
"thought. On the Idealistic interpretation Reason is a meta­ 
physical faculty, reyealing to us the phenomenal character of 
"experience and outlining possibilities such as may perhaps be 
"established on moral grounds. From the sceptical standpoint, 
on the other hand, Reason gives expression to what may be only 
"our subjective preference for unity and system the ordering of 
"experience. According to the one, the criteria of truth and 
"reality are bound up with the Ideas) according to the other 
"sense experience is the standard by which the validity even 
"of the Ideas must ultimately be judged". p.j60. Prof, 
Smith's conclusion however is as follows s-
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"The Idealist solution is that to which his teaching as a 
"whole most decisively points; but he is as conscious af the 
"difficulties which lie in its path as he is personally convinced 
Hof its ultimate truth", p. 561•
Kant then did not decide definitely whether the Ideas of
Reason had or had not objective validity. His main difficultyi
probably was that nowhere is experience did their objects appear 
in concrete. He has, however,no doubt regarding the reality of 
the ideas of Reason. And they have their use for they guide 
the understanding as headlights on a car guides the motorist. 
Moreover the Ideas are generated by the same Reason as generates 
the categories just as the headlights are lit from the same engine 
that drives the car. When Kant turns his attention to the moral 
consciousness he discovers there exactly what he found in pure 
Reason. He finds again a source whence radiates certain a priori 
principles constituting the possibility of the moral life. 
The awareness of duty, the consciousness of freedom, the guiding
X
principles of all right actions, the»e are supplied by the mind 
itself independently of all experience and have a purely rational 
origin. In no way are they derived from the world of sense^or
^ •<
from desire,OK natural inclination* The practical reason or 
reason on its practical side, legislates autonomously in the 
realm of action just as the theoretical reason determines the 
character of our experience of the world of physical objects. 
Its principles are not derived from experience; all moral ex­ 
perience is made possible by them. "The reason of itself-
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"independent of all experience, ordains what ought to take place"•
It is at once the source of moral obligation, of freedom, of 
practical principles of conduct, and of the idea of moral 
perfection which is the summum bonum of life. And the moral 
law thus rere&ed independently of experience has a categorical 
character. It is a bare, direct and unconditional command* 
AH moral obedience is to be rendered only on the ground of 
respect for the majesty of the law. Duty for duty's sake must 
therefore "be the principle of true moral action.
But what in the realm df morality is the ob.lectire counter­ 
part of the mind's ;/»s»thetic activity? We hare of course, 
answering to the manifold of sense, the material of human impulse 
and desire and the ways in which man reacts to the physical and 
social enrironment, and also, answering to the natural order,the 
highest good itself, the Kingdom of God which includes both rirtue 
as complete obedience to the moral law for its own sake, and the 
happiness associated with it, but we are no nearer than we were 
at the end of the Critique of Pure Reason to a Dirine objeot* 
The only objectivity implied in the a priori principles of moral
•
experience is the objectivity of the moral law itself, with its 
character of ^nirer«ality and necessity. At the same time the 
nature of the moral consciousness as the autononous source of 
the moral law, and of $he principles of moral action, together 
with the character of the summum bonum, lift man above the world 
of appearances and make him participate in the noumenon. The 
moral consciousness therefore reveals in experience a moral 
world parallel to , but /
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equally real with,the physical. Within this world, however, 
the a priori powers of the mind do not supply us with the idea 
of God directly,but only indirectly. Duty must be obeyed for 
duty's saker for that is the nature of the good mil and therefore 
of virtue. The idea of God creeps in as a postulate of the 
practical reason^because without it there would be no ground 
for the belief that the highest good is possible of attainment. 
"The moral laws lead through the conception of the summum bonum 
"as the object and final end of pure practical reason to 
"religion, that is, to the recognition of all duties as divine 
"commands .... which must be regarded as commands of the supreme 
"Being, because it is only from a morally perfect (holy and good) 
"and at the same time all-powerful will, and consequently only 
"through harmony with this will, that we can hope to attain the
"summum bonum which the moral law makes it our duty to take as
1) 
"the object of our endeavours".
This postulate is however useful only? and in no sense an
v
essential constituent of the moral consciousness. M It is 
"morally necessary to assume the existence of God" but "this 
"necessity is subjective*that is, it is a want and not objective, 
"that is, itself a duty for there cannot be a duty to suppose the 
"existence of anything (since this concerns only the theoretical 
"employment of reason)". In other words "it is not meant by 
"this that it is necessary to suppose the existence of God as a 
"basis of all obligation in general ....." The idea of God
discoverable in the 'Critique of .Practical Reason takes the same
1) "Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason" p. 226. - Abbott.
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place and performs the same function as it did in the critique 
of Pure Reason. It is not constitutive but only regulativex 
useful not dynamic^ an adjunct merely "but not organic, and
therefore not essential to moral experience./
There are in the Dialectic of Bare Practical Reason, as in 
the Dialectic of pure Reason, expressions which bring Kant to 
the brink of admitting substantial reality to the idea of God. 
He is prevented from taking this step by his resolution to 
establish morality on its own foundations independently of all 
theological implications. When he does give religion a place» 
it is only by deriving it from morality*and his God appears in 
the end as a Deus Ex Machina brougt in to unite the physical 
and moral universes, and thus reconcile virtue and happiness 
as essential factors in the summum bonum. The only necessity 
that belongs to the idea of God is that which is derived from 
our want and not from reason itself. Its proof is pragmatic 
rather than rational. And this because he is not prepared to 
accord to the ideas of religion, in particular the idea of God, 
the full a priori character which he accords the categories of 
the understanding and the principles of morality.
Kant's difficulties, one would fain believe, arose,not
from his critical method but from the point at which he began his
\ 
analysis. If the a priori nature and therefore the objective
validity of the ideas of religion are discoverable at all, they 
must be sought by an analysis of experience in its most concrete 
form. PorBligion is man's most ancient and most comprehensive
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interest* He was religious and in full possession of all the 
main ideas of religion long before he looked out on the world 
through the eyes of Plato and Aristotle, and long before he even
•
dreamt of isolating the physical world from the moral or both 
from the religious. God was not discovered at the end of a 
syllogism nor a postulate of the moral life* AS Pichte ex­ 
pressed it: "If God is for us only an object of knowledge, the
"Ding-an-sich at the end of the series, there is no escape from
1) "the answer that man, the thinker, in thinking God, made him".
Kant Would hare been more successful with his metaphysical 
theory if he had started with the Aesthetic;-instead of with Pure 
Reason* Even still more successful wou^d he hare been if he had 
taken as his starting point the religious consciousness, and 
traced the emergence of all the a priori elements inplied in 
knowledge from that centre whence they flow* It is not 
difficult to see that his inability to admit a thoroughgoing 
a priori character to the idea of God arose from the narrow 
meaning he gave at the outset to objectivity, and the 
philosophical character he gave to the idea of God* Once the 
objectivity involved in experience was narrowed down to the 
physical object in space and time, only the cateogories involved 
in the constitution of such an object could be admitted as having 
objective validity in knowledge, In concrete experience however, 
the content of thought is always richer than the object in space
i*
and time as considered by science, which isolates/by 
abstracting all its features which are not physical or materialf 
The religious outlook on the world involves the scientific, the
^H ̂ _ ̂ n ̂ M ̂ m ̂ m ̂ B^» ̂ v ̂ M •• iB ^* ̂ M •* ** V ** ** ̂ * " ̂* ** ̂ * ̂ * ** ** ** ** ** ̂ * ** ** " ** ̂ " ̂ * ̂ *
i) "Christian thought since Kant". (quoted by) Mo ore p. 57.
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moral, and the aesthetic, within itself* and therefore complete 
Objectivity is only given within the religious purview. Prof, 
J. Arthur Thomson was flagrantly putting the cart before the 
horse when, in an occasional article he wrote:- "Religious 
"activity is seen when man has reached the limits of his in­ 
tellectual emotionsOand practical endeavours, and, all unsatis­ 
fied with his Science, altogether overwhelmed with awe or with
"joy, all ashamed of his sin, sends out tendrils towards the
1) 
"Divine". , If this is how religion functions, then few
indeed ever attain to it, for few are they who have made this 
diligent search along the avenues of science and culture previous 
to any religious awakening. When this does happen, when re­ 
ligion is thus awakened*it is only because the religious con­ 
sciousness has previously been denied its true function, and 
wilfully stifled, under the misapprehension that it was not in 
itself a fundamental interest of man. Life was faced without 
the encumbrance of faith} in the hope that human knowledge would 
yield more complete satisfaction. "When failure came, and 
religion was grasped as a drowning man lays hold of any floating 
object, it wa» a recovery of a lost faith,and not the discovery
»
of a brand new article. It is this misunderstanding of the 
place of religion in life which is the root cause of the 
irreligion of civilisation arid of culture. It is Kant looking 
for God along the avenues of science and morality and aesthetics 
and failing to find him except as a necessary postulate to
give the finishing touch to an otherwise disappointing world. 
1) "Outline" March 2nd, 1929.
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It is also the prodigal son leaving his father's house to seek 
satisfaction elsewhere, only to find that his rewaard is famine 
and exposure,with no alternative at last "but to return to his 
father's house whence he set out. The ideas of religion,if they 
determine experience at all, and have objective validity must in
some way "be shown to be constitutive of all experience and
\ 
not derived from it, possessing f that is, an a priori character,
and, therefore,fundamental and dynamic within the world of a 
self-conscious being.
N
But obviously,the ideas of religion>whose a priori character 
and objective validity we would seek to establish by reversing 
the order of Kant's critical method,would not be the ideas of 
Reason as he formulated them. Religious thought,as it has 
appeared and functioned in the history of the race, is something 
quite different from the idea of God, which for instance Kant 
found"to be an idea of Reason. Kant's God is the philosopher's 
Gad - the absolute, which sums up all nature and mirtd in the 
infinite totality of things, the God who is all in all. Hardly 
is it necessary to point out that such an idea of Reason is the 
result of a very complicated process of reflexion. As an idea 
it is an elaborate intellectual construction built up on the basis 
of every kind of knowledge and experience of the world. It is 
this idea of God which Fichte had in mind when he pronounced it 
a human crdation. The God of religion,and the ideas of religion 
clustering around the idea of God,are to human experience,- of a
different order from the philosopher's God. It fflay be that Kant
could see his way to confer objectire reality on his supreme 
idea of Reason* That he found it difficult to do so, we know, 
and are not surprised. For if God be not a fact in the real 
world of concrete experience, he cannot easily be found a place 
in that world when thought professes to discorer him somewhere 
in its own hidden treasure house* When Kant finds him in the 
mind as an idea of Reason, he has already explored the real world, 
and submitted self-conscious experience to analysis without en-
*
countering God* When, later, he found God hiding under the 
seat of the moral Law, he could find no secure place for Him in 
the world of existent realities. In both realms the physical 
and the moral, Kant, after failing to discorer God at the outset, 
meets erery conceirable obstacle in the way of bringing Him into 
the world of actual concrete experience, and we are not surprised 
for God always has been a jealous God! He is there if you gire 
Him the first place; when that is denied Him, you may not 
stumble across Him again though you seek Him erer so diligently*
The God of Religion has always been, from the dawn of 
history, a real Being,entering into the daily experience of men* 
He was real because His very existence was intertwined and inter- 
woren with, and rerealed through, the actual world of nature* 
The God of Religion has always been and still is, the God of 
Nature. He was there confronting the first eyes that saw the 
sunset, and without Him there was no sunset at all* There is an 
eraluation of the world, primitire in character,and due to some 
fundamental power of the human mind which brought God and man 
face to face at the dawn of/
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self-consciousness in its interaction with its physical environ­ 
ment. It is this religious evaluation based upon an immediate 
intuition of the divine presence in and through our experience 
of the world of objects,which needs justification as an objective 
reality. The question is, as Baron Yon Hugel has said, not 
whether we can know God, but whether we do. The real problem 
of the validity of the idea of God lies not at the summit of 
the pyramid of knowledge but at its base, where the foundations 
are laid, and human experience takes its rise. For, surely, 
religion was there at the first entering into the most primitive 
form of purely human reaction to environment. The problem of 
the philosopher is not to find room for the God of religion or to 
justify belief in him, much less to discover him. It is rather 
to interpret the universe in the light of the religious evaluation 
which admittedly is the higtiest, , and most comprehensive form of 
human experience. The real apologetic which religion needs, 
and the only profitable one, is that which will demonstrate the 
objective necessity and validity of religious judgments in the 
light of the nature of self-consciousness*understood as comprising 
asc the consciousness of a world religiously evaluated. 
Philosophy in the main accepts the scientific value of truth; 
it also accepts, as its starting point,the fundamental nature of 
the Good and the Beautiful, It proceeds, not to question these* 
but to interpret the universe in terms of them. The same 
attitude should be adopted in regard to the ideas of religion. 
These are also like the others fundamental,'and it is the task of
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philosophy not to seek their Justification so much as to enquire 
into their essential nature and use them for metaphysical 
construction. It is pure dogmatism to assume that scientific 
truth, moral Goodness and aesthetic Beauty have a greater right 
than the judgments of religion, to be accepted as the avenues 
through which reality reveals its nature to us. What if the 
religious reason as an instrument of knowledge has a sharper
edge and a surer light than the others we employ? There is no
of
answer that we know/to the question why the three Kingdoms of
science, morality,and aesthetics,should tyrannise over the
territory of the religious consciousness. The problem of
nor 
religion is not met by a Critique of Pure Reason/of the Practical
nor of the Aesthetic Reason. It can only be effectively dealt 
with by a Critique of the Religions Reason. For the crucial 
task here is to show how the religious personality, or the 
religious consciousness,gains its peculiar insight into the real 
and what are the epistemological conditions involved in the 
evaluation of the world given in religious experience, - both 
as something specific and as organic to all human experience 
whatsoever. We shall in our constructive statement return to 
Kant's central doctrine of the unity of self-consciousness as 
providing the key to a critique of the religious Reason.
CHAPTER IVV .
• *
RELIGION AS AH IMPERATIVE.
What now do we mean by the Religious Imperative? The 
term is obviously an echo of Kant's Ethical philosophy and
v
any discussion of it must naturally begin with Kant's cate­ 
gorical Imperative* We propose however to make but a 
brief reference to Kant. We do so only to ask in what 
sense he used it and how it was related to the a priori 
character of the practical reason.
According to Kant the moral law is known as an uncon­ 
ditional commandment. It is an 'ought* which implies a 
'must' quite as much as a 'can'. It was all three, - 
'I ought, I must, I can*. It came like the martial command 
"Yours not to reason why, yours but to do or die". In 
that sense the Law was an 'Imperative'. But it was also 
categorical. By that term was meant that the moral law 
was not prudential or pragmatic in its rationale. It did 
not declare a way of life which would*if followed, lead to 
some satisfaction of need or to happiness or even any 
particular state of felicity otherwise evaluated or desired.
65.' '
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It was not conditional on our wishing to arrive at a certain 
goal. Man as a rational being was not therefore free to 
choose whether he would obey or not. His freedom was 
constituted by the fact that he could obey, not by his 
ability to choose whether he would or not. The law was, 
then, not ,-hypothetical, a way of achieving a moral result if 
man wished it - but categorical and therefore unconditional*
But on what ground did Kant base this categorically 
imperative character of the voice of duty? He based it on 
the fact that the practical reason was, in the moral life > 
itself the legislator just as Reason on its theoretical side
was in the world of the physical* The moral law was not
was it 
imposed from without; nor/in any way the product of
4
experience* It was a quality of consciousness itself, the 
condition and source of the possibility of moral experience 
and therefore strictly a priori in character. Without it 
man would not be capable of moral ju&g,eaent or of moral 
conduct. Its discovery was not made independently of the 
material of social life^and yet its character was not derived 
from the empirical facts of experience* It was itself 
assumed in all moral action. The moral law was then 
Imperative just because it was a priori arising out of the 
nature of Reason itself. All rational conduct was therefore 
imperative because it rested on human nature as possessing the 
character of rationality.
In thus referring to Kantjg; ethical doctrine in order
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to help us on t>ur way»it is not necessary to accept the 
whole of his philosophy as it stands. His reading of the 
a priori elements in morality may or may not be convincing. 
But of one thing however there can be little doubt. Kant 
was able to establish the imperative of the moral law because 
he was able to show that it proceeded from something more 
fundamental in experience than the empirical factors. Its 
source was in self-consciousness itself and not in the external 
conditions of the struggle for existence,nor yet in the realm 
of the instincts which man has in common with the animals. 
Morality had its foundation in Reason which is the distinctive 
property of self-consciousness. And yet in spite of its 
subjective origin the charge of subjectivity could not be
r-it
levelled against it because, being constitutive of all moral
experience, it did not leave the matter of behaviour where it
'life 
otherwise would be. In practical /reason clothed all
behaviour with its own form and by so doing metamorphosed 
it into what we know specifically as moral conduct. Thus
the objectivity of morality with its imperative character,
\ 
was secure,possessing the a priori qualities of universality
and necessity.
We are now in a position to consider the religious 
imperative. IR/hat precisely do I mean by the term? I 
mean that man is under a necessity to relate his life to a 
spiritual environment and come to terms with it,exactly as 
he is compelled to relate himself to the physical and moral
woridst That such a spiritual world is given to the mind 
and forms part of human experience is the axiom upon which
• '
all religious thinking proceeds and experience/1§uilt up. 
If this is not so, if the realm of the spiritual and the 
invisible is nothing more than an inference from the facts 
with which science and morality deal,then religion may "be 
axspeculative or experimental interest,but it will have 
no direct bearing upon life and can be neglected at will* 
Man will know of no commandment ordering him to his prayers 
and devotions. Of course, if by Divine Revelation, God and 
the spiritual are made known to him, and the way of approach 
to God declared to him in a set of ordinances, then the 
religion life would have an imperative character. But 
failing divine revelation,how can it be shown that man must 
believe in the existence of God and must bring his life into 
relation with Him? That is the problem of the religious 
Imperative, as I understand it.
Kant found the Imperative of morality by an analysis 
of Reason on its practical side. He found deep down in the 
mind an awareness of duty which was binding on every rational 
creature. Self-consciousness was a moral existent aware of 
good and evil* It had no option to be non-moral; it was shut 
up to morality just because it was itself. Yet in spite of 
the categorical Imperative of Duty,the practical reason con­ 
tained no necessity beyond that of doing duty for duty's sake. 
That was all it directly enacted. As far the deeper needs of
the soul, its quest for happiness and deliverance from imper­ 
fection and-mortality the moral imperative was indifferent. 
It had nothing to say except to point to the need there was 
for postulating God, .freedom and Immortality in order to 
guarantee that Virtue and happiness should coincide. But the 
moral Imperative stood on its own basis, and it in no way 
commanded men to believe in the existence of God, and in no 
way brought them to God* Although man is bound to relate 
his life to duty, - he cannot help that, - yet so far as 
God is concerned that remains a matter for speculation. 
The moral life is here and now complete without any Theology 
or religious belief or even religious practices. God is 
a postulate of the moral life; He is not given but inferred, 
and unless you happen to be a philosopher you may not worry 
much about Him. You need not relate your life to God but only 
to the voice of duty. And duty must be done for duty's sake 
and not for some ulterior End beyond the obedience itself for 
the good ,i§ in the goodwill and not outside it. Morality 
is therefore firmly based on self-conscious Reason and is a 
necessary human interest but Religion has not a similar 
ffou 0-7«2 in Reason. It may arise from fear or desire, or 
Imagination, or it may be equated with philosophy which arises 
from the impulse of men to know as much as possible about 
the world. But religion is not a matter of direct experience, 
and religious values are not among the staple goods of life. 
God Himself is not given in experience but only inferred
70.
from it* All religion is therefore speculatire in character 
and in no sense binding on anyone. A perfectly human, and 
a completely rational life is possible without it*
TShile therefore we have a categorical Imperative of duty 
upon which morality securely rests, religion is left hovering 
around us either on the pinions of the imagination and 
fleeting desire, or else on the somewhat heavier - than - air 
dirigible of metaphysical speculation* But this position
/
is quite unsatisfactory and cannot meet the deeper problem 
of the religious life* The ideas of religion are certainly 
not the product of an inference based either upon the facts 
of the world as a scientist sees them, or on the implications 
of morality as a Kant might discover. The religious 
valuation of life is as primitive and as fundamental in human 
experience as the economic or the moral* In some way we must 
consider ourselves doomed to religion as the sparks fly upwards, 
and it is the problem of the"philosophy of religion to discover 
why man is a religious animal, why he views the world
:- -'J\ .
'/J ,
.religiously and discovers religious values in it, and why he 
has always felt compelled in one way or another to relate 
his life to a spiritual divine environment*
t
How I think we must admit, if there is a religious 
imperative we must look for it in the human mind itself* If 
the religious attitude to the world is, to put it in the 
mildest terms, at least one of the avenues along w&jfchthe 
meaning of ultimate reality is made known to us, if there are
religious values discoverable in our experience, values that 
cannot be equated with or derived from other values, say the 
scientific, mo raj. or aesthetic, then there must be within 
the mind itself some pristine capacity for viewing the 
world in the way we call religious* Religion cannot be 
derived from non-religious characteristics of experience. 
Every attempt to do this has, in my opinion, failed. Should 
the attempt succeed it is likely that religion would no longer 
be a basic element of human experience. It would be for 
human life not a necessary article of diet but a luxury, 
perhaps to be indulged in only by a few choice and highly
i
cultured minds, by poets, painters and metaphysicians* But 
religion has upon it the stamp of democracy and seems to 
belong to the very texture of all self-conscious experience. ' 
If this is so it must spring from some a priori root which 
predetermines man as a rational being to view the world 
religiously, to discover religious values in it and to 
seek fellowship with the spiritual and the supersensible. The 
universality of religion, its primitive character, its power 
to affect life in all its more secular relationships,points 
to some power of the mind which enters constitutively into 
all experience and colours everything within the sweep of 
the rational life with its own peculiar valuations. Should it
be possible, by an analysis of self-consciousness in the interest
a -N 
of epistemology, to discovey' reE&ous a priori predisposing
the mind to view the world sub-specie divinitatis - and 
1) cp Bosanquet: Value and Destiny, pp 238-9.
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supplying certain forms of thought'to which all experience 
must conform, then we would reach a religious imperative along 
the lines which brought Kant to the categorical Imperative 
of duty. Two things would be done for religious philosophy 
by the discovery. Religion would rest on Reason and would 
be shown to be a fundamental characteristic of self-conscious 
life. It would also solve for us the very question of the 
objectivity of religious value, for now the religious inter­ 
pretation of the world would be based on the same foundation as 
the scientific and the moral. That there are such a priori 
principles, that the ideas of religion are generated by the 
activity of self-consciousness determining us in our outlook 
on the world is the thesis I would like to maintain*for it 
appears to be warranted by the facts*and in no other way 
do I think the imperative of religion is possible of demon­ 
stration. Should analysis and experience reveal their presence, 
the objective validity of religious ideas could no longer be 
seriously called in question. Man would no longer be free to 
react on the world except as that woarld is interpreted by the 
religious reading of its meaning and worth. Should he be 
guilty of reacting otherwise it would only be by emptying 
himself of a spiritual capacity native to his human nature, 
a capacity which will have in any case already provided him 
with some measure of religious insight and experience. 
For men do not reason themselves into a religious from a 
non-religious view of the world-; they rather awaken to it-J
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they possess the experience long "before they can reflect upon 
its meaning or gain the ability to make it articulate to 
themselves. Indeed did this not happen the power to receive 
instruction from others would not be theirs at all. The 
vision is originally given with the awakening self-conscious­ 
ness* All that instruction and subsequent experience can do 
is to clarify > to enrich, to correct and to reveal the 
wider intellectual and moral implications of the vision 
already present. The categories of religions thought 
must be already operative in experience, and EiiBt be present 
determining experience,before the intellect could ever begin 
the work of interpretation and elucidation. The 
intellectual constructions of religion are not the whole of 
religion. They always presuppose an experience of the 
world in religious terms. The true character of the 
religious consciousness is therefore to be sought not in 
philosophy or theology but in the concrete experience when 
man confronts the world religiously and views it as something 
alive and pulsating with divinity. We cannot reduce religion 
to philosophy, to the attempt reason naturally makes to organise 
experience and think out the world as a unity or reach some 
absolute or God as the principle of that unity. This was 
Kant's impossible quest. The idea of God was viewed by him 
as the principle of unity, and the unconditional ground of the 
world which reason demanded that the world should possess.
7*.
But God thus conceived is not the God of the religious con­ 
sciousness. He is the God of philosophy. Kant's ideas of 
reason are not the ideas of religion nor are his postulates 
of the moral life, except in a derivative sense. The ideas 
of Religion including the idea of God f are all primitive 
in character and cannot therefore be based on any activity 
of Reason narrowly conceived whether as theoretical; 
practical or aesthetic. Religion does not come in, either 
historically or in experience, after science and morality 
have done their work. The order of human interest and 
experience are the exact reverse of this; primitive life 
was an undifferentiated religious life when nothing was 
purely secular. Secularism is a product of civilisation. 
IShatever else he was primitive man was not a secularist, 
nor were his go&s the gods of modern philosophy. All 
his ideas and all his interests dwelt under the roof of 
religion and were made subservient to it. However, much 
modern life may owe to the development of the sciences and 
their delimitation from and their independence of religion,- 
and .no'doubt the gain has been very great,-the way we estimate 
the value of this deliverance is often misleading. The 
deliverance and freedom gained is not freedom from the 
dominance of religion or of the main ideas of religion but 
from the heavy :hand of the dogmas of religion. The
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religious outlook on the world and life has not ceased to 
dominate the sciences. Careful enquiry*; into XBK human 
motives might and probably would reveal the fact that the 
religious view has all along the line of scientific and 
philosophical advancement been the mainspring of the sustained 
interest which accounts for its triumphs.
*
Now few.^I think t would deny to the moral law an imperative 
character. It would be foolish, we all admit^to try to 
explain to a man why he should do that which is right. It 
might take us a long time to convince him of what is 
really right or good, and a longer time still to persuade him 
to do as we think he ought to do. But in all moral instruction 
we assume that everyman knows himself shut up to moral 
conduct merely by virtue of his rationality. As a son of 
Adam he knows good and evil,and he must choose the one 
and eschew the other all his life.
But where does the necessity of religion come in?
we 
Do we assume, and must/assume ,that everyman is also shut up to
*>
a religious life of some sort, that he must worship some God 
and must act as if God is interested in him and will bring 
him to judgment for his conduct? Is the religious valuation 
of life normal to human nature and can we always deal with 
men on that assumption? Is it a fact that the seemingly 
irreligious really view life through purely secular eyes, 
seeing nothing to suggest God or immortality to them,and 
feeling no need of God, or is it only that they do not accept
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the particular "brand of religious thought and practice we are 
offering to them?,. If the former then there is no religious 
imperative, for the religious consciousness is not the 
normally human. Nothing is imperative in life which does 
not belong to life f s very texture and meets some fundamental 
need of the soul. If the latter, if religious indifference
is due not to a deficiency of nature so to speak but rather
our 
to a failure to accept religion on/own particular terms, then
the imperative remains and is in fact operative.
But what does this imperative imply? It implies that 
man is religious ty nature, incorrigibly and in^eradica&ly. 
It means that his religious ideas and experience and 
valuations have their source not in the world outside but 
somewhere in the mind itself. The world and our experience 
of it yields a religious meaning only because in some way 
that meaning is conferred upon it,or, is discovered in it. 
In either case, conferred or discovered - the mind makes its 
own contribution to the experience, and determines it in a 
fundamental way. Exactly as Kant by analysis of self- 
consciousness found that the objective validity of a
was
scientific proposition/guaranteed by the fact that the 
understanding imposed its forms upon the data of sense and 
thus made its own specific contribution to the building up of 
scientific experience, and just as he also found the same thing 
present in moral experience,so are we justified in looking 
in the mind itself for the source of all religious valuations.
77.
The-scientific Imperative which compels the scientist to 
interpret the physical world in terms of causation,and the 
moral Imperative which decrees that all rational beings should 
act under a sense of duty, both originate in a priori qualities 
of the mind, qualities which are not derived from experience 
but rather enter themselves into all experience and determine 
its character. That there are a priori elements involved 
in scientific and moral experience is not today seriously 
questioned. Thinkers are ready to admit that the certainty 
of scientifiC| as well as of moral propositions^ is ultimately 
based on the fact that the categories employed in scientific
9
explanation and in moral philosophy^are derived, not from 
empirical sources f but from the mind itself. The function 
of the mind in .knowing is not a merely passive one, accepting 
a ready made world and gaining experience of it»without making 
a real contribution of its own. The mind imposes its own 
forms upon the data of sense, and employs categories of its 
own in the building up of experience. The mind legislates 
and the legislative enactments are discoverable by analysis 
of the knowing act. Thus for example Mr. Bert rani Russell 
admits the presence in logic of pure logical forms which are 
independent of the matter of any or all logical propositions. 
And these logical forms, because they are thus independent of 
all content, spring out of the nature of the mind itself and 
have an*a priori, character. Universal propositions derive 
their truth, not from particular instances empirically observed
78.
but must "be based on something either self-erident or else 
inferred from premises which contain already a general truth. 
"Thus", he says, "general truths cannot be inferred 
"from particular truths alone, but must, if they are to be 
"known, be either self-erident or inferred from premises of 
which at least one is a general truth* But all empirical 
"eridence is of particular truths* Hence if there is any 
"knowledge of general truths at all, there must be some 
"knowledge of general truth which is independent of empirical 
"eridence, i.e. does not depend upon the data of sense* The 
"abore conclusion of which we had an instance in the case of 
"the induetire principle, is important, since it affords a 
"refutation of the older empiricists. They beliered that all 
"our knowledge is derired from the senses and dependent 
"upon them. We see that, if this riew is to be maintained 
"we must refuse to admit that we know any general propositions.** 
"We must therefore admit that there is general knowledge 
"not derired from sense and that some of this knowledge is 
"not obtained by inference, but is primitire* Such general 
"knowledge is to be found in logic* Whether there is any
"such knowledge not derired from logic I do not know; but in
1) 
"logic at any rate we haye such knowledge"* pp*6j-66.
Logical analysis therefore according to Mr* Russell discoTers 
that there is knowledge which is, if not temporally, at least 
logically prior to all experience. In other words,knowledge
contains forms or categories or schemata which are in no way
•••••••••••*••••••«•••••••••••«••••(»»
1) -Our knowledge of the External World" pp.65-66*
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provided "by the sense data "but are contributed by the mind. 
These forms are the framework of knowledge and it is because 
of their presence that knowledge is both universal and 
objectively necessary.
As I have said,it is also readily admitted that morality
*
has likewise a subjective or mental source. The knowledge 
of good and evil is not provided by experience. It is 
assumed in all moral experience. No particular fact of life 
could yield one of Kant 1 s ethical propositions unless the 
mind already was aware of the moral law. Experience reveals 
what is right and what is wrong but there would be no 
morality at all were the mind not of itself aware of a 
categorical Imperative, not of course previous to experience 
but along with it. The moral consciousness contributes 
a constitutive factor to the world of behaviour and changes 
behaviour into what we know as moral conduct. The sense of 
duty comes not from the world of sense but from the world of 
thought. Its source is in the reason, and reason on its 
practical side, to use Kantian language - legislates in the 
world of action.
But if science and morality are both based on a priori 
elements derived from the constitution of self-consciousness, 
that is,, from the mind itself* and if the validity both of 
scientific generalisations and of moral judgement ultimately 
rests on this a priori factor,why should it be difficult to
flb v%
believe that our religious JudgjemctetE and values also have/a
8o.
priori origin? Is there any serious objection to a critique 
of the religious reason or religious judgment? If the 
objectire ralidity of science rests on a priori grounds, on 
the unprorable principles of the uniformity of nature and 
of causation, and if morality is based on a sense of duty which
v
seems to be innate, why not suspect $hat all the edifice 
of religious thought and life may also rest on equally sure 
foundations? Should the discorery of the a priori be made 
it might giro us the ground we need for the objectire 
ralidity of religious judgments.
Professor John Baillie, in his recently published work 
on "The Interpretation of Religion" makes a rigorous 
attack on the attempt to derire religion from a priori prin­ 
ciples* Dealing with Troeltftch, he charges the adrocates 
of a prior ism with using a faulty method, and tries to prore 
them guilty of begging the rery question at issue when 
they search for a priori firs.t principles, "They speak" 
he says, "as if to raise the epistemological question with 
"reference to any realm of human experience were the same 
"as to ask, 'IVhat specific a priori principles does it 
"'contain? 1 This, however is to beg the rery question at 
"issue in a sense in which it is nerer begged in Kant's
.. •
"pages", p.248. But as it happens this was the way in 
which Kant actually did formulate the epistemologieal problem 
raised by the scientific scepticism of Hume. He set out to 
discover the factors in knowledge which would account for the
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universality and necessity which a proposition of science
seemed to possess. In other words he made a straight search
v 
for some a priori root for the scientific understanding.
He saw that the objective validity of a proposition must 
rest on a priori principles of experience and nowhere else. 
The failure of empiricism to reach validity showed that the
only alternative open for the justification of scientific
«, 
knowledge was a search for an a priori ground for it within
%
the mind itself. That is precisely the method of a priorism 
in religion. The charge of subjectivism here drives the 
philosophy of religion to adapt Kant's own method. But the
s
failure of Troeltsch and others to unearth the religious a 
priori is no argument against the method when employed in the
interest of religious philosophy. Professor Baillie admits
%
that Kant succeeded in basing morality on a priori foundations*
s§ securely,indeed,that the edifice of religion can be safely 
reared upon it without troubling to find any similar a priori 
principles to serve as the peculiar ground of religion itself. 
"There are undoubtedly" he maintains "certain basic principles . 
"of our moral natures which stand in need of no proof and are 
"susceptible of none - which are as little requiring or 
"capable of being supported by prior evidence as are the Law 
nof sufficient Reason and the law of Universal Causation and 
"whatever other laws are recognised by logicians to lie at the 
"roots of our scientific knowledge. But even the most elementary 
Mof our religious beliefs are felt to stand in need of some
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"kind of further evidence and substantiation and are entirely 
"capable of being doubted if such support does not appear. A 
"self evident proposition is defined as a proposition the 
"contradictory of which is not rationally conceivable; and of 
"what article in one religious creed could one claim that to 
"be true?" Prof. Baillie admits the existence of a priori 
principles underlying morality, science,and logic,but he will 
not admit even the possibility of the existence of similar 
principles predisposing man to thing of the world religiously. 
His reason is that no religious beliefs seem to be self-evident, 
needing no support beyond themselves before the reason is 
constrained to accept them as true. But to shut the door 
in the face of the possibility of discovering a religious a 
priori on this ground is to misunderstand the nature of the
s,
a priori. The categories of thought are not self-evident 
propositions whose contradictory cannot be conceived. They 
are the forms employed by thought in the ordering, and there­ 
fore interpretation of experience and are only known through 
the function they perform. They are not in Kant equivalent to 
the self-evident propositions of the rationalists serving as 
starting points for the exploration of the supersensible
Vworld. Prof. Kemp Smith in his Commentary points this and 
with some insistence. "As the principles which lie a/b the 
Hbasis of our knowledge are §ynthetict they have no intrinsic 
"necessity, and cannot possess the absolute authority ascribed 
"to them by the rationalists. They are prescribed to human
"reason, "but cannot be shewn to be inherently rational in any 
"usual sense of that highly ambiguous term. They can be 
"established only as brute conditions, verifiable in fact* 
"though not demonstrable in pure theory (if there be any 
"such thing) of our actual experience". "The a priori 
"then is merely relational without inherent content, it is 
"synthetic and therefore incapable of independent or 
"metaphysical proof; it is relative to an experience which 
"is only capable of yielding appearances. The a priori is 
"as strictly factual as the experience which it conditions* 
"Even in the field of morality, Kant held fast to this 
"conviction. Morality no less than knowledge presupposes
t.
"a priori principles. These however are never self-evident 
"and cannot be established by any appeal to intuition. They 
"have authority only to the extent to which they can be shown 
"to be the indispensable presuppositions of a moral conscious-
V"ness that is undeniably actual. That the a priori is of 
"this character must be clearly understood", p. XXXVI.
The religious a priori if it exists must be of this 
character. What it will furnish us when found will not be 
a series of self-evident propositions serving as a key to the
nature of the supersensible world and God. It will be the
_ .. , ., , . , . , constitutive ,.forms of human thought which are «Stiil*ft**«s of experience
when that experience reveals a religious meaning and 
significance in the world of ordinary life, forms of thought 
which make it possible for the mind to see the glory of God in
84.
the heavens and his work revealed in the finnamait and every 
bush i. afire with His presence. They will be involved in 
religious appreciation just as the practical reason makes
X.
possible moral appreciation. The religious a priori will be 
the principles operative in the construction of a religiously 
known world, possible and also inevitable for a self-conscious 
rational being. The religious a priori will of itself yield 
no definite religious beliefs or credal. formulations, - any 
more than the principle of causation can give us the cause 
of any one particular event. All that it could do would 
be to explain why religious judgments are possible and 
inevitable, and why they have necessary objective validity 
within experience. It will tell us why the mind is aware of 
religious values in the world by showing the subjective con­ 
ditions underlying the ideas and values of religion, conditions 
which will guarantee - the necessary truths of religious judgments 
As "consciousness is in all cases awareness of meaning 11 , 
the discovery of the religious a priori will give no more 
than a knowledge of the subjective conditions involved in 
experience of the world and valuation of it which we call 
religious. It will show us why we are living in a religious 
world, why God is here confronting us all the time in and 
through nature, why we react on the world as if it were alive 
with a divinity which echoes all our deeper thoughts and 
emotions, and why»because we are dimly aware of the world 1 s 
divine background we,desire, in order to gain the victory
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over all .physical conditions,to reach fellowship with the 
supernatural and the supersensible. If this can be done the 
a priori ground of religion will furnish also a religious 
categorical Imperative, commanding all men to go up to the 
mountain of the iord to behold as by a transfiguration, the 
whole world glorified and wearing the garments of the eternal
.* » *
whose presence in life is already discerned by all, though for 
the most part only through a glass darkly.
CHAPTER V.
SOME IMPLICATIONS OP RELIGIOUS A PR I OR ISM,
That the world has always had for man a religious 
significance independently of his moral life can no longer 
remain in question* It is also true that historically 
morality has developed in strict dependence on religious 
ideas and practices, and even magic and primitive science 
was under the same control, both being born out of the womb
of a nebulous religious awareness of some power other than
1) 
human controlling the world* The world of primitive man like
his experience was an undifferentiated whole, but if any one 
feature of it stands out more clearly than the rest and 
dominant, it is his religious outlook* His religious ideas 
might not be deeply moralized nor his gods beings of high 
moral quality, yet his own life in its practical relationships 
was associated with the invisible background of thv world* 
The gods might be indifferent to him but he could not be 
indifferent to them* Religion must be given a place at 
least as primitive as morality itself. The attempt to explain 
man's religion as nothing more than the objectif ication of the 
1) cp. Murphy: Primitive Man. pp, 146-7-8.
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tribe, which amounts to a derivation of the religious 
consciousness from morality, is scarcely successful and sRRK is 
inadequate for the facts. The problem of the religious a priori 
however is not altogether a question of history, although 
were it proved that, as a historical fact, religious ideas 
arose late when man had attained a certain lerel of moral 
culture, it would be less easy to base religion in some 
fundamental characteristic of the human mind* But few 
hare ever questioned the primitire character of religion* 
what has been seriously attempted is to show that the 
religious view is something merely primitive, a phase of 
developing mind, and that the progress of civilisation is 
fast shedding the outworn garment of religion and theology* 
What the a priori quest in the philosophy of religion must 
assume however is that the religious evaluation in experience 
is fundamental, original, and primitive, and is not derivable 
from the moral consciousness* Moral ideas do not necessarily 
and of themselves lead to religion in its highest and widest 
sense* The sense of duty and the moral order to which it leads, 
and which it creates with its system of objective moral 
values, is an integral part of the religious life as well as of 
the world of specifically religious experience, but that does 
not argue that religion is nothing more than morality touched 
with emotion* Religion includes morality but morality is 
not the whole of religion. From natural science and ethical 
philosophy it may be possible to rear a respectable theistic
88.
metaphysie, "but no one would be prepared to affirm that a moral 
unirerse is all that religion.demands «r is able to provide* 
A metaphysic expressire only of the true, the good and the 
beautiful, which seeks to arrive at a conception of God 
or the absolute alone in terms of these three kingdoms of 
human yalues may yet fall short of satisfying the needs of 
man as a religious being* Even Professor Sorley admits that 
the facts of the religious consciousness are necessary before 
some of the most pressing problems of Theism can be dealt with* 
Ethical Theism leaves out of its purview what to religion 
is central, viz. man's experience of direct contact and 
intimate, personal traffic with the Divine. If religion 
means that man does rise to such fellowship, the religious 
consciousness is at least supraethical in nature and gains 
with one leap an^ assurance of metaphysical reality not within
^
reach of the moralist qua moralist. It is possible to deny 
the moralists the right to interpret ultimate reality in terms 
of moral values. Moral values may after all hare r;&< value for 
man here and now, and yet not be a characteristic of the real 
world. They are made to provide a basis for metaphysical 
construction only by an act of faith, a faith which has else­ 
where its origin. Dr. Bosanquet, for example, concludes that
Moral distinctions on account of their finite implications,
l) 
must in the Absolute be transcended or metamorphosed.
l) "Value and Destiny of the Individual") P.259*
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But if religion achieves what it professes to do, direct 
experience of the supersensible world we have in religion 
a safer foundation for our metaphysical superstructure for 
we already know something of the character of God Himself. 
Religious values are at least objective like the moral. 
But they are more, they are objective in a metaphysical 
sense. We reach them and develop them in our contact with 
the physical and social world, but the experience through 
which we possess them implies a specific setting for the 
world and human society, and is a realisation of a spiritual 
reality £aac which overflows the soul and transfigures the 
world. We begin to see all things in God and God in all 
things.
But underlying this religious achievement a fresh power 
of the mind is involved predetermining all rational beings 
possessed of self-consciousness to view the world thus, and 
inspiring them to set out in quest of ever more intimate 
realisation of the divine in his experience^ sense of duty
alone does not adcount for this spiritual adventure, and it
a
certainly nowhere explains the religious experience of 
mysticism. God is no more than a task-master keeping back 
all secrets regarding the rewards of virtue if there be any. 
We may be only postulating His existence in order to make 
sure that some reward there must be,perhaps in the form of 
happiness. Moralists have found it possible, as in the 
doctrine of naturalism to deny to the moral consciousness
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any validity whatsoever beyond the finite world of human 
society, and metaphysicians have fouad great difficulty in 
attributing moral qualities to the Absolute. Even if the 
a priori source of the moral law is accepted, and man 
iw shut up to the performance of duty for duty1 s sake, even 
then so far as duty is duty and nothing more, to be per­ 
formed for its own sake, the objective validity of morality 
though guaranteed does not bring us to where religion does, 
into personal, living fellowship with God, nor even to the 
possibility of evaluating the world in a religious way* 
For the reason that we are so accustomed to clothe all 
moral conduct with a religious significance, it is difficult 
to realise how poor and circumscribed the moral life is by 
itself in complete abstraction from religious faith and 
religious habits of thought* The same is true of beauty.
*
Wordsworth's poetry is more than poetry; It is poetry 
inspired by religion, and many of his greatest verse is as 
much the inspiration of religion as it is of poetic 
fancy. In vain do the poets strip themselves of their 
priestly garments. fhey may throw away one article after 
another and refuse to retain even one of religion's sacred 
vestments but, t&wi as soon as they tread the Muse's 
sanctuary it is not ©f beauty alone they sing. They know 
themselves in the presence of the Shekinah, and they cxyy 
like the seraphim whom Isaiah heard in the Temple "Holy, Holy, 
"Holy is the Lord of Hosts, the whole earthen full of His
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"Glory"•
Religion then cannot be equated either with philosophical 
speculation, science, morality or aesthetics. Not with 
philosophical speculation because religion was a human 
interest only before man turned philosopher, and the 
religious mind professes to know and to deal with realities 
into whose nature philosophy is merely enquiring. Not with 
science because science deals only with the physical world 
where it seeks to formulate the laws of physical changes in 
quantitative terms. Not with morality because though morality 
is an integral part of any religious life it is never the whole 
of it. Religion has features in it which stamps' it as a human 
interest quite different in character from morality. From 
the side of religion you may pass to morality but from 
morality there is no obvious nor even a possible path to 
religious experience. Not with aesthetics, because the worship 
of beauty in the abstract, and the emotions awakened by a 
beautiful object considered in and for itself in no way resembles' 
religion which always links all objects with the world as a 
whole ,and sees God in all things and all things in God. In 
view of the refuiftl of religion to bow to philosophy science 
morality or aesthetics, for none of them embraces the religious 
quest,nor views the world with the eyes of religionf nor can 
give any clear answer to the demands of religion, we are forced 
to think of religion as something which grows from its own roots, 
and must be dealt with in its own domain and on its own terms.
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The religious consciousness is sui generis but it is more. 
It is the ancient mother of all the sciences, - the science 
of nature, of morality,of aesthetics, of philosophy. These 
are but the children whom she has begotten and we must beware 
of trying to reverse the order of the spiritual Evolution of 
man, by seeking for the foundations of religion in some 
function of reason which is less primitive or less compre­ 
hensive than the religious quest itself. We must reverse 
the order of Kant's famous enquiry. Instead of beginning the 
examination of knowledge at the scientific end and then mov 
on to morality and aesthetics, we must begin with the Religious 
Reason and descend from that to its other employments in the 
world of science, morality and beauty. For these fields of 
enquiry and action are all partial abstractions from the 
concrete wholeness of life. JLlfe is covered completely by 
nolle of them, and to look for God along any one of them is 
to seek the concrete by means of the abstract which is a futile 
quest. From the concrete to the abstract there is assuredly a 
way, but none from the abstract to the concrete. From within 
the categories of the understanding there is no possible path 
to the Idea or the Experience of God,and there is none 
from -• the categorical imperative either. Kant is obliged 
to give to- the ideas of Reason, - the idea of God among them, 
a secondary place in the interpretation of the world. They 
are regulative only and not constitutive and do not guarantee 
the reality of their objects. This was the inevitable result
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of taking reason to begin with in one of its functions only, 
the scientific, and making/%ne standard of all rational
•
methods of interpretation* He ought to have started with 
the religious view of the world where God is somehow given, 
and all things appear as in some way bound up with God and 
with a spiritual "background of the world and life. In­ 
volved in such a primitive view of things, and underlying 
primitive experience in the concrete, there wefce mental 
factors as potent to determine that experience as the 
categories of the understanding or the moral consciousness* 
The ideas of religion were constituted of normal human 
experience at the first, so that the world was evaluated 
by primitive man in a religious way before the scientific 
or the moral view developed, when man became", a scientist 
and a moralist he did not cease to be religious. He 
only abstracted from the religious view certain aspects 
of his experience and concentrated on them. He remained 
religious and still remains, for the offspring of the 
primitive mind did not take their Mother's patrimony entirely 
from her. The categories of religious thought are logically 
prior to all other categories, and we can only find their 
interdependence and their organic relationship by starting 
with the concrete, primitive, religious view of life,and work 
downwards to science, morality and aesthetics.
If then we tentatively accept the a priori source of
» 
religion, if, that is, religious ideas are already involved
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in human experience of the world and not due to intellectual 
construction or invention, if they have contributed something 
essential to experience from the first then certain very 
interesting consequences will follow. Let us see what they 
are*
1) In the first place human experience will be seen to be 
fundamentally religious experience. What appears secular 
is not wholly secular; because the hinterland of life is 
sacred and the world is lit up with divine meaning* Instead 
of rising to religious experience on the foundation of a 
secular reaction to the world, man falls rather into the 
purely secular life from a religious pedestal. But the 
lamp of religion is never entirely put out even in the case 
of the secularist who consciously parades his irreligion. 
Self-conscious irreligion has something of the religious 
outlook left in it, for the world is still problematically 
divine. It is the purely scientific or naturalistic view of 
the world that is due to constructional activity, and not the 
religious. Behind pure naturalism there is a process of 
abstraction which leaves the world, though more in hand it maybe, 
yet W infinitely poorer and seriously stripped of its wealth 
of meaning. But to self-consciousness the world, in spite of 
every violence done to it, remains at heart what religion 
at first pronounced it to be.
2) Another consequnce that will follow is this 
Developed religion is not an amalgam of non-religious
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elements, built up from the primary emotions or instincts of 
our sub-human natures. The tree of religion, with its wealth 
of fruit in the form of experience and ideas, has grown, 
not from a graft placed in another root, but from its own 
root. Neither the ideas nor the emotions which constitute 
or express the specifically religious evaluation are derived 
from outside religion's own principle. They have evolved from 
within, and although light and sustenance and nourishment have
come from other human interests and the separation of the
the sciences, energetic source of religions evolution is
primitive in character and comes from the peculiar
qualities of self-consciousness. "The Sod-idea", says Pfof«
Va$erhouse, Nis not an invention reached at a certain stage of
"culture but the gradual unfolding of the implications of an
1) 
"elemental emotional attitude". Religion comes neither
from animal instincts and emotions, however intermingled, nor 
from morality,nor frem the scientific view of the world,nor 
from tribal life,nor from any other way in which man reacts 
to his environment. It comes and can only come from its own 
plasm within self-consciousness.
(3) Still another consequence follows the a priori 
hypothesis. Religious experience if subjected to adequate 
analysis should reve&l its own specific categories as 
constitutive factors in experience, just as Kant believed
1} Philosophy of Religious Experience, p. 42,
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the categories of the understanding to "be, and not as 
regulative only. It would show why the world as we know it 
speaks the language of religion as a native tongue which we 
can understand with the least effort of all, why man has
always believed that somehow, somewhere^all his needs can be
\
met, how in his quest for satisfaction he has persisted in 
his assumption that the world at heart is not alien to his 
own life,but in some deeper sense,of one piece with it, and 
will therefore respond to his effort to understand it and 
make it yield up its treasures. If and when the analysis 
gives us the a priori categories of religious thought,those 
categories will be seen not to be unrelated to the other 
categories which thought employs in the determination of 
natural or moral or aesthetic experience. We shall expect 
to find the religious a priori to be more fundamental than 
the others,yet organically related to them as their vital 
source. And perhaps also, the discovery would be made that 
a certain species of anthropomorphism underlies all our 
sdience of nature, morality and art and that unless man 
sees the world in terms of his own concrete image he cannot 
see it at all as it is. Should such a conclusion be forced 
on us and the charge brought against it that we are back
again in a helpless subjectivity^ would point out that
> 
anthropomorphism acting on a priori lines is not the same
thing as subjectivism understood as the objectification of 
desire or the projection of complexes. What we would have to
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admit would "be that man has no other way open to him to inter­ 
pret the world and to think of God, except in terms of the native 
structure of his own thought. He is as much committed to that
*
as any empiricist is to the reality of sense data* To sum up* 
The religious imperative arises from the fact that the mind 
is so constituted that it reacts upon the world in such a 
way as to discover there the foot-prints of the divine
*
presence* This discovery is inevitable and is accompanied 
and interfused by a specific emotional reaction which is 
more than a mere amalgam of animal feelings - an original 
primitive religious emotion* But neither the reaction, nor 
the discovery, is the result of reflection and certainly not 
the product of science, whether physical, ethical, 
aesthetic or philosophical, - although all these do react 
upon the religious valuation in a thousand ways. Religion is 
primitive and persistent and all subsequent experience of 
the world is built upon and around this religious nucleus, 
whatever categories are employed in the sciences for the 
understanding of the world, these are functions within the 
wider religious categories, from which in fact they arise. 
There is therefore no such thing for a rational being as a 
non-religious view of the world and life. He is shut up to 
religion, and he has no option but to relate his existence 
to a spiritual reality. It is moreover as a rational creature 
and not as a bundle of emotions that man so views the world 
so that religion is essentially a rational;, reaction, and
valuation. It follows that the voice of God is logically 
prior to the voice of duty, the religious imperative to the 
categorical imperative of morality, and I would dare go 
further and say that the principles of the uniformity 
of Nature and of Causation are logically based on, and 
grow out of what we know as religious intuition or religious 
faith. Finally the religious reaction is an immediate 
experience of reality, a coming face to face, through the 
ministry of nature and human life, with the spiritual power
»-
which pulsates and indwells every object and every environ­ 
ment in which man finds himself. In religion reality is given 
not to be analysed as in science, or reflected upon as in 
philosophy, or obeyed as in morality or even copied and 
interpreted as in art but worshipped and communed with as 
the soul of all that exists and the power immanent in the 
world and life.
CHAPTER
FROM MORALITY TO RELIGION .
In order to pursue a step further the contention that 
religion springs from its own root within experience it is 
necessary to review the attempts made to derive it from or 
base it upon other sources within self-consciousness. For
if, as the present argument seeks to establish, religion is
v 
essentially a priori in nature, it is reasonable to suppose
that its fundamental character (though not, of course, all 
its features nor all the elements which have decided its 
course in evolution), cannot be adequately explained on any 
other view of its origin. To examine, and if possible to 
show the inadequacy of other explanations than the a priori 
will be seen to be therefore a relevant undertaking. In 
doing this we shall clear away a certain amount of mental 
confusion and also gain a better access to the truth we 
are in search of.
To some extent this task has occupied us already. What 
must now be done is a fuller treatment of the questions 
raised, and a more adequate justification of the conclusions
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reached at the end of the last chapter.
I propose first of all to deal with the attempt to base 
religion and its Taluations upon the moral consciousness, 
upon our sense of duty, and the values which grow out of the 
moral life. The most recent contribution of this subject 
is Professor John Baillie's very able book on the Inter­ 
pretation of Religion" reference to which has already been 
made. Professor Baillie who is very definite in his re­ 
jection of the a priori hypothesis, argues very powerfully 
and eloquently for a philosophy of religion based upon moral 
experience. "What we have to do", he says, "is to trace, in 
"as exact and careful a way as we can, the process by which 
"faith in God comes to birth in the soul of man, and the 
"first point to be firmly established is that the process 
"begins from the awareness of our human values, that is to 
"say from thr moral consciousness as such. In the order of
"evidence, moral knowledge is anterior to religious knowledge.
»
"The certainty of conscience is a certainty which is logically 
"prior to the certainty of faith". "The certitude of duty 
"is thus a genuine prius in the approach to faith. Unless 
"appeal can be made to it, religious assuiCrance can never be 
"brought to birth in the soul*. "It is simply the truth
"that there is nothing of which man is more certain than of^ _
"his primary moral values, 4 HWe possess, therefore", he 
goes on, "in the moral consciousness a firm standing ground 
"from which we can hope to rise to the certainties of religion 
340 2 ) p. 342. ~ ~""~~
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"And it is of vital importance for the theologian that he 
"should clearly recognise this character of selfsufficiency 
"attaching to our moral knowledge 1*. "Here then is firm 
"standing ground on which the man of faith may build his 
"soul's house and the theologian his system. If only the 
"foundational affirmations of religion can be made as
"certain as are our basic moral values, there will be few
2) "indeed who will ask for more".
V
Having thus affirmed the a priori character of the 
moral consciousness and therefore the validity within ex­ 
perience of all moral values, Professor Baillie goes on 
to pave the way for a secure foundation also for religion 
and religious values. He is obliged to make this transition 
because morality and religion cannot be equated,in-as-much 
as the latter deals with a reality not directly given in 
the moral consciousness itself. In this demand he accepts 
the leadership of Kant who saw that the moral imperative of 
duty contained implications which inevitably led on to some­ 
thing more than is immediately given in moral experience, 
into a further awareness of a reality from which the claim 
derives, an f is f behind the 'ought 1 , "Our values refuse to 
"hang in a permanent state of suspension in the thin air
*
"of the idealj rather do they, as soon as apprehended, de- 
"mand a cosmic setting for themselves; or indeed they weave 
"for themselves a cosmic setting out of their own substance, 
"or, to change the metaphor, they unfold out of themselves a 
(1 p.343 (2 p.345
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"scaffolding -that reaches down to the world of reality,
judgement "For/tEe form ! I ought,' though indeed it is the very root
"and type of immediate and certain knowledge, has neverthe­ 
less never appeared capable of standing by itself in 
••isolation from same kind of context in the reality to which 
"the 'I 1 in question belongs", p. 346. The moral con­ 
sciousness therefore leads us on to the affirmation of 
same kind of ground and source of it in the real order. 
When we ask of what nature is this transition from morality 
to reality - this 'leading on', Professor Baillie is not 
quite sure what answer he will give. He says that "the 
"mental process concerned is undoubtedly of the nature of 
"inference" and yet he adds with the same breath, that it
is not a real inference "like a conscious piece of deductive
1) "reasoning still less anything like argumentation". Indeed
we seem here to be quite at the opposite pole from anything 
of that kind. The truth is that, under the long tuition of 
moral experience.the consciousness of the moral claim comes, 
by an almost imperceptible transition of thought, to be inter­ 
preted as an awareness of a Divine Reality. The process is 
not really a passage from believing in duty to believing in 
something else,but is much rather a passage from one way of 
reading the meaning of duty to another way of reading it. 
For what religion does is just to give a deeper meaning to duty, 
a deeper significance to our values. Moreover we cannot
think that man is ever at any stage without some dim con-— __ — „« — _«,•—« — » — -. — — «. — -. — «-••••-•••-••—— — — • — -.
1) p. 348
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sciousness or premonition of this deeper meaning. The seed 
of religion is in every man's heart, ....... "and the slow
"growth of a firmly established faith in the soul of the 
"earnest seeker is perhaps more than anything else the 
"gradual dawning of the realisation that in believing (as 
Hhe has all the time believed) in duty he has been believing 
M in more than he thought ".p. 348.
There is therefore implicit in the moral judgment, 
logically bound up with it, a reference to a system of 
reality which takes us beyond the world of moral conduct, 
"Normally this system is not present to consciousness in 
"any explicit way, yet in some real sense it is latentlyi) ~~
"contained in the conscious judgment w . How this wider
t
expeifence is gained and how the moral life is and always
A
has been directly associated with the world of reality, with 
the Divine order, Professor Baillie is unable to tell. Our 
psychological Knowledge, he thinks is inadequate to help us 
out* For this purpose we would require a much deeper 
insight into the workings and nature of mind than we 
possess. "Now it may be difficult to know what psychological 
"account we are to give of this 'implicit 1 existence in an
"intuition of a system which reflexion afterwards reveals to
2) 
"have been its logical basis from the beginning". After
quoting Mr. Bradley approvingly that this implied system is 
a system of what the latter calls 'my station and its duties' 
he goes on to plead that the system is wider than the social 
1) p.349 2) p. 349.
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or merely human, which at most is but a fragment of the 
world in which we live and move and have our being. "We 
tt come to see that what the voice of conscience actually 
"does say is something more like this:- "The very heart and 
"nature of things, the most ultimate reality that there is, 
"demands that I be pure and true and tender and brave". 
"Ho obligation can be absolute which does not derive from 
"the Absolute ". p. 350
Having reached this point in his effort to span the 
chasm separating morality from religion,, Professor Baillie, 
although he knows himself to have begun from the side of 
the moral consciousness, is not quite sure whether he has 
not been drawing supports for his bridge from the side of 
religion also. In any case when he is only half way across 
he begins to tremble on account of the inability of his moral 
buttresses to get him right across to the other side. He is 
dimly aware of the inadequacy of the moral consciousness to
get him over at all. But he will not avoid the issue for
over 
he must get/somehow from his own particular side, using
only materials he has deliberately chosen and which all 
along he defends and wishes to prove sufficient for his 
purpose. "Setting out from the knowledge, which is the 
"essence of morality, that 'right is right though the 
"'heavens fall* it has arrived at the faith that because 
"right is right the highest Heaven will not fall or fail; 
"and that is the essence of religion", p. 351
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He is across Jordan, then.,and in the Promised Land, "but 
he is honest enough to admit that his bridge is not con­ 
strue ted, and that he has only jumped across by a sheer act 
of Faith. "But does this mean, he asks, that the truth of 
"religion is capable of rigid logical demonstration? Does 
"it mean that by a simple process of argument we can show 
"the truth of it to be implied in certain ethical facts
"which are themselves too fundamental to admit of being
1) 
"questioned? " in his answer Professor Baillie unwittingly
calls to his aid the religious consciousness itself . 
"Such proof as there can be is no more than a drawing out 
"into more consciously deductive and sylJogi^ic form of the 
"thought-process that is always present in religion itself".
"The most we can do is to bring religion's own logic into
2) "sharper detail". This logic of religion he expresses thus:
"IShat faith, when squarely interrogated seems centrally 
"to insist upon is that in our consciousness of duty, or of 
"ultimate values, there is contained an authentic intimation 
"of the nature of the system to which we belong; and hence 
"the only proper apologetic for religion is that which sets 
"out the logic of this insistence. Perhaps there is no
"better way of setting it out than the very simple one of 
"asking what else it can mean to say that I 'must 1 do this 
"or this, except that the nature of things demands that 
"I can do it. Can any possible meaning be attached to 
"absolute obligation, or to ultimate value, if these are
"conceived as having no sanction in the all-enclosing system? 
1) p.351 2} p. 351
106.
•'If I am right in feeling that it is absolutely demanded 
"of me that I be pure in heart and just and honourable in 
Mall my dealings,then can this mean less than that reality 
"demands these things of me? and if reality demands these 
"things of me, then reality must be interested in moral 
"value; it must have a stake in the moral issue; it 
"must be on the side of the good and against the unworthy 
"and the evil. But that is to say that it is a moral 
"Being itself, not indifferent to moral distinctions, but, 
"on the contrary, supremely sensitive to them and really and 
"deeply caring whether good or evil prevails. The ultimate 
"reality must thus be One who loves the Good". p«(352).
But ha* Professor Baillie in the course of his argument 
passed from the certitude of the moral consciousness ,which 
to Mm is axiomatic and a priori, to equal certitude concerning 
the moral character of reality which religion affirms and with 
which it primarily deals? That he has passed from morality 
to religion in his thought is beyond question. The ethical 
nature of ultimate reality, the fact of a Lawgiver, 
behind the iaw, the existence of a Being who takes side^in 
man's moral struggle are clearly affirmations of the 
specifically religious mind. But are they reached in the 
way Professor Baillie makes out? Does the moral consciousness 
per se provide a basis for such a superstructure,and if so, is 
the building as firm throughout as the foundations upon which 
it rests? He is willing to admit that morality demands
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religion for its completion, that ideals are suspended in the 
void unless they are justified at the bar of Reality,but 
he insists nevertheless that the root of the assurance of 
such a real universe as will guarantee the conservation 
of all ethical values is to be found in the moral conscious­ 
ness itself. Indeed he tries to evolve that assurance from 
the imperative of duty. But why, if the moral consciousness 
is itself able to furnish an implicate to guarantee the 
objective validity in reality of its own values is it 
necessary to call in religion to its aid to provide the 
required moral universe? Why does not morality provide its 
own guarantee throughout, both the certainty of a moral 
universe as well as the imperative of duty? This of course 
it cannot do so long as it remains itself, a consciousness 
of obligation to obey the voice of duty, for duty's sake, 
and nothing more. Acknowledging this deficiency in the moral 
ideal there are two ways open to us to seek its completion. 
The one way is to find it in the religious view of the world 
given in consciousness independently,or else logically 
antecedent >to the moral imperative. The other is to make 
the moral imperative yield the assurance religion gives 
concerning the moral nature of reality. In the former case 
morality would be logically dependent on religion as an 
original evaluation of reality; in the latter religion would 
would be an appendage of the moral life, something added 
on to complete what is otherwise insufficient,though so far
io8.
as it goes, perfectly valid. Following Kant it is the latter 
course which Professor Baillie adopts. When however we 
follow him in his method of transition he wants to gain for 
religion the same objective validity as the moral imperative 
possesses. To do this he makes the moral consciousness yield 
from its very-bosom as it ". were > a*1 *1 no "t ^v a process of 
inference or argumentation, direct contact with tfc« ultimate 
reality itself. In doing this however he is aware that 
morality is morality no longer. It is religion,and it is 
of the logic of religion that he speaks when he affirms the 
moral character of the cosmos. But obviously the religious 
evaluation he has thus gained is not in anyway derived from 
the consciousness of duty for duty's sake, the knowledge 
of right and wrong. The assurance of a moral universe, 
of a Divine worid,is gained by him»not by an analysis of the 
moral consciousness in the Kantian sense of duty for duty's 
sake, - which in any case must be to some extent indifferent 
to the ultimate nature of Reality - but by reading into 
morality an awareness of a Divine Reality not given to the 
purely moral consciousness itself. If it be that only by 
religion's own logic the objective moral universe is discovered 
to guarantee the moral life, why try to make out that the very 
logic which is religious is nevertheless but an implication 
and no more of what to consciousness is merely moral in nature? 
Either morality needs religion to complete itself^ or it does not. 
If it does, then religion provides a valuation of the world
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not given in the moral consciousness and therefore not 
derivable from it. If it does not, then there ought to be 
no need to seek for more in the awareness of duty and the 
nature of moral values than that awareness provides. 
Although Professor Hail lie sets out with the statement that 
"moral knowledge is anterior to religious knowledge" and 
that"the certainty of conscience is logically prior to the 
"certainty of faith", he soon finds himself irresistibly 
though perhaps unwittingly, affirming that what the voice 
of conscience actually does say is: "The very heart of and 
"nature of things, the most ultimate reality that there is, 
"demands that I be pure and true and tender and brave 11 . 
Although he starts off with the belief that "we possess in 
"the moral consciousness a firm standing ground from which 
"we can hope to rise to the certainties of religion", and 
proceeds to throw his bridge across from the one to the 
other, he nevertheless admits later that "No obligation can 
"be absolute which does not derive from the Absolute" which 
must mean that only religion itself can guarantee the 
validity of moral obligation. But if morality requires 
the sanction of religion,what becomes of the self sufficiency 
of the moral imperative of duty upon which religious faith 
itielf is to rest, and how can religion be based on morality 
if morality needs for its enforcement what religion alone can 
provide? Professor Baillie even admits that what religion 
does is to give a deeper meaning to duty, a deeper
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significance to our values, but if so, religion must be a 
more fundamental feature of consciousness than morality, and 
must spring from a supra-moral root, in human nature. "When 
he also goes on to admit that "the seed of religion is in 
Hevery man's heart" and that in believing in duty the earnest 
seeker has been believing in more than he thought, Professor 
Baillie is obviously employing categories of thought which in 
no sense can be derived from the moral consciousness, and he 
clearly contradicts the very thesis he sets out to establish 
namely, that the certainty of religious faith is based 
ultimately on our consciousness of moral values.
That Professor Baillie is led to make the religious 
consciousness confer an added validity on morality, at the 
very time when his object is to show how religious certainty
must be based on the moral consciousness, is sufficient proof
%
that morality itself though a priori as a categorical im­ 
perative* does not cover the whole of human nature. It is 
a partial aspect only, and must be supplemented by other and 
equally fundamental reactions of the human mind to the sum 
total of life's environment. Although it may be true that 
morality cannot be evolved from non-moral elements, and is 
therefore an original endowment of mind,&nd an essential 
characteristic of Reason ,it may yet be illegitimate to 
treat the moral consciousness in the strict sense as a 
sufficient or the only ground upon which the nature of 
reality is made known to us. The facts of morality are
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doubtless of supreme worth both for philosophy and theology 
in their attempt to systematise experience and interpret 
ultimate reality. We certainly cannot argue cogently about 
the nature of the world and leave moral experience on one 
side. Any such omission would at once invalidate our method
•
no less than our conclusions. From the point of view of the 
metaphysician, however, the real trouble about the moral 
consciousness is, not that it does not lend valuable, and 
indeed priceless aid,but that it does not take him far enough 
into the heart of reality,but leaves on his hand new 
difficulties and perplexities created by the moral life 
itself. In the words of Professor Galloway "on two 
"grounds the ethical consciousness requires to be supplemented 
"and completed: it can neither guarantee the persistence 
H of its values, nor can it state the ultimate Good in a 
"finally satisfying form".
It is the merit of Professor Baillie f s discussion 
that he sees clearly that this deficiency must be made 
good, not by a process of inference or argument or reflexion. 
Something more is required than a deeper speculative insight 
and dialectical acumen. "What is wanted is a new transubjective 
path along which the ethical character of reality itself may 
be intuitively grasped, and communion established through
1} Phil, of Religion - p. 202.
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immediate experience, a communion not altogether independent 
of the moral life but still capable both of anticipating
•
and transcending ordinary moral relationships. It is this 
direct intuition of ethicil reality that the religious 
consciousness provides, and it is because of this that 
religion is something sui generis and expresses an original 
endowment of the reason in no way implied, however we 
interpret that word, in the awareness of duty, and the
distinction between right and wrong in conduct. Religion
with
is thus not to be identified with philosophy, or/the con­ 
scious effort of the discursive, understanding to explain 
ultimate reality. The way religion completes morality, is 
not by providing a new dialectic, but by cutting an entirely 
new way into direct experience of the absolutely good 
which morality is impotent to reach. Religion has its 
own logic therefore, as Professor Baillie perceives, but it 
is not the logic of the moral consciousness any more; it 
is the logic born of another order of experience and a 
quite different power of reason. It is the logic of the 
religious consciousness, of the awareness of a divine 
meaning discoverable in concrete experience of the real. 
The persistence of moral values and the true nature of 
the ultimate good - the two demands which, according to 
Professor Galloway the moral consciousness , in spite 
of its alleged certitude, cannot meet, are guaranteed, by
religion. They are not guaranteed by philosophy working
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exclusively on moral data. Philosophy can only guarantee 
them if they are already in some measure facts of experience. 
But it is only in religion that they are facts, and religion 
attains them "because self-consciousness is richer in its 
capacity for evaluating and experiencing reality than is 
discoverable in the moral imperative of duty. "The 
"problems raised by ethics find their solution in Religion
"and it shews that the inner connection of the two comes^
"to light. For the religious consciousness states explicitly 
"the implications of the moral consciousness; it affirms the 
"reality of an ultimate Good in the form of a supreme and 
"personal will, who is the Ground and End of the natural 
"and the spiritual order of things. The God who is ethical 
"Ground of the world guarantees the validity and persistence 
"of the ethical values; and it is in and through man's 
"relation to God, the perfect Good, that the ethical ideal 
"can be transcended and completed. The moral end cannot 
"be stated in an absolute form because morality itself is 
"not absolute and final: it is a phase of spiritual life 
"which points beyond itself and comes to its goal in 
"riligion. And the goal to which religion points is supra- 
Mundane, a transcendent realm in which man's moral endeavour
"passes into a higher fulfilment, into communion with the
1) 
"Source and End of all goodness".
1) Galloway - p. 202-203. cp. F.H.Bradley, Ethical Studies p.314
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This is a clear and valid statement of the relationship 
between morality and religion. Religion is not to be derived 
from morality; it stands in its own right as an activity of 
self-consciousness that cannot be resolved into moral elements. 
But Professor Galloway deals with both religion and morality 
in the interest of philosophical construction and is not 
here concerned with the question how the religious view of 
the world arises,or in what way religion reaches this 
assurance of the ultimate Good. That its nature and growth 
are possible only in organic relationship with morality he 
readily admits, as indeed does Professor Baillie, but the 
admission that religion is other than morality and reaches 
reality in a different way is an important acknowledgment 
which must not be overlooked.
That religious experience of Reality, an awareness that is, 
of the spiritual and divine which gives rise to religious 
values independently of the moral, is primitive and original, 
is now a commonplace of anthropology. This Professor Baillie 
freely admits, "For the savage cannot but be aware of the 
"larger background against which his life is set and of which 
whis fate is for the most part determined. He cannot help 
"regarding himself as a fragment in a larger scheme of things . 
"NO race known to history has been entirely without faith in
a possible interest, on the part of some superhuman agency,
n 
in our mortal weal and woe. There the modern Christian
theist joins hands with the rudest of his ancestors. Where
he differs is only in the way in which that agency is
conceived by him", (p. 321). If this is so then all 
discussion of the nature of the religious consciousness and 
the values it finds and creates must keep steadily in view 
this primitive and independent character of religion to 
which history bears witness. That science, morality, and 
art have played a big part in religion's growth and 
purification must not hide from us the fact that religion ;, 
as we know and live it,is still at heart and in all its 
potency and revelational quality something that is not 
completely accounted for by knowledge of nature, morality 
and Beauty which the sciences furnish. The ePJLs/temology 
of the soul is not exhausted along these lines of approach 
to reality. Human experience contains revelation of truth 
which is not derived from any one of them separately nor 
from all of them together. Christian theism may owe much 
to physics, ethics and aesthetics but it certainly does not 
owe all it possesses. Its foundation at least,and also its 
coping stone, are given by religion and every stage in its 
progress owes something to the intuitions of the religious 
consciousness. It may be that at the present moment our 
failure to make headway in theistic reconstruction is due to 
our lack of understanding concerning the character of the 
insight which religion can produce and the certainties which 
lie hidden at its heart. We have trusted too much to the
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sciences to control our metaphysics in the belief that religion 
is completely covered by science morality and art. What if 
religion after all, because it has its own secret approach 
to the ultimate reality, has also its own logic which alone 
is adequate for philosophy, and which is necessary to reinforce 
or supplement the logic of the sciences which so frequently 
breaks in our hands? Not infrequently, when other armour 
fails us, such a xogic is called in to help us out, but 
weak is the effort put forth to unravel its mystery and 
make it glow with its own light. Perhaps not until this 
is done shall we meet with greater success in our reading 
of the nature of ultimate reality.
CHAPTER VII 
PROM PSYCHOLOGY TO EPISSEMOLOGY.
There are at least two ways in which the psychology of 
religion can view its main task. On the one hand, because 
religion always deals with the ultimate Reality or God, it 
may seem to he the business of the psychologist to lay bare 
the avenues along which the supernatural enters the soul, 
tracing its operations as a determining factor in human 
experience. Accepting his problem in this sense the psycholog­ 
ist will naturally call to his aid the witness of the 
saints of history, of all abnormal religious souls who may 
have had strange experience, as well as the testimony of the 
ordinary devout man. In particular he will turn to the great 
mystics and will scrutinize carefully their writings as classical 
expressions of the working of the spirit of God in human life. 
Religious experience, on this reading, will be taken in its narr­ 
ower connotation and the presupposition of the method will be 
that God reveals Himself directly to the individual soul. 
Religious experience is experience not merely of God but experience
engendered by Him directly and therefore providing clear eviden 
His presence and reality.
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When the task of religious psychology is accepted 
in this way the enquiry tends to be dominated by the 
psychologist's own theological or scientific prepossessions. 
The the1st, e.g. will proceed to his analysis in full faith 
that what the mystic says is in the main true, that he has 
experienced contact with God and that God is as real in him, 
as his own hands and feet. The materialist, however, though 
interested in understanding the religious life, so called, 
will proceed to explain it all on the assumption that the 
experience of God is really little more than an illusion due 
to certain psychological factors, which he is able to point 
out and explain. When the problem of the psychology of 
Religion is thus understood it is difficult to avoid 
extreme positions, involving a whole metaphysic of reality to 
the neglect of psychology's main business and more humble method.
f
The second, and as we think the more profitable way of 
reading the problem of religious psychology is to view 
religious experience, not exclusively as something inexplicable 
apart from the hypothesis that God Himself enters directly 
into the soul, or as an experience obviously God-created, but 
as essentially an evaluation natural to man, of the world 
sutfspecie divinitatis an evaluation in and through which the soul 
is aware of God as the indwelling spirit and power, sustaining 
both the world and the soul in their intercommunion.
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Here God is not the object, so to speak of the 
religious consciousness in the ordinary sense of object 
as distinguished from the subject of cognition. God is rather 
the over-arching reality, or* over-soul 1 as Emerson would say, 
which is experienced along with gnithrough our experience of 
the^world outside. God is a factor of experience not 
independently of the world which is always with us^nrough 
the medium of that world when the soul is able to view it in 
a certain light which v;e know as the light of religious faith. 
The problem of the psychology of religion is then not first 
of all to decide whether God is found in experience in a 
unique and exclusive way independent of and outside the world 
altogether »but whether our experience of the world is at 
heart also an experience of God, whether, in fine, the world 
and our experience of it does not imply an awareness of God, 
in any case, as something inescapable and therefore positively 
real. Putting the problem in this way we are able to avoid the 
departmental view of the soul^and we bring religious experience 
into organic relationship to every other form of experience. 
We also keep the religious consciousness close up to the real 
world,and we avoid the temptation to lift God and our awareness 
of Him above the flow of the all encircling reality of which 
we ourselves form a part, and which enters into the context 
of all experience whatsoever, Although in religion God is 
spoken of as the object of worship,we cannot in strictness 
reduce even the God of religion to the limitations of ordinary
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objectivity. God cannot be an object of perception,as the sun 
or any physical thing, nor is God for religio/n an object of 
thought merely. Religion is neither idolatry nor philosopj^. 
The God of religious experience is more than object and more than 
idea* He ia reality experienced in and through our conscious­ 
ness of th* world of objects, when we view that world as 
baring a spiritual significance, both sub specie- divinitatis 
and also, if our religion be mature - subspecie aeternitatis. 
In religion God has, after all, something of the character 
of the Absolute, in that He appears in experience only at the 
point where the subject - object, relationship becomes partly 
transcended in the soul's communion with the world illumined 
by the eye of faith* But never in religious experience does the 
Soul cancel out the world, except perhaps at the point of its 
highest illumination* Whether it be through the contemplation
of Nature, or the ordinary affections of human life, or through
in this sense 
history, God is for finite experience/ always mediated. The
psychology of religion has to deal therefore not with an 
exclusive experience of God direct or immediate, however 
specific the experience may be in itself, but with the experience 
of the world and life in which more than the world and more 
than human life is present, an experience of these which 
sets them in spiritual and divine relationships, and sees
them all transfused with a significance and a glory that is
but
not transcient/abiding, not physical merely but spiritual, 
not temporal but eternal. This is a more concrete quest than
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the endeavour to find the hand of God touching life directly 
in the individual soul. The method of the latter must be 
the Elimination of every 'natural 1 factor^and the attribution 
of the residuum to divine agency, - a very unsatisfactory 
procedure indeed. We could never be sure that we had ruled 
out all possible f natural 1 explanations of religious experience. 
If however we adopt the concrete path of concrete experience 
and trace the characteristic values which the religious outlook 
discovers in the world and life, and show how they affect all 
other values and how these are all given a supersensible 
setting by religious faith,we shall be better able to give 
religion its true place and more likely to discover the equal 
validity of its valuations with those on other levels of 
experience. Religious psychology is not confined to the study 
of mysticism on the one hand as with ieuba, nor to abnormal
souls ( on the other as with James and the Freudians. Its
in 
main task is with the normal commonplace folk who/their
religious lives seem to be exercising themselves along lines 
ordained for them by the constitution of their minds and can 
do no other, to whom God comes in divers forms and in divers 
ways and who see,as by an inner necessity ,though perhaps f dimly 
enough,all things in God and God in all things. In this chapter 
we will follow the more concrete method and consider religious 
experience as a constituent of experience in its wider range.
Let us begin with a statement from Prof. Galloway. "However 
"valuable the psychological study of religion may be, w says
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Prof. Galloway* "the facts themselves hardly allow us to 
"rest at the psychological point of view. The tendency will 
"always be for those who examine-religious experience to draw 
"conclusions, expressed or unexpressed, on religious truth.
•Religious experiences, in point of fact, do not come to us, 
"in a perfectly pure form, so that they can be reckoned as
w {
•immediate data. Here as elsewhere the psychologist finds
•that presentations and representations, facts and meanings
•cannot be separated by a hard and narrow line. A
•psychology of pure presentations or facts is not practicable;
•for psychical facts are more than bare events; being facts
•for a self-conscious mind,they possess meaning and involve
«
•inference. It is because religious experiences are more
•than mere events that they acquire spiritual significance and 
"value, and play a part in the religious life". In this 
passage Professor Galloway faces up to the crucial difficulty 
of religious psychology* TJfeie borderland between the psychology 
and the metaphysics of religion is very treacherous territory 
at the present time and until some more exploration has been 
undertaken thejpe is small promise of any real advance. It is 
notorious that the psychologists are finding it difficult, 
when dealing with religious experience, to keep to their own
i
peculiar domain* Hot satisfied with prosecuting their own 
science they insist on passing beyond its province to pass 
judgment on the truth of religious ideas and beliefs. Although 
as psychologists they theoretically accept the rule of detached
1) Philosophy of Religion , pp 253-4.
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and disinterested observers, taking religious experiences as 
a series of psychic facts to be examined and correlated in the 
interests of science, they cannot or will not stop at 
scientific generalisations concerning the working of the 
religious mind. They irresistibly pass over beyond the 
limits of science and pronounce on the objective validity 
of religious judgments* In the study of religion our 
psychologists are almost all metaphysicians* Those who 
disagree with their conclusions are never tired of pointing 
out to them their trespass, declaring that religious 
psychology ought to leave questions of the truth of religion 
alone, not only because psychological knowledge is not 
advanced in that way,but because the weapons of science, even 
of psychology, are quite inadequate for the higher tasks of 
metaphysical enquiry* But the rebuke goes unheeded and the 
psychologists persist in their waywardness as if in spite of 
themselves, Ftrhaps Professor Galloway is right, as we shall 
presently see that he is, in pointing out that in religion, the 
facts themselves hardly allow us to rest at the psychological 
point of view.
To return to the passage quoted above, Professor Galloway 
is insisting on two important but quite distinct considerations* 
In the first place he reminds us of the difficulties the 
religious psychologist has to contend with, difficulties due 
to the nature of his subject matter* Religious experience. 
he points out, is never pure fact as it comes to the notice
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of the investigator. It is fact plus interpretation and infer­ 
ence. When he comes to relate his experience the religious 
man finds it difficult to differentiate between the experience 
itself and his own theological and mental predisposition. 
In his account, presentation and representation,fact and 
meaning are intermingled, and, more important stilly the 
experient's own intellectual beliefs and personal history colour 
and determine his experiences in a real way, entering as it 
were into their very texture. The psychologist is seldom 
therefore, able to get at the facts, as they-appear in so 
called pure experience, Already they are clothed facts, 
interpreted events ,whose meaning is given along with them* 
The psychologist is obliged therefore to look critically into 
his data and endeavour,as best he can,to sift fact from 
meaning, event from interpretation.
This however is not the crucial difficulty facing the 
student of religious experience. For even were it possible to 
get behind the individual's own interpretative falsification of 
his experience would we then come up against 'pure 1 experience 
and bare fact? Would the psychologist then be faced with 
immediate, unsophisticated data upon which to base his 
induction? One thing is quite certain * and this, is the 
very important second point in the quotation from Professor 
Galloway - the fact would not be a bare fact, or event in the 
natural sense. It would be a 'fact 1 plus 'meaning', and the 
meaning would be the biggest and most important element in the
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Experience as a fact. There is no event for a self-conscious 
being which we can speak of as a bare event. Experience 
never gives mere facts; the facts are always facts with a 
definite meaning, a meaning that itself constitutes the fact, 
and apart from which the fact would not be what it is. The 
presence of meaning as the essence, or core of the fact^so to 
speak, is a characteristic of all experience* For psychology 
therefore the data to be studied are not quite like the 'facts 9 
which are the subject matter of the physical sciences. The 
fact here is a concrete experience of an individual mind, 
and experience,as Prof. Ward insists in his 'Psychological 
Principles'* always implies the duality of subject and object, 
in which the experient is aware of the presented object. This 
duality within every psychic event must be respected in 
psychological analysis of experience, KBither the subjective 
side of it,nor the objective,taken in abstraction, constitutes 
the 'fact* or datum for psychology but always the concrete 
experience as a whole, including both the act of awareness and 
the content of which the individual is aware, cognition and the 
thing cognised* To sunder experience into two, and, taking one 
side of the duality, treat it as a psychic fac t to be investi­ 
gated in independence, is a fruitful source of confusion, as 
Prof* Yard points out* It turns duality into dualism*
Psychic facts, just because they are facts within the 
individual's experience, possess a character very different from 
the physical facts with which the ordinary sciences deal*
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There are for the psychologist no 'objects' in the strict 
sense to study in the same way as there are for the physicist. 
The elements of experience are not psychic objects in any real 
sense* because self-consciousness which is the bearer of 
experience is itself the condition of all objectivity* when 
experience,within which objects arise, is investigated it is 
plain that we cannot treat the whole vnk psychic fact as if it 
were an object and nothing more. The object here is but a 
part of the fact and the part must not be treated as if it were 
the whole* The objective fact alone is not the whole, but that 
object as it is held and evaluated within the experiences an 
experience which is always the experience of an individual 
self-conscious being. Prof. Ward insists that the empirical 
psychologist cannot imitate the procedure of the natural or 
objective sciences because the two standpoints are entirely 
different* "The language the physicist uses is simply:
•there is this or that - a, b, c, or d. But the psychologist
•cannot by saying: there are such and such presentations or 
"feelings, or movements * as if they were independent entities *
•bring out the characteristics of his own standpoint. To
•this end his statements must (and always do) either explicitly
•or iaplicityly, take the form: The individual experient has 
"such and such presentations, feels thus or thus, and acts 
"in this wise or in that* And this is the 'form of
•
•'consciousness': to eliminate it is to ignore the concrete
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gTrpo yj «»n/»a Of the individual subject altogether,
"and to abolish what is characteristic of psychology; when 
"its 'absolute presupposition* goes, the content is no longer 
"content of consciousness in the psychological sense".
Dp abstract character of psychological method is well 
expressed by Prof. Bergs on. "Psychology, in fact, proceeds 
"like all the other sciences by analysis* It resolves the 
"self, which has been given it, at first in a simple intuition, 
"into sensations , feelings, ideas etc* which it studies 
"separately* It substitutes, then, for the self a series of 
"elements which form the facts of psychology* But are these 
"elements really parts? That is the whole question ,and it is
"because it has been evaded that the problem of human
2) 
"personality has so often been stated in insoluble terms".
When Prof* Ward exhorts us to adapt in psychology the 
viewpoint of the experient and not to handle psychic events 
in a radically objective way, he is saying pretty much the 
same thing as Prof. Galloway* A particular experience as the 
latter asserts ia always more than a mere event. It is an 
event having a definite meaning, a meaning in the first place 
not for the psychologist but for the experient himself. The 
meaning is the iaBgc heart of the psychic fact. It is indeed the 
major constituent of the fact. The 'fact* and the 'meaning 1
"Psychological Principles" p« 23-4. 
"An Introduction to Metaphysics" p. 21.
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of Prof. Galloway must not however be identified with the 
'subject 1 and the 'object' respectively of Prof. Ward. It is 
the experience as a whole including its subjective and its 
objective side that is a 'fact* or an event, and the 'meaning* 
it has for the self-conscious experient covers the whole 
experience likewise. Experience must be accepted therefore in 
its entirety both as a fact and as 'meaning' for these are so 
indissolubly bound together as the subject and the object 
are. If the recognition of the latter relationship is . 
necessary, for psychology, the acknowledgment of fact and 
meaning is equally fundamental for epistemology. For 
psychology then let us repeat, the duality of subject and 
object is an essential, the essential and basic feature of 
experience; concrete experience implies the subject - object 
relationship. The object, the content of conscious experience 
must in psychology be dealt with always as a constituent 
element of a psychic fact,and in strict relationship with the 
subject or the experient. The 'object* must always be the 
'subjective object' within self-consciousness; never the 
'objective object' of scientific investigation. What the nature 
of the object may be outside experience is no concern of 
psychology. It cannot decide the knowledge value of a 
presentation. That is the task of epistemology which enquires 
into the nature and extent of the knowledge of reality which 
experience provides. In 'subjective object', that is, the
object as correlated with the subject in concrete experience must
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not be identified forthwith with the 'objective object 1 of 
physical science, which in any case, is a very elaborate 
mental construction built up on the intersubjective 
intercourse of many minds*
The psychology of religious experience cannot afford to 
ignore this subject-object relationship upon which Prof. 
Ward lays so much emphasis. The object in religious 
experience must be viewed in strict dependence on the act 
of awareness as the content of a concrete experience. If 
this were strictly adhered to there would,in religious 
psychology,be no falling into the temptation of passing 
judgment on the objective validity of religious experience. 
The question of objective validity would not arise,for the 
simple but sufficient reason that the objective factor in 
the experience is but the object within the concrete individual 
experience,and not the object viewed Objectively 1 as in 
physical science. It is of the utmost importance that the 
psychological and the epistemological study of religious 
experience should be carefully distinguished. The mischief 
due to their confusion is more serious in religious than in 
general psychology. If, as Prof. Ward asserts psychology suffered 
in the hands of Descartes and Locke by being burdened with 
epistemological problems ,today the problems of religious 
epistemology is suffering by the attempt to solve them with 
the methodology of psychological enquiry. "The confusion 
l) Cp. Ward: Essay's in Philosophy p.355.
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"between the standpoint of a given experience and the standpoint 
"of its exposition", a confusion "to which no other science 
"is liable except psychology and the sciences dependent upon 
"it", is still prevalent in religious psychology. 'Facts' 
and 'meanings' are taken together and discussed as if they 
were 'just* facts in the objective sense of the natural science,. 
To strike the delimitation between psychology and 
epistemology is as important for epistemology as it is for 
psychology - particularly the e.plptamlogy of religion.
"In Bpistemology"says Prof. Ward "objective we may say, 
"means so much of experience as is common property, and sub­ 
jective so much as is private property* In psychology
"'subjective' refers to the owner and 'objective' to the
2) 
"property that he owns". To turn the object into common
property is to transcend the point of view of individual concrete 
experience. It is to think of it as a thing standing in its 
own right and independently of the apprehending subject. It 
belongs to the transubjective order of reality the reality with 
which physics and the other natural sciences deal. When this 
object is reached and its nature discussed we have passed 
beyond the realm of psychology.
It is important to note however that when the object 
of experience has thus become common property it has not cut 
its moorings within psychic experience. The object is still 
a thing owned and its reality is not independent of mind which
perceives it .(pmmon property is still property. True
l) Ward: Psychological Principles p. 19 
Hold p. 18
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objectivity in knowledge is not independence of mind,but' only 
independence of the individual mind,in so far as, and no 
further than, the individual experience is peculiar and does 
not permit the object to fit into the scheme of public owner­ 
ship* An object is pronounced illusory when it is not 
apprehended alike, and the same character is not ascribed 
to it, by all minds* Only in this sense is subjectivism in 
knowledge condemned. Objective validity is not inconsistent 
with subjectivity but only with subjectivism.
To make matters clearer> let us at this point distinguish 
still more definitely the three ways of handling experience 
known as the psychological, the epistemological and the meta­ 
physical. Psychology takes experience as it is for the individual 
concrete mind in its interaction with the world of objects* 
Whatever is revealed within the subject*object relationship 
be it real or illusory is subject matter of psychology. In 
epistemology although the subject-object relationship is not 
transcended,the individual experient qua individual experient 
is. For now the problem is to find some standard by which the 
individual experient can judge what is objectively real and 
what illusory. It is the attempt to 'socialise 1 property, to 
define what is truly common to all experients and therefore 
objectively valid, and also - seeing that experience alone is 
the giver of reality - objectively real* And yet such common 
property is not to be viewed as if it were real independently of 
the individual minds who possess it. The objectivity demanded
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toy a theory of knowledge is never independence of experience; 
tout only independence of the individual experient qua individual. 
The realm of truth, the system of judgments having objective 
validity,is the creation of many minds and therefore not only 
transcends the individual tout is essentially transubjective 
in character. The objective validity of our judgments is 
established when they attain this universality. And yet we 
cannot proceed to treat the system of objective judgments as 
if it could stand for the whole of reality independently of the 
minds that systain those judgments.
When however, epistemology has done its work of deciding 
the elements of experience that are truly objective and therefore 
universally valid for all minds it leaves the larger task of 
enquiring into the nature of ultimate reality in the hands of 
the metaphysicians. For the ultimate reality comprehends the 
subject and the object, the world of minds and the realm of 
objective fact. Complete reality is given,not at one pole of 
experience the subjective or the otojective,tout within experience 
itself which comprises tooth. Epistemology therefore does not 
give the final answer concerning the nature of the absolute; it 
does not do that even when it decides what judgments are 
objectively valid. What it gains is a half way house only. 
But it is an important point on the way to metaphysics, and 
religion in particular has need of greater certainty than it 
possesses regarding the objective nature of its own evaluation. 
Ho metaphysics can be safe which has not made sure fir8t Of all
'•>.*
that the judgments of religion concerning the world are to be 
taken seriously as having objective worth,at least as great as 
other judgments*
Now, in ordinary perceptual experience there is general 
agreement concerning the character of the objective world* 
The region of common property is extensive and well delimited. 
The epistemological problem as to the illusory nature of ex­ 
perience is not so pressing here, in as much as the objective 
world of concrete private experience is not very different from 
the world of common knowledge. The reality of the objective 
world as it is given in perceptual experience is accepted and 
taken for granted* Generally speaking the objective world is 
very much the same to concrete sense perception as it is for 
thought and public discussion* And yet it should not be for­ 
gotten that in dealing with it as common property as a world 
of objects constituting a realm of reality,it is no longer 
the concrete reality it is to immediate experience* When 
a physical object is considered in itself and is an object 
of thought,as distinguished from immediate experience,we are 
dealing - metaphysically-with an abstraction* Concrete Reality 
is given only in immediate experience, which depends upon the 
subject-object relationship. When the 'subjective object* 
becomes the 'objective object 1 we have passed from concrete 
reality to a metaphysical abstraction and also away from the 
field of psychological enquiry*
Turning now to religious experience we must still hold
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that concrete reality is given only within the subject-object 
relationship* But here it is not so easy, as in ordinary 
experience of the world, to come to an understanding regarding 
the amount of common property to be conceded. The object in 
religious experience, it is contended, is not a reality but 
only an illusion,and illusions are seldom more than a private 
and therefore subjective reality in the epistemological sense. 
Psychologically, of course, the object is conceded to be real 
enough for even an illusion implies the subject-object relation­ 
ship and to that extent is a fact of experience.
But why is the religious object, whatever it may be, 
pronounced illusory? It cannot be because it is merely 
private property, for that it is not* There are not as many 
religious objects as there are subjects. Religion has always 
had a public interest,and men have not singly,but in groups and 
tribes and nations worshipped the same objects* Religious 
objects,and ideas concerning them,are declared illusory on the 
assumption that the character of the world is already known 
independently of religious experience* The world of scientific 
knowledge, we are toId,leavesno room for the world as evaluated 
by the religious consciousness* But what right has the 
scientist to take his own world of physical objects physically 
related as if it were metaphysically real outside the subject- 
object relationship? Our final and only criterion of Reality 
is after all concrete experience,and whatever 'objective 1 
world is constructed to become common property and actually real
135-
that world depends altogether upon its * absolute* presupposition* 
which is the human mind itself. The objective world of science 
is a world of objects declared to be common property, but 
treated as if they were not owned. But owned they are 
nevertheless, and the owners have the disposal of their
propertye
Reality is only given in concrete experience, let us repeat. 
Both the subject and the object are constituent parts of that 
reality. The object must not therefore be taken as equivalent 
to reality, because it is not the whole of the experience. For 
can the experience be viewed merely as an occurrence or event, 
either from the side of the object, or the subject, for the 
experience, as Professor Galloway points out is always more 
than mere fact. It is fact plus meaning, and as a revelat­ 
ion of meaning it is for ever a potential source of new 
knowledge of reality. TO regard experience as an object physical 
or other in the scientific sense, to be looked at and handled, 
is to assume that the world as it is expressed in experience 
can have no other meaning than that which is discoverable 
in the objects given in sensation and perception. 
But experience has many strands and each strand reveals a new 
meaning of the real. The world of scientific knowledge expresses 
only one stratum of reality, and give& us the meaning of 
the world on one plane only. «e are not justified in setting 
up that world of physical objects whose behaviour is mechanically 
determined by natural law as the pattern of reality. Experience
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pronounces jfcfcgt reality to be richer than science reveals it 
and we have no warrant, for delving into concrete experience 
and demandiE that the categories of thought which we employ 
in physical science shall be adequate also to interpret 
the meanings bound up with the facts of the inner life of man. 
For one thing, in concrete experience, the meaning the object 
may possess depends as much on the subjective as it does on 
the objective factor* Interest controls both attention and 
action. But it is not the object only that depends for its 
meaning on the perceiving mind. For self-consciousness, the 
subjective factor, through exalted feeling and conation, 
determines the meaning of the whole experience too,and it is 
the whole experience,and not the object only valuated in a 
particular way,which gives reality, and yet the object does 
share whatever illumination experience achieves,and it may be 
that only through this evaluation of the objective world that 
philosophy can rise to speculative knowledge. We know that 
the truths of religion realised in concrete experience do 
lighten up the universe with a "light that never was on sea 
or land 1* and the soul thus enriched does seem to see into the 
very life of things. "The knowledge of God and eternity 11 says 
Prof. Otto, "and the real value, transcending space and time 
of our own inner being, cannot,even in form,be mixed up with the 
trivial truths of the normal human understanding or the con­ 
clusions of science. In fact the truths of religion ..... are 
altogether bound up with exalted states of feeling". "It is
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"only in exaltation, in quiet enthusiasm, that religious 
"feelings can come to life and become pervasive, and religious 
"truth can only become a possession available for everyday 
*use in proportion as it is possible to make this non-secular
"and exalted state of mind permanent and to maintain enthusiasm
1) 
Has the enduring mood of life and conduct".
Now in religious experience the meaning of it is 
paramount to the experient. As an experience its very esse lies 
in its meaning, the meaning it gives to the world and to the 
life of the individual. It is not novel or peculiar 
situations which account for the insight we call religious. 
Religious meanings are discoverable in perfectly familiar 
and commonplace environment. Whence does this meaning 
arise? It is not due to scientific inference,for very 
unscientific persons possess it, and scientific inference 
could not in any case create it* Sacred objects and rites 
and events have nothing in themselves to mark them out from 
what is strictly secular. They all belong to the order of 
nature but they owe their sacred quality to the religious
mind which concentrates in them the religious meanings it
in 
finds/the world* But whence this evaluation of experience
expressed in sacred rites and objects and events? It is due, 
we believe, to a equality of self-consciousness,deeprooted
1) "Naturalism and Religion" pp. 11-13,
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and fundamental, a quality which is more than feeling, which 
is rather cognitive in character constituting a category of 
thought, a principle of knowledge through which the meaning 
of the world and life,and so of the ultimate reality itself* 
becomes revealed in human experience. As a vehicle of meaning 
it can lay claim to epistemological value. It is one of the 
coloured glasses in the dome of life through which the white 
radiance of eternity affects our finite minds and enters our 
experience. It may even be the only window which is not 
coloured, through which the white radiance itself reaches the 
soul. In any case, as a principle of knowledge its meanings 
cannot be adequately handled by psychological science. There 
may be a branch of psychology dealing entirely with the way 
this meaning affects and works its way through human experience 
but as an instrument of knowledge it takes us beyond the realm 
of descriptive science. Its full implications are 
epistemological and metaphysical and must be metaphysically 
handled. *The final question of the objectivity of religion 
"can only be raised in connection with what Weisse refers to 
as the ultimate grounds of knowledge; and these must 
necessarily involve also the ultimate grounds of Being. Jrom 
the psychology of religion we are bound to go on to the 
epistemology of religion. We must ask what ground we have 
for holding that the beliefs of religion are valid, and that 
its feelings are justified and warranted. The answer to these 
questions constitutes the epistemology of religion; but this
"again in its turn must lead us to the metaphysics of 
"religion, ^e have not merely to consider the relation of 
"religion to the ultimate grounds of knowledge; we have also 
"to relate it to the ultimate grounds of Being, All questions
"as to the validity of knowledge finally merge themselves into
l) 
"the question of the objective reality of its content".
Religion forces this enquiry upon us "by virtue of the 
specific content of its valuations, which cannot be reduced 
to other and lower values, and, although Principal Franks is 
right when he urges the implied metaphysical problem, it is 
the epistemological inquiry that is very urgent, both as a 
deliverance from the limitations of psychology, and as a 
preparation for metaphysical construction.
In religion, then, the meaning is everything, for religion 
takes its rise from the discovery that the earth below, the 
firmament above, and all the romance of human fellowship, yield 
a spiritual and divine significance to the mind of man, and
*
become, to his wondering eyes, as the very garments of God, 
TO the religious man, the meaning of his experience is the 
very heart of it. It is what it means. No account of a 
psychic event in this region can be of any use which does 
not deal with its meaning. The psychology of religion is
l) Robert S. Pranks in "The Metaphysical Justification of 
"Religion", pp, 31-32.
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always finding this out and cannot resist the temptation to 
draw conclusions regarding the meaning and value so clearly 
constituting the very core of the experience itself. 
It feels that unless the nature of this meaning is cleared 
up,psychological knowledge in the sphere of religion takes 
us but a little way* The bigger problem is left on our 
hands,because the accepted meaning is not here so readily 
agreed upon as in natural experience of the physical and 
social world.
CHAPTER VIII. 
A PRIORISM IN RECENT WRITERS.
The position we hare now reached rules out altogether 
the attempt to derive the religious riew of the world 
from aspects of experience which are non-religious, I1 or 
if, as we hold, the world riew which is characteristic 
of the religious consciousness is something primitive and 
fundamental to human nature, the religious evaluation is 
already a factor underlying and colouring, and in some 
sense determining, experience from the first. It will be 
unnecessary therefore, in the light of our guiding prin­ 
ciple, to examine further the efforts that have been made 
to find the origin of religion in some non-religious 
aspects of selftconscious life. Neither the Freudians, 
who derive religion, like everything else> from sex, nor 
Durkhein and the French school of Sociologists, who see the 
origin of all religious beliefs and practice in the gregarious 
instinct, nor those who would find the root of religion in 
the demands put forth by the struggle for existence, will 
delay us in our quest. No doubt religion has made use 
of all the raw material provided by the instinctive basis Of
141.
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life and the conditions of earthly existence in its develop­ 
ment and in the manner of its expression, but the religious 
view must have been already operative independently of life's 
other interests and native tendencies, or at any rate 
concomitantly with these,before it could reveal itself in 
association with them.
Vv'e will turn our attention instead to those writers who, 
while they do not pretend to enquire into the a priori basis 
of religion,and who perhaps, would, if pressed>vote against 
a radical a priorism, yet confess openly that man is religious 
by virtue of his rational nature,and that the religious out­ 
look is ultimately derivable from the essential nature of self- 
consciousness itself. In this chapter we will seek help 
from these upon our way.
We will begin with Professor William James' oft-quoted 
passage, from his 'Varieties'. Dealing with the origin of 
the Greek gods he says that "the whole array of our instances 
"leads to a conclusion something like this: It is as if 
"there were in the human consciousness a sense of reality, 
"a feeling of objective presence, a perception of what we 
"may call * s ome th ing the re'. mo re deep and more general than 
"any of the special and particular 'senses' by which the 
"current psychology supposes existent realities to be0"
"originally revealed". Prof. Otto commenting on this passage
1) "Varieties of Religious Experience" p. 58.
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in a footnote in "Das Heilige,:: sees in it a recognition of 
original faculties of knowledge and potentialities of 
thought in the spirit itself, the existence of which Prof. 
James owing to his empirical and pragmatist stand-point f 
seeks to explain by singular and mysterious hypothesis. 
"But he grasps the fact itself clearly enough" he adds, 
"and is sufficient of a realist not to explain it away". 
Prof. Otto naturally identifies this f sense of reality 1 
with the feeling of a 'numinous* oTaJectjWhich to him is 
a 'primary immediate datum of consciousness* thus finding 
in Prof. James 1 almost casual admission a support to his owni)
a priori doctrine.
In his chapter on "philosophy" James openly admits that 
the philosophy of religion has for its "basis and subject 
matter a definite and immediate religious awareness which 
however he identifies with feeling. Y7ithout such immediate 
experience of the spiritual or 'religious feeling 1 he 
doubts "whether any philosophical theology could ever have 
"been framed. I doubt if dispassionate intellectual 
"contemplation of the universe ,apart from inner unhappiness 
"and need of deliverance on the one hand, and mystical 
"emotion on the other, would ever have resulted in religious 
"philosophies such as we now possess", p., 431.
1) "The Idea of the Holy" p. 10, 11.
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"What religion reports, you must remember, always purports 
"to be a fact of experience: the divine is actually present, 
"religion says, and between it and ourselves relations of 
!lgive and take are actual. If definite perceptions of fact 
"like this cannot stand upon their own feet, surely abstract 
"reasoning cannot give them the support they are in need of. 
"Conceptual processes can class facts, define them, interpret 
"them; but they do not produce them, nor can they reproduce 
"their individuality. There is always a plus, a thisness, 
"which feeling alone can answer for. Philosophy in this 
"sphere is thus a secondary function, unable to warrant 
"faith's veracity ,...." pp. 4|?4-5«
"The study of comparative religion", says Dr. Selbie, 
"and of the psychology of religion has made it more than 
"ever evident that religion is something natural to man, 
"and is not imposed upon him by any extraneous authority, 
"art, or device. It belongs to the very constitution of 
"his nature that his reaction to the universe should find 
"expression in forms which we can only call religious. Man
"is made that way,and can do no other if he is to fulfil
1) 
"his proper bent".
Touching upon the relationship of the religious con­ 
sciousness to the instinctive basis of life Dr. Selbie rightly
1) "Psychology of Religion" p. 2.
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finds confirmation of the fundamental nature of the former 
in the fact that it is able to sublimate the latter. "If 
"there is any meaning at all in the term natural religion, it 
"will imply that religion is closely bound up with the 
"normal operations of human nature ........ Strong instincts
"like those of fear and sex undoubtedly serve to determine 
"the direction of religious emotions and impulses, and it is 
"one of the differentiae of humanity that these instincts 
"should be so used. They are themselves, as it were, merely 
"raw material, and it is the use of them that counts. $he 
"fact that religion is capable of sublimating primitive 
"instincts like those of fear and sex shows clearly enough 
"that it is not all compacted of them, but is something 
"sui generis, and therefore able to use them for its own high 
"ends". p, 13.
And again - "as we have already seen, in the light of
"psychology the term natural religion takes to itself an 
"entirely new meaning ..... It rather implies that religion 
H is now to be regarded as natural to man, an essential element 
"in iiis being. It is his distinguishing characteristic to 
"react to the universe in a religious way. The instincts 
"and tendencies which find their ultimate expression in
"religious ideas and practices,however crudely set forth, are 
"known to be universal and are therefore to .be regarded as 
"rooted in man's nature as such. V/e can therefore no longer 
"see in religion something imposed on man by interested parties
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"priests, medicine men, or even by the pressure of social 
"needs and the herd instinct. It belongs to his iuost intimate 
"self. (pp. 23-24).
"Rather is it the case that man*in the lower stages of his 
"development tends to read nature in religious terms and to 
"ascribe to natural phenomena powers greater than those with 
"which he is himself endowed. The form in which this is 
"done may be determined by the necessities of his group or 
"social life but the thing itself belongs to the very nature 
"of man. Again we have to admit that man is made in this 
"way and can do no other. The earliest expressions of his 
"religious consciousness witness to the fact that it is his 
"distinguishing characteristic so to express himself", p. 36
In his Gifford Xectures on "The Nature of Religion" 
Prof. W.P. Paterson is explicit in grounding religion in the 
mind itself as a natural movement of the human spirit. 
"It seems undeniable that man, whatever may have been the 
"precise factors and stages of his development as a moral 
"being, is now endowed with a moral instinct, in virtue of 
"which he forms judgments and experiences emotions of a 
"special kind, and is impelled to special lines of action. 
"And man, hov.ever he may have acquired them,is certainly 
"moved now by religious tendencies of the instinctive sort .... 
"There is also good ground for saying that this tendency, 
"though in a much weaker and more intermittent form, and 
"operating in large measure below the threshold of consciousness
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Hhas been an important factor in the general human experience^ 
"The age long duration and the world-wide prevalence of 
"religion raise a presumption that it has had a root in human 
"nature, and that man has felt an inward constraint to lift 
"up his eyes to the hills and to set his feet in the way to 
"some Jerusalem", (p. 99)• Using Prof. McDougall's famous 
definition of instinct, Prof. Paterson applies its terms to 
a description of the root of religion: "In virtue of an 
"inmate disposition man has "been determined to pay attention 
"to a class of divine or sacred objects, he has experienced a 
"peculiar emotional excitement,and he has been instigated 
"to act in a characteristic way"* p» 101.
After dealing with Troeltsch and Otto, both advocates
\
of the religious a priori,Prof. Paterson remarks: "The
"doctrine of a religious sense has persisted because there 
"are peculiar facts connected with the religious mind and 
"its working which obstinately continue to force themselves on 
"the attention. The point which seems to me to be best 
"established is that man has a religious instinct which,in 
"its cognitive aspect, is an awareness of the existence of 
"the divine, and in its conative aspect is a godward impulse 
"involving a sense of control by the divine. It also seems 
"to be a just observation that he has a capacity for 
"recognising the divine, which he marks off by a distinct 
"category as belonging to the sacred sphere". Answering the 
question whether these things represent an integral element
148.
of the human constitution, or are adequately accounted for 
by early education and discipline, Prof. Paterson rightly 
concludes that "even if it were true that the individual 
M owed to education the direction given to his sense of 
"reverence, the question would still remain why the family 
"the religious group, and the national community had thought 
"it necessary to provide such a training,and in the last 
"resort we seem to come back to a constraint that has its 
"source in the depths of human nature". (p. 171)•
A different kind of witness to the independent and 
specific nature of the religious valuation,and its origin 
deep down in the mind itself is Dr. William Brown. Con­ 
trasting the religious with other human values he says:- 
"The value experiences of the good the beautiful and the true, 
"are not identical with religious experience,although they 
"are related to it. Religion is not exactly on all 
"fours with them; it is not on the same level, but is 
"on a higher level still. Religious experience arises so far 
"as the individual is facing the totality of existence. 
"The feeling thus aroused, so far as the personality takes up 
"a mental attitude towards the whole universe, is religious 
"experience . \7ithin it the value attitudes are of the 
"utmost importance and we tend nowadays to emphasize the 
"ethical attitude, the appreciation of goodness, duty, 
"obligation in relation to religion. But, if we study it 
"psychologically,we see that there is not always a point to
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"point correspondence between genuine feelings of religioni)
"and genuine feelings of morality".
"There is the level of value but the level of religion is 
"higher than the level of value in the sense that it is more 
"all-inclusive and more face to face -with totality and the 
"innermost mystery of existence. Thus there are aspects, 
"ethical, aesthetic and logical which are all aspects of 
"reality but religion itself is an attitude to reality in its 
"concreteness. The values are important, and it is difficult 
"to conceive religion apart from them. We should probably 
"be right in saying that normal human nature has a religious 
"sense, not in the out-of-date sense of faculty psychology 
"but in the form of a primitive tendency towards the 
"religious attitude to feel the mystery, the beneficence and 
"perhaps the sternness of the spirit of the universe", p.299-30.
This isolating of the religions from the other three 
great values, and the affirmation of its essential independence 
is important as coming from one who is certainly r.ot writing 
ostensibly in defence of religion. So also is his claim 
that there exists in normal human nature an independent 
'sense* as the spring of religion. What Dr. Brown does not 
seem to realise however, is the logical priority of the 
religious attitude to the rest. He speaks as if the religious
1} "Mind and Personality" pp. 298-9•
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values, because they occupy a higher level were outgrowths 
of the other three. This impression of his meaning is 
deepened when he speaks of the religious attitude as being 
towards the totality of the universe In its concreteness which 
seems to rule out the logical priority of religion, Our 
contention is however that although all that Dr. Brown says is 
true we must add that the totality with which the religious 
consciousness deals is strictly relative to the stage of 
intellectual development,and that the true values are them­ 
selves offshoots of the fundamentally primitive religions 
attitude towards the totality of things confronting primitive 
man. At every stage in the development of religion the 
distinctively pious attitude has been towards the totality and 
the ultimate nature of things, but the meaning of totality has 
varied concomitantly with intellectual expansion. If we 
characterise religion in terms of such an attitude, we are
next door to admitting the inclusion of the great trinity
consciousness > 
of values within the religions/ the very thing we are indeed
contending for.
The witness of Baron Von Hflgel, to whom we now turn, to 
the independent reality of the religious consciousness is of 
great importance. In his Essays and Addresses on the 
philosophy of religion he opens his defence of the objectivity 
of religious experience by reminding us that "the data of 
"man's actual experience are subject and object, each giving 
"to and taking from the other, the two and not the one only
i)
"are included within the single human consciousness". "In 
"the endless contacts, friendly, hostile, of give, of take, 
"between ourselves and the objects of all kinds which act 
"upon us, and upon which we act in some degree o»* way, we 
"do not obtain, of ourselves a real knowledge, and of the 
"other things a merely subjective impression as to their 
"mere appearance; but such contacts always simultaneously 
"convey some real experience, some real knowledge, both of
"ourselves and of the objects thus experienced, and indeed
2) "of each precisely on occasion, and because of the other". '
While he finds no difficulty in affirming the "ilo re- than-
>) 
"me rely- subjective "character of the three realms of reality
gained by science morality and aesthetics, calling to his 
aid here such names as Fichte, Windleband and Eucken, he 
admits that in neither of these do we gain 1* a vivid ex­
perience of God as a Distinct Reality, as the Supreme
2)
Subject, as Self-Conscious Spirit." "xiow even with these
"three more- than- simply- subjective worlds we have not, it 
"is true yet reached the self-conscious Spirit experienced by 
^"Religion . But we have thus established important points. 
"Man's general human experience ... reveals intimations and 
"orders of more than merely human origin, truth and range. 
"Man's general human experience, reveals this Trans- subjective, 
"superhuman world in at least three specific forms, on three 
"different sides of his experience. And whether or not there
"be still another legitimate forrn and side of human experience
p. 51 p. 52
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11 a fourth revelation of the trans-subjective superhuman 
"world, which can bring further light and support to those 
"three, it is certain that, having got as far as those three 
"revelations, it is exceedingly difficult for men at large 
"to retain a vivid faith in those three world,^ and yet 
"deliberately to reject the revelation of self-conscious 
"spirit offered to them in Religion". ' Von Hflge^s own 
contention is, as against Fichte this time, that we cannot 
rest in these three orders,and must proceed, if we accept their 
validity to the acceptance also of the affirmations of 
religious experience as equally a revelation of objective 
reality. To refuse to do so ,as Fichte did,is, he thinks 
to fiy in the face of the "now immensely abundant testimony 
"of Religion" and "to confound philosophical thinking and 
"the general idea of religiousness with the specifically 
"religious experiences themselves". "These experiences 
"themselves", he adds, "always present their object as 
"overwhelmingly existent; and, in proportion as spirituality 
"becomes more conscious of its own requirements and more 
"sensitively discriminating, this object is apprehended 
"as perfect self-conscious spirit, as very source of all 
"existence and reality. We may indeed argue against 
"religion, as mistaken in so doing, but that Religion 
"actually does so, and this not in the form of deductive 




Although Von Hflgel speaks of the Religious consciousness 
as providing an original revelation of Reality in contradis­ 
tinction from the three orders revealed in science, ethics 
and aesthetics, he allows a certain religious character also 
to the apprehension of the three "Intelligible Orders", 
His mode of expression also justifies the conclusion that the 
manner in which he thought jj&aamaarixv the mind gained knowledge 
of truth, goodness and beauty is the same as in the case 
of religious experience. His term ! Revelation 1 , which he 
employs to express the agency of knowledge,applies to both 
activities and in the same sense. When he relates the 
'Intelligible Orders' to the divine reality itself reached 
in religious experience he allows to the latter an all- 
inclusive range which comprehends in every way the 
revelations of the former. He does not however proceed to
show in any precise fashion how they may be logically related
t
as expressions of the minds activity working on one and the
same world. It is clear, nevertheless, that what the religious 
consciousness attains takes up into itself the results of all 
knowledge providing not the crown only but the bast and the 
setting as well. Beyond this admission he does not 
unfortunately go.
"In the case of these intelligible orders we have already 
something more or less religious. Indeed the sense of
givenness, of prevenience, of a grace, of something
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"transcendent having in part become Immanent to our human 
"world as a Fact within this factual world, and of this Fact 
"as alone rendering even possible that sense of givenness - 
"all these experiences are already present in the apprehension 
"and affirmation of those Intelligible Orders as truly extant. 
"And yet it is only the specifically religious experience which 
"gives us Revelation at its fullest not only as to Revelation 1 s 
"content but also as to Revelation*s form. For Religion alone 
"brings the vivid revelation of spirit other than the human - a 
"spirit so perfect and so richly real as Itself to be the 
"ultimate, overwhelmingly self-conscious cause of man's very 
"capacity for apprehending It. Nevertheless, such a self- 
Manifestation of perfect spirit, once found and accepted, 
"gives a base, a setting and a crown to all those other 
"self-manifestations of the lesser realities - a base, a 
"setting and a crown which their graduated series, taken as 
"a whole, so greatly requires ,and which indeed it dimly and 
"semi-consciously prepares, yet cannot itself effectuate". ' 
We have to admit, however, that Von HiHgel, in spite of ex­ 
pressions which would justify a contrary interpretation of 
his meaning, thinks of the content of the specifically 
religious apprehension ef the self-conscious spirit itself - as 
due to an act of Revelation from the God side of Reality, so 
to speak, and not to the native constitution of the human 
self-consciousness. Man attains to an experience of God
by an act of Revelation wnich also takes the form of miracle. 
1) pp. 56-7
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Truth, Beauty, and Goodness though in themselves purely human 
achivements are yet revelations, in a sense, but religious 
experience of God Himself is Revelation par excellence, spelt 
with a capital ' R1 . This seems to be his meaning in the 
passage immediately following the last quotation. He goes on • 
"and this same self-manifestation of spirit and the human
"spirit's response to It, render superfluous all attempts,
\
"always more or less hopeless, to construct God a priori, or
"even to demonstrate Him, from the facts of nature and of human 
"life, by any single deductive argument of a strictly constrain- 
"ing force. Because spirit, God, works in our midst and in 
"our depths, we can and v.e do knowri Him; because God has been
"the first to condescend to us and to love us, can we arise
1) "and love Him in return". The a priorism here regarded as
superfluous and ^consistent with his own doctrine is however 
for Von Hugel not the a priorism taught by Prof. Otto or 
that for which we are here provisionally contending. It is 
rather the rationalism of DescaTtes and his school who 
professed to discover in the mind an idea of God, complete 
and adequate to the understanding of the Divine nature, an 
idea present antecedently to all experience and needing 
no a posteriori factors for its actualisation. Such an 
a priori knowledge of God was knowledge gained deductively 
from an analysis of the idea itself. TShat Von Hflgel writes 
of is not an idea of God,but a warm-personal experience of
Him - an awareness of a spiritual Reality directly and 
l) p.57
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intuitively apprehended. Whenever such an experience becomes 
actual it does provide a more sure proof of the Divine 
Reality than any rationalistic proof could "be. Such a 
proof would, as our author states, be quite superfluous. 
Equally would an inductive argument from the facts of nature 
and human j.ife be superfluous and less forceful or convincing.
But the Baron 1 s Claim that God is directly known in 
religious experience in a unique yet certain way whether 
in the form of Revelation or not,is not inconsistent with the 
position that the mind possesses powers sui generis in and 
through which such knowledge becomes possible and without 
which it would not be possible at all not even by Revelation. 
Indeed the fact of Revelation has to postulate some kind of
native capacity of self-consciousness to apprehend God
\
directly and intuitively. A priorisrn of the epistemological
sort,-not the rationalistic, - of Kant, and riot of Descartes* 
does not rule out Revelation as a fact. It only connects the 
Godward side of religious experience with a definite, and 
specific category of thought,predisposing man to view the 
world under the form of the divine,and determing him to associate 
all phenomena with a spiritual background, thus making him 
continuously aware of the divine presence and expectant of 
divine revelation. What can the Baron mean when he speaks of 
God working "in our midst and in our depths", but tne recognition 
of a hidden source of religion knowledge within self-conscious­ 
ness? In such mystic depths revelation and intuitive powers
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of understanding are surely not separable in fact,though they 
may be distinguishable in analysis. Only on this supposition 
can we reconcile to any extent the claims of natural and 
revealed religion. It is true that Von Hi9gei, when referring 
to religious experience "as a vivid revelation of spirit other 
"than human" speaks of that spirit as being M so perfect and 
"richly real as Itself to be the ultimate, overflowingly self- 
Mconscious cause of man's very capacity for apprehending It". 
But here he is referring to religious experience on a 
comparatively mature level of development where no doubt 
revelation appears as a quickening of the powers of the mind 
as well as the unveiling of a spiritual reality. That there 
must always be this subjective expansion of mental powers 
accompanying every new revelation of spiritf no one can deny. 
Objective Revelation must in^ly this subjective expansion 
as its counterpart. To acknowledge this, however, does not 
carry with it the implication that previous to,or apart from 
all objective revelation,the mind is not already aware of God and 
able to some extent to hold fellowship with him. ' If 
Revelation actually creates the capacity for knowledge of God 
one would like to know when such a revelational movement began in 
history. If the Revelation Von Hi2gel speaks of is something 
late and particular and special as e.g. exclusively in Hebrew 
life, then anthropology forces us to believe that religious 
experience, in all its essentia^ characteristics, v/as a fact beyond 
the boundaries of Revelation. If on the other hand Revelation
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merely describes what seems to be a characteristic of all 
truly religious experience, then there is nothing inconsistent 
in maintaining that the mind of man knovrs,i God by virtue of 
a specific religious category of thought of which he is 
possessed in his human constitution, and the fact of Revelation 
as the active operation of God "in our midst and in our 
"depths". Otherwise to use the term f Revelation' with a 
Capital "R" is to introduce a theological and dogmatic 
prepossession into the philosophy of Religion to the initial 
detriment of that philosophy. Moreover, unless the response 
to the self-iLanif estation of Spirit made by the human spirit 
is not due to the native propensity of the mind,it is 
difficult, perhaps almost impossible,to understand how 
such a self-manifestation, producing religious experience, 
should become a base, a setting and a crown, to our knowledge 
and experience of the three "Intelligible Orders" of Truth, 
Goodness and Beauty. More natural and more logical is it to 
search for the cause of this comprehension of the lesser 
realities within the religious experience by an analysis 
of the conditions of knowledge within the mind itself. The 
logical relationships among the categories of thought them­ 
selves may give us the key to this subsumption of all human 
knowledge under the wider roof of religion.
We conclude therefore that Baron Von Hugel 1 3 philosophy of
on its 
Religion is not, even/most narrow interpretation, antagonistic
V
to the doctrine of religious a prioriam but that on its more
159.
positive side,along with a liberal interpretation of its 
spirit, it constitutes a real and valuable contribution towards 
the recognition of a priori roots of religion, as distinguished 
from other values, in the mind itself.
In his "Psychology of Religions Belief* Prof. Pratt 
finds the foundations of religion among the native capacities 
and powers of the soul.
"The belief in God of the religion of Feeling is then, 
"I repeat, a vital rather than a theoretical matter, and 
"like breathing, is an outcome of the needs and demands of 
"the organism, not of the reason. It has its roots deep 
M in the field of vital feeling; its roots go deeper 
"than do those of most of our practical beliefs. It is 
"an attitude towards the universe; our reaction to the 
"stimulus of the whole cosmos. This reflex is determined 
"by no momentary reasoning of the individual; the whole line 
M of his heredity, the whole of his conscious, and of his 
"subconscious personality is involved in it. It is not so 
"much the individual that thinks; the race thinks in 
"him ........and this same religious feeling apart from its
"accidental and purely intellectual accretions, is biological 
rather than conceptual, it is not so much an acceptance of a 
"proposition as an instinct. I do not mean by this that 
"it is an instinct in the technical sense of the term, but 




"Such "belief is ia essence quite independent of argument. 
"Argument is irrelevant to it. The particular formulations 
"that arise from it in order to make it articulate may be 
"refuted ,but the fundamental religious demand and attitude 
"is not amenable to refutation. For it must be remembered 
"that this belief is not the result of an argument based on 
Han emotional experience; it is an immediate experience of 
"belief. It is an organic, a biological matter and hence 
"has a strength and certainty that puts its possessor quite 
"out of the region of doubt. This absolute certainty is 
"characteristic of the Religion of Feeling in all times and 
"in all Creeds". (p. 295).
Although the grounding of religious belief in biological 
soil makes one desire a clearer statement of his meaning 
than Prof. Pratt supplies, these passages do enforce the con-*
tention that the roots of religion go much deeper into life 
than the discursive understanding or the moral consciousness. 
The emphasis here on Feeling, as the main factor in religious 
belief does not rule out all cognitive or conative elements. 
Indeed the conative side is involved in the biological 
reference. The Feeling element is stressed,not in contrast 
either to cognition or conation, but to the analytical reason 
upon which argumentation is based. We are justified, in 
the light of this passage from Prof. Pratt, in claiming him 
also as an important supporter of a priori elements in religious
experience*
Let us now turn to Prof. Alexander. In his second volume 
of Gifford Lectures "Space, Time and Deity" he reaches a 
conclusion not far removed, except in one particular, from 
the position of Von Hflgel. In the following passages he 
speaks not as a metaphysician but as a psychologist. He says:-
"Various emotions enter into the fu.il constitution of the 
"religious sentiment - fear, admiration, self-abasement - 
"but its distinctive constituent is the feeling of our 
"going out towards something not ourselves and greater and 
"higher , than ourselves, with which we are in communion, a 
"feeling whose object is not that of any of these subsidiary 
"or suggesting emotions, nor of any combination of them. Like 
"the other sentiments it is fed from many sources but it 
"gathers around some distinctive constituent of its primary 
"nucleus ......... without this distinctive element a sentiment
"would be a mere composite without its peculiar flavour".
(PP. 374, 5).
"It is impossible to explain the religious sentiment 
"as a composite of various emotions, not specifically 
"religious, which we feel towards God. For this presumes 
"that we can begin with a cognition of God and that towards 
"the object so presented we feel these emotions. The question 
"we have rather to ask is, how is the intellectual notion of 
"God revealed to~us? The fear of the thunderstorm is not the 
Mfear of God, though such fear may be the first channel by
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"which the religious sentiment is provoked. It is merely 
"the feeling that the thunder is terrible. That God is 
"present in the thunderstorm is discovered only in the 
"feeling which is our outgoing towards something or other 
"which works through the thunderstorm or resides therein. 
"That there is this something or other is not the discovery 
"of reflexion. The metaphysical interpretation 
"of deity as that to which the world is tending or any other 
"metaphysical interpretation of God, is as far as possible 
"from being an original discovery of knowledge; it is only 
"possible to reflexion working upon primitive notions already 
"acquired. Even the idea that there is something mysterious 
"which we fear or reverence is never in the first instance 
"a piece of cognition, but is revealed to our wondering 
"response, our uneasy astonishment and curiosity. It is 
"the feeling or emotion which images the object, not the 
"idea which induces the emotion. Ihen we ask how we come 
"by the cognition of God we must answer that, as with love 
"and hate and appetite and aversion, it is because the world 
"itself provokes in us a specific response which makes us aware, 
"no matter in how primitive a form, of God, and this specific 
"reaction is what has been described above as a going out to 
"something in the world with which we are in communion". 
(PP. 374, 5)-
*
The religious sentiment, then, according to Prof.*.
Alexander does not create its object, but finds it. At the
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same time this discovery is something more than a bare cognition 
of,the world of objects; it is a cognition Bade possible by a 
certain emotional response which enriches the cognitire content, 
and gives to the world a new •oaCboabdtooc^toeaning - the specific 
raluation of the religious consciousness*
The idea does not of itself induce the emotional reaction; 
it is the emotional reaction, arising spontaneously, which 
images the definitely religious object, thus discorering the 
divine meaning in the world* Bare, cold, detached cognition 
does not, therefore, discorer God in and through the world; that 
discorery is essentially due to the emotional response. 
"In the developed life, " he adds/cognition and emotion become 
"intertwined so that the cognition may seem to be prior. But 
in our original experience it is the emotion which discovers 
"the corresponding object of cognition", p. 374. whether 
we accept or not Prof. Alexander's reading of the psychological 
Genesis of the religious evaluation, finding the roots of 
it, as he does, in the emotional reaction to cognitive 
apprehension not itself religious at all, his doctrine de­ 
finitely gives to religion a specific psychic origin. The 
religious interpretation of the world is for him a discovery of 
the real in an original way, due to the soul's power of reacting 
peculiarly to the phenomena of nature. It is not the outcome 
of philosophical reflexion upon the world. Indeed philosophy 
itself can only elaborate and make articulate what religious 
experience itself provides; the emotional reaction which leads 
to the discoTery of deity expresses a fundamental aspect
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of the structure of thflt human mind. It is indeed the mark 
of the presence of what he calls the 'Nisus 1 of the world 
within the mind* "The religious appetite of emotion depends 
"upon the whole make-up or constitution of the mind and body, 
"and is the response of it to the whole of reality in its 
"rise towards a new quality." "The whole world with its real 
"tendency to deity stits in us, from the depths of our nature, 
"a vague endeavour or desire which shadows forth its object."
One other quotation will enable us to range Prof* 
Alexander on our side as claiming for religious experience , 
not only the reality of its object and an independent root 
in the, human spirit, but also as providing a faith in God 
which is higher than the faith expressed in Prof. Ho'f fling's 
phrase "The Conservation of values" - the values of Truth, 
Goodness and Beauty.
"The faith of religion was, as we saw, a faith in the 
"existence of deity, not in the conservation of value; and we 
"do not need a faith in the conservation of valuable existence 
"to tell us that we are sustained by something greater than 
"ourselves, for this is an immediate consciousness evoked by our 
"pre-adapted nature by the world of reality itself. But 
"enquiry into the object of faith, God, does show us that 
"deity is in the line of value; and I find myself regretfully 
"expressing dissent from this writer (Hoffding), while seeming
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"to say the same thing, on the ground that he appears to 
"me to do less than justice to the immediately felt reality 
"of God", (pp. 408-9)
One could go on almost indefinitely gathering support 
from other modern writers on the psychology of religion 
to the presence in religion of an element which because it 
cannot be derived from other aspects of experience, must 
somehow be attributed to the epistemological properties 
of the mind itself. Those we have passed in review seem 
to agree^without.however attempting a radical analysis 
of the subjective factors in religious knowledge,in affirm­ 
ing the presence in religious experience of at least five 
features which stamp it as something sui generis and unique.
(a) There is in religious experience a specific nature 
not reducible to,or derivable from, any other single 
or cumulative reaction of the mind to the world.
(b) This specific aatuort is constituted by the character*
(1) of the object which,instead of being something 
finite or partial, is always thought of as the 
1 whole 1 or ultimate Reality.
(2) of the subject as being related altogether 
and in every way to this sum total of the 
universe or God.
(c) The experience is also of the intuitive sort
• gaining direct intercourse with the Divine nature,On 
this rather than on argument is religious belief 
founded.
(d) All other experiences through which aspects of 
Reality are revealed in self-consciousness - the 
"Intelligible Orders" - are somehow comprehended 
by the religious experience or become subsumed 
under it.
(e) The religious evaluation of Reality implied
166.
religious experience grows out of unique but 
fundamental epistemological powers of the mind 
which seem to be ultimate, and all that can be 
said about them, or all that is said about them 
is, that they belong to the mental make up of 
the human personality.
CHAPTER IX. 
OTTO'S DOCTRINE OF "THE HOLY".
Undoubtedly the most important recent contribution 
to the interpretation of religion in terms of a priori 
principles is that made by Professor Rudolf Otto in his 
well known book Das Heilige, "The Idea of the Holy 11 . 
No attempt to deal with the religious a priori can well 
afford to ignore this work. As a contribution to the 
analysis of religious experience it has distinctive and 
original value quite independently of the particular theory 
of religion which it supports. Should a prioriem be 
further developed and gain a more secure place than it at 
present seems to hold in the philosophy of religio^ Professor 
Otto's work will become a permanent landmark in the progress 
of-religious thought.
The Enquiry sets out with the contention that the 
religious life as an experience is'something much richer than 
theological thought is able to express. In theology the 
nature of the Deity is formulated by means of concepts drawn 
from human analogy,concepts which can never express adequately
167.
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the divine object of religious experience. God may be Spirit. 
Reason, Purpose, Goodwill, Power* but these concepts fail to 
convey what God means to the worshipper, Ho rational concepts 
can do justice to the unique nature of Deity. God is the subject, 
of whom we predicate these attributes, but his value for personal 
religion is not covered by these predicates. There is this
rational element in religion, but there is also an irrationalj-s--~
one which is the more profound aspect of it. This contrast 
between the elements in religion which have been singled out by 
analysis and which are expressible in conceptual terms, and the
*
residuum which eludes such analysis and conceptualisation, is the 
key to Prof. Otto's method. The presence of this residuum, which 
he designates the non-rational, in contradistinction to the rational, 
i.e. conceptual, is the most fundamental element in the religious 
consciousness. It has a unique character, and the true nature of 
religion itself is discoverable somewhere in this region of the 
ineffable and the mystical, and it baffles conceptual expression. 
According to Prof. Otto, the particular category df thought under­ 
lying and determining religious experience, is the "Holy 11 . But 
'Holiness 1 is for him, a complex category, covering the rational and 
the non-rational elements. It is, in fact, the term which best 
expresses the religious evaluation of the world and life, nojs in 
its more primitive or narrow but its modern and wider connotation. 
Within this category of »The Holy 1 he finds, by analysis, that there 
is implied, what he calls another/
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category which accounts for the specific and characteristic 
'moment 1 in religious experience. This category he terms
H
the ' numinous \ and it is this which lies ai the basis of the 
irrational and ineffable element at the heart of all religion. 
The term "Holy" as applied to the Deity in developed religion
includes of course rational and moral attributes which are
» 
transferred to Him by analogy from human life but it also has
an * overplus of meaning* which gives it its peculiar tone or 
flavour. It is this element, this overplus which Prof. Otto 
isolates and calls the 'numinous*. "I shall speak then of a 
"unique 'numinous* category of value and of a definitely 
"*numinous* state of mind, which is always found whenever the 
"category is applied". "This mental state", he adds, "is 
"perfectly sui generis and irreducible to any other, and 
"therefore like every absolutely primary and elementary 
"datum while it admits of being discussed, it cannot be 
"strictly defined", (p. 7). Having isolated this primary 
element in religious evaluation, he proceeds to analyse its 
component features. From the subjective point of view it 
yields what he calls a * creature feeling*, an experience more 
self-obliterating than Schle^ermacher* s 'feeling of dependence*. 
The worshipper aware of the 'numinous* feels himself to be 
mere 'dust and ashes'. Further analysis reveals the presence 
of a complex reaction which he calls the experience of the 
'mysterium tronendurf , or the awareness of the numinous object 
as a 'mystery inexpressible and above all creatures'. 
Accompanying this awareness of the numinous or "mysterium
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"Tremendum"^ there is a specific emotional response which can 
best be expressed by the German word Schauer, or the English 
'awe 1 . This emotion is also sui generis, a thing quite by 
itself, indefinable and primary. Its specific character or quale 
persists throughout the evolution of religion from the primitive 
feeling of 'something uncanny 1 , 'eerie 1 , or 'weird' right up 
to the "awe" of the developed religious Consciousness. "It is
T
"this feeling, which, emerging in the mind of primeval man, 
"forms the starting point for the entire religious development 
"in history*. "It implies the first application of a category 
"of valuation which has no place in the everyday natural world 
"of ordinary experience, and is only possible to a being in v/hom 
"has awakened a mental predisposition unique in kind and 
"different in a definite way from any 'natural' faculty. And 
"this newly revealed capacity even in the crude and violent
t
"manifestations which are all it at first evinces, bears witness 
"to a completely new function of experience and standard of 
"valuation only belonging to the spirit of man". (PP. 15-16). 
ftn the objective side the mysterium TTemendum possesses the 
characteristics of ' overpoweringness w (majestas), of 'energy' or 
'urgency', and it is viewed as "wholly other". 'The truly 
'mysterious' object is beyond our apprehension and compre­ 
hension, not only because our knowledge has certain irremovable 
limits,but because in it we come upon something inherently 
'wholly other', whose kind and character are incommensurable 
with our own, and before which we therefore recoil in a wonder
"that strikes us chill and numb", (p. 28). And yet in spite of 
this f wholly other1 character of the 'mysterium* with the dread 
and awe we feelin regard to it, it yet has a fascination for 
the worshipper who is led to seek fellowship with it and to 
share its very life. This 'fascinans* element in the f numen f 
or the f mysterium f, is its positive character for the worshipper, 
in contrast to the 'wholly other1 . It is the root of 
mysticism and asceticism. But this positive experience is not 
expressible in conceptual thought. "Only from afar, by metaphors 
Hand analogies do we come to apprehend what it is in itself, and 
"even so our notion is but inadequate and confused". (p. 34).
Having thus discovered by analysis the non-rational elements 
in religious experience viewed both subjectively as emotion and 
objectively as content of the religious consciousness, and having 
pronounced them a priori and sui generis, springing from an 
original root in the soul and constituting the very essence 
of the religious reaction, Prof. Otto goes on to show how the 
category of the numinous clothes itself in rational and moral 
forms. The experience of the numinous which originally and 
essentially had nothing to do with what is rational and ethical 
in religious life and ideas,yet in the development of religion 
on ever closer association is established between them. The 
category of the numinous spreads out as it were,or grows into 
the more complex category of the 'Holy 1 by taking up into 
itself rational and ethical elements. This process of compre­ 
hension is described as a process of f Schmatization of the
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Categories 1 much in the fashion of Kant. In this way religion 
becomes moralised and human,and rational qualities are conferred 
on the numinous, and appear as a corresponding enrichment of 
the religious emotions. Prof. Otto takes some pains to show 
how this rationalising and moralising of the numinous takes 
place. The numinous as something sui generis cannot from 
itself "become moralised, nor can what has been pronounced 
non-rational put on rationality. There is no logical 
evolution of the one from the other. Yet the miracle does 
happen f 3waX not by chance association,but on account of 
"necessary connections according to principles of true inward 
"affinity and cohesion". (p. 46). Both the category of the
V
numinous and the category of moral obligations are a priori 
and sui generis. The one cannot and need not be derived from 
the other. Both spring directly from the spirit of man^but they 
become associated or 'conjoined' in the course of history. 
At the same time the numinous or non-rational element is never 
eclipsed in developed religion by the rational and the moral. 
The former element continues present in it and gives it its 
specific character as an experience of reality.
There are, however, according to Prof. Otto,two processes 
in the development of Religion. The numinous consciousness 
develops along its own inner non-rational impulsion. "This 
"element or 'moment 1 passes in itself through a process of 
"development of its own, quite apart from the other process - 
"which begins at an early stage by which it is 'rationalised 1
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"and 'moralised'". Then, "secondary and subsidiary to this, 
"is the task of tracing the course of the process of rationalisa­ 
tion and moralisation on the basis of the numinous conscious- 
"ness". These two processes 'if not quite'% yet 'nearly',
\
synchronise and keep pace one with the other. Thus is the 
category of the 'Holy 1 enriched by the non-rational and the 
rational, the numinous and the moral, the sacrosanct and the 
.good, developing in harmony and-pari passu; as if by a pre- 
established harmony. But the 'Holy' as the supreme religious 
category must be regarded throughout as definitely a priori 
in character. "It follows from what has been said, that the 
"'holy' in the fullest sense of the word is a combined, complex 
"category, the combining elements being its rational and non- 
National components. But in both - and the assertion must 
"•ttar* be strictly maintained against all Sensationalism and 
"Naturalism - it is a purely a priori category". P. 116.
"We conclude then, that not only the rational but also the 
"non-rational elements of the complex category of 'holiness 1 are 
"a priori elements in the same degree. Religion is not in 
"vassalage either to morality or teleology, 'ethos 1 or 
'telos' and does not draw its life from postulates; and its 
"non-rational content has, no less than its rational, its own 
"independent roots in the hidden depths of the spirit itself. 
"But the same a priori character belongs, in the third place, to 
"the connection of the rational and the non-rational elements 
"in religion, their inward and necessary union. The histories
"of religion recount indeed, as though it were something axioraatic ( 
M the gradual interpenetration of the two, the process by which 
1 the divine 1 is charged and filled out with ethical meaning, and 
"this process is in fact felt as something axiomatic, something 
"whose inner necessity we feel to "be self-evident. But then 
"this inward self-evidence is a problem in itself; we are 
"forced to assume an obscure a priori knowledge of the necessity 
"of this synthesis combining rational and non-rational. For it 
"is not by any means a logical necessity. How should it be 
"logically inferred from the still "crude 1 , half-daemonic 
"character of a moon-god or a sun-god or a numen attached to 
"some locality that he is a guardian and guarantor of the oath 
"and of honourable dealing, of hospitality, of the sanctity of 
"marriage and of duties to tribe and clan?"
For the purpose of this enquiry it is not necessary to 
proceed further with the exposition of Professor Otto ! s work. 
The brief outline given is sufficient as a starting point to 
the help v&e may gain from it on our a priori quest, and also 
for a basis to any criticism we shall want to make.
In the first place let us point out a few of the results 
of Prof. Otto's analysis which we will provisionally accept 
as v/ell founded and likely to bear careful scrutiny.
(l) He is certainly justified in hio contention that there 
is present in religious experience an emotional quality not to 
be identified with any of the 'natural 1 feexings, nor produced 
out of any synthesis or fusion of these. Religious 'awe* or
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1 reverence 1 , is something different from the emotional compound 
supposed to be made up of certain primary or elementary feelings 
which Dr. McDougall calls "reverence "- the religious emotion 
par excelJance. Within the strictly religious experience there 
is present a feeling element that gives c.olour and tone to 
whatever natural emotions are joined with it, sari in the total 
experience, and this element is unique and "belongs to man as 
a religious creature. It is found in primitive religion and it 
persists,though refined and moralised, as the dominant factor and 
characteristic of mystical experience on the higher planes of 
developed religion. And the difference between this emotion 
and all f natural 1 emotional reactions is not one of degree..but 
of kind. It springs from an original root in the soul and for 
that reason is a-priori. Without the presence of this specific 
'dread 1 or 'awe 1 religious experience would lose its real 
and specific quality as religious. There would be nothing to 
differentiate it from other emotional reactions. In thus 
establishing religious experience on the firm ground of 
psychological fact Prof. Otto is throwing down a challenge to 
the current tendency in religious psychology which, masquerading 
as science and therefore jealously regarding all matters of 
fact, confidently affirms that religious experience contains no 
emotional element that cannot be traced to perfectly natural 
sources within the mind. Whether further analysis will sustain 
Prof. Otto's position or not, what he contends for seems perfectly 
true at any rate, to religious people, who can widely testify
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to a unique experience, in worship, ^hich they do not get in 
any other moral or spiritual exercise. If tl.i^ emotion is 
native or natural to man then it in,ill "be necessary to revise 
our conception of what natural experience is composed of, and 
religion will ^ain a standing ground very different from that 
now accorded to it by psychological science.
(2) The aiscovery of a specific religious emotion is 
not, however, Prof. Otto's main achievrnent. There are 
psychologists who, while denying the existence of a specific 
root to the religious emotion^would account for v/hat is 
characteristic of it as due to a difference on the objective 
side of the experience. They would say that reverence awakens 
in the soul when man by inference from the facts of the 
physical world and from the sense of duty, rises to the idea 
of God, that it is this idea as ihe object of tnought which 
creates the specifically emotional reaction of reverence. In 
contrast to this Prof. Otto connects the specific emotion Viiith 
an equally specific cognition of the real world, an objective 
evaluation which he calls the perception of the numinous. 
According to him the emotion has a cognitive counterpart which 
indeed is prior to the emotion and through which the emotion 
is awakened and on which it depends. The numinous is not 
gained by inference but is a simple and direct apprehension of 
a quality of the real world. This numinous consciousness 
is an inalienable element in every religious experience strictly 
so called,^nd it answers on the cognitive side to the emotion
177-
of 'awe 1 on the subjective as the specific feeling element. 
Although it is in and through the emotion that the character 
of the numinous in its essential nature is revealed, yet 
it is intuitively apprehended if not as an object f yet as a 
reality clothing itself in the objective world.
Now if there be a religious evaluation of the real in 
this way, and if it cannot be derived from any other kind of 
evaluation, physical or moral, then it is not gratuitious
to conclude as Prof. Otto does, that it springs from an
\
original category of thought, and is therefore strictly a
priori. And it is important to note that once we have accepted 
the numinous category we ate gaining a new foothold on our 
way to the establishment of the objective validity of religious 
experience. For with the recognition of a cognitive element 
which,like the religious emotion,is also sui generis, we escape 
the charge of subjectivism. We are admitting a transubjective 
reference as of the very core of the religious outlook.
With Prof. Otto then, we ar4 led to think of religious 
experience as based on independent and ultimate factors in the 
human mind. This experience is a priori in regard both to the 
cognitive and the emotional elements in it. As an experience 
it cannot of course be altogether a priori; it is "a priori 
in so far as it involves a category of thought without which 
the empirical experience would not be possible.
How in estimating the position thus gained by Prof. Otto's 
analysis it may be pointed out that, like so many other
pioneers of thought* b&* discussion is open to much misunder­ 
standing owing to the cut and dried distinctions he is driven
to make in order-to make his actual discovery clear. Let uson
take first of all his doctrine of the non-rational/which he seems 
to hase the religious edifice. At the outset of his enquiry 
he makes it quite clear why he makes the distinction between 
the rational and the non-rational. He makes it in order to 
show that there is in religious experience something which is
t
never adequately expressed in religious thought and doctrine', 
God in personal experience is richer and greater and "better 
than He is to the mind of the thinker whose "business it is to 
interpret the character of God in conceptual terms in the 
light of that experience. Thinking about God and holding 
fellowship with Him in worship are two different functions 
of the soul. True, the thinking presupposes the experiencet 
but in the natmre of things thought can only take so much of 
experience with it-as can be pitchforked into concepts. 
And even if much of the experience is explicated by conceptual 
thought,the experience itself is, when all is said and done, 
something real and warm and personal,and touches the very 
pulse of life,whereas thought deals with abstract ideas which 
can in no way be equated with the real experience.
Now, in order to understand better the inner core of 
religious experience it is clear that we must turntnot to 
doctrines that profess to explain experience, but to concrete 
experience itself. This surely is the only way to gain new
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knowledge. It is to face what is real in concrete in hope 
that some unlabelled feature may be found which has escaped 
observation "but which may be after all fundamental. All 
scientific advance has been gained by this process of looking 
first into experience, and scrutinising the real in a new 
way. That is surely how the stone became an assemblage of 
atoms and an atom a universe composed of elections. what Prof, 
Otto has done with religious experience is to subject it to 
analysis in a new way, and the new way was to separate - in 
thought of course - all the elements in it already labelled 
from those which were unlabelled. He professes to find a
residuum of unlabelled features, and he calls them non-
and to 
rational, but only in opposition to^/distinguish them from labelled
features. But of course this residuum, is no longer quite 
non-rational because Prof. Otto has given it a local 
habitation and a name. The numinous is less non-rational 
than it was, for we can now &% any rate call it the f mysterium 
'Tremendum1 and the emotion of 'dread 1 or awe will put on the 
garment of rational concept. Indeed o.n page 6l he distinctly
tells us that the distinction is a purely formal one. 
MSo that this name (i.e. the ! non-rational 1 ) is for us a 
"purely formal one merely commoting a contrast and hence merely 
"provisional. It has no longer any particular aptness when 
"once we have succeeded in coming to an understanding of the 
"way in which this hidden deep affects religion". These words 
ought to be marked by the critics of Otto ! s non-rational.
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He does not equate religion with these hitherto non-rational 
elements. He cannot be doing that because he allows that 
the character of religion is also revealed through the rational 
concepts, and that experience on its rational side is already 
affected by the non-rational elements.and would not be what it 
is apart from these latter. Prof. Otto does not identify re­ 
ligion with the non-rational then; what he does is to affirm that 
there are more things in the realm of religion than, have 
hitherto been dreamt of in our philosophy. It would be less 
misleading if instead of speaking of the rational and the non- 
rational, as he does, we were to use the terms 'rationalised 1 
and f non-rationalised 1 . The non-rational in Otto's analysis is 
not incapable of progressive rationalisation. In fact he 
admits that'a great deal can be said about it.
"Although it eludes the conceptual way of understanding, 
"it must be in some way or other within our grasp, else nothing
"could be asserted of it, and even mysticism, in speaking of
•*( 
"it as To ApptifoYi the ineffable, does not really mean to
"imply that absolutely nothing can be asserted 6F the object of 
"the religious consciousness; otherwise, mysticism could 
"exist only in a broken silence, whereas what has generally 
"been a characteristic of the mystics is their copious eloquence", 
(p. 2). The non-rational is not then the incomprehensible; 
it is only what as yet has not been expressed in conceptual 
terms. That is all he means by the non-rational. If he meant 
more, his own attempt to make known the nature of the non-
1B2.
rational would appear futile from the first, nor can he mean that 
the non-rational does not provide an insight into the nature of 
reality. That would be equivalent to the assumption that ex­ 
perience distils no truth,unless first of all it is made to 
pass through the silre of the discursive intellect. It is Prof. 
Otto's "basic assumption that the non-rational does give knowledge
of an intuitive sort which,like every intuition,awakens-.
in
spontaneously/the mind, and is "BPHhtrtift not, except indirectly, 
the result of instruction. The non-rational is a bearer of 
knowledge,like the rational,to the experient. The only real 
difference between them is that the one can be expressed and 
conveyed to others f whereas the other, though equally real, 
remains for the most part private property.
It may also be pointed out that the distinction of 
rational and non-rational has no existential import whatsoever. 
It expresses a distinction in thought, in analysis, and not 
a rift in experience. Religious experience is not given 
within two distinct compartments yielding two different 
kinds of knowledge. As we have said the rational is shot 
through and through with the non-rational and vice versa. 
The Christian's consciousness of his own Sonship when he cries 
out with St. Paul "Abba, Father", is not something entirely 
apart and different from the numinous consciousness which Prof. 
Otto ! 'j terms the non-rational. The former is itself numinous 
in character; the mysterium Tremendum is a constitutent of the 
Christian's experience of the Fatherhood of God. He feels
182.
differently when he addresses God directly in worship as Father 
from what he fefcls when he cries to his earthly father. The 
concept Father as applied to God is a rational concept in a new 
sense from that obtaining in the natural filial relationship. 
The difference is made up by the numinous quality which the 
Deity possesses in concrete religious experience. The recog­ 
nition of this fact is the answer to the projectionist theory 
that the idea of God is derived solely from the riiitural filial 
feeling, reemerging through the unconscious^God is not merely 
1 Father 1 ; He is the 'divine* Father, the numinous reality, the 
niysterium Tremendum, in fact. And this numinous quality surrounds 
Him like a halo. Whence this numinous addition to the idea of 
Fatherhood? The projectionist has no. answer to gire, except 
the elusive one that it is produced by the alchemy of the 
unconscious. That there must be such alchemy cannot well be 
disputed if the projectionist theory is true,because the father­ 
hood of God is very different from human fatherhood. The uncon­ 
scious must ther^bxe out of its own resources transform the 
idea very fundamentally. But our point at the moment is that 
the rational concepts by which religious experience is interpreted* 
and the character of God expressed, are not independent of the 
specifically numinous element which Prof. Otto calls the non- 
rational. What he aims at establishing is not that there are no 
numinous elements in the rational, but that there is a numinous 
whose nature is not fully conveyed through it, whose presence in 
the experience is not generally discerned,because the analogical 
character of. the concepts used tend to eliminate the
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numinous nature of all religious experience.
Having thus pointed out the real significance of Prof. 
Otto's distinction "between the rational and the non-rational, 
and safe-r guarding ourselves from seriously misunderstanding his 
essential position, we must go on to admit freely that Prof. 
Otto himself does not remain faithful to his own distinctions. 
In the development of his doctrine of the numinous consciousness 
he forgets the nature of the distinction he has ma.de between the 
rational and the non-rational. Instead of accepting it as an 
expression of two phases of one and the same experience,he 
persists in regarding the numinous as a specific experience per 
seRecurring as it were in complete independence of all rational 
factors. What he starts with as a mere 'overplus* of meaning 
in association with rational elements,he hypostatises 
later on into a completed experience, thus converting what is 
a distinction of value within the same experience into an existen­ 
tial difference,yielding two experiences which can happen in 
complete independence of one another. Throughout the latter 
part of his book the numinous consciousness is treatedr not as 
an element or feature of religious experience^but as the 
whole of it. The numinous originates and persist^ and even 
develops in complete independence of the rational and moral
V
factors usually found as constitent aspects of all religion.
ft
A religious experience , non-rational in character, is therefore 
possible outside the rational and the moral,and both theology and 
morality,which have their own^a priori root,can develop independ-
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ently of the numinous consciousness. We therefore have on the
V
one hand,an a priori religious evaluation which is non- 
rational the awareness of the numinous quality of the real, and 
on the other a rational and moral consciousness wherein no 
definitely religious import appears, though this in turn is 
also derived from va priori grounds in the mind. Religion and 
morality, the non-rational and the rational, are thus not only 
distinct in their source^but can and do often develop inde­ 
pendently of one another. Morality is not derived from religion 
therefore, nor religion from morality. They are parallel 
developments, and t although they do meet and coalesce and 
influence each othert there is no inner necessity why they 
should meet and move together as one stream.
Having established the numinous on its own specific
'a priori basis* independent of both the rational and the moral
«
ideaSfthe f telos f and the 'ethos* with which it is associated 
in developing consciousness, Prof. Otto faces the new problem 
which this hypostatisation or separation of religion, philosophy, 
and morality has laid upon his hands. He has now to forge 
the link of connection between them»to restore morality to the 
bosom of religion and religion at the heart of the moral life, 
and philosophical reflexion. He is aware that religion and 
moralityf the non-rational and the rational*are somehow essentially 
related as the history of religion distinctly shows*but having 
separated them,not only in analysis but in fact»as both sui
generis and totally independent in origin and essential develop-
ment,he makes a desperate attempt to-reconcile them and brings in 
a Deus ex machinavto.effect the reconciliation. This Deus ex
>
machina is another^, priori factor which establishes the 
essential connexion required to explain religious history and
V
experience. "But the same a priori character belongs, — 
Ho the connexion of the rational and the non-rational elements 
"in religion, their inward and necessary union'*. "This process 
"is as something axiomatic, something whose inner necessity 
"we feel to be self-evident", and he goes on to add a 
significant remark, "But then this inward self-evidence is
Ha problem in itself; we are forced to assume an obscure
»
"a priori knowledge of the necessity of this synthesis, com-
"bining rational and non-rational". (p. 140). But he 
nowhere attempts to say anything in explanation of this 
new a priori factor which he introduces surr^ptit^ioualy to solve 
the problem of the inner harmony between the rational and the 
non-rational which his system has created for him. The synthesis 
of the non-rational and the rational, the way in which "beings 
"obviously born originally of horror and terror, become gods - 
"beings to whom men pray, to whom they confide their sorrow 
«ar their happiness, in whom they behold the origin and the 
"sanction of morality, law, and the whole canon of justice", 
remains for him a process explicable only on the assumption of 
some obscure a priori knowledge native to human self-consciousness 
His resort to Plato, Luther and Christian missionaries helps 
him not at all in his endeavour to interpret this relational
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a priori; it but enables him to affirm its existence by calling 
witnesses to his side*
But Prof. Otto does try to explain the working of this 
obscure "a priori source of knowledge which, likej-Leibnitz 1 s 
preestablished harmony and Descartes' God, he calls to his aid 
to secure an inner correspondence between the rational and 
the non- rational. His attempt however proceeds on different 
lines. In pure Kantian fashion he explains the miracle by 
the help of Kant's doctrine of the Schematisation of the 
categories. Although he has told us that the rational and the 
non- rational elements in religion - the rational covering also 
the moral - are both strictly a priori in their origin, he now 
subordinates the rational to the non- rational and makes the 
foiMsrto appear only as a schematisation of the latter. "As 
"the rational elements, following a priori principles, come 
"together in the historical evolution of religions with the 
wn on- rational, they serve to Schematise 1 these..... The
the daunting and repelling moment of the numinous
H is schematised by means of the rational ideas of justice, moral 
"will, and the exclusion of what is opposed to morality; and 
"schematised thus, it becomes the ! wrath of God* ... The 
"fascinans, the attracting and alluring moment of the 
"numinous, is schematized by means of the ideas of goodness, 
"mercy, love, and, so schematized becomes all we mean by 
"Grace ....," (.44-5). And not only so but the Numinous Category 
thus schematised transforms the rational .ideas ordinarily under-
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stood by infusing them with the potency so to speak of its own 
form. In this way "by the continual living activity of its
"non-rational elements su .'. religion is guarded from passing
and 
H into rationalism", aaat equally, per contra,the numinous
Mby being steeped in and saturated with rational elements 
w (it) is guarded from sinking into fanaticism or mere 
Hmysticality ..... and is qualified to become a religion for all 
"civilised humanity". (146).
As we have already pointed out Prof. Otto's real intention 
in making his distinction between the rational and the non- 
rational was not to sunder experience into two compartments, the 
religious and the rational, each possessing existential reality 
apart from the other t but rather the distinction was one in 
analysis merely.* If Prof. Otto had kept strictly to this 
first intention the problem how the rational and the non- 
rational come together and coalesced in history and experience 
•
would never arise, and no obscure a priori knowledge to effect
*
the fusion would be needed. The new problem has arisen for him 
because he has gone beyond his first intention and turned a 
distinction into a radical existential differentiation. In his 
endeavour to bridge the chasm he has thus created between religion 
and morality on the one hand -and religion and rational thought on 
the other he is obliged to relinguish the dual a priori character 
of the rational and the non-rational, and to subordinate the 
former into a schema only of the latter, and this after saying 
distinctly that the rational and the non-rational elements
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are a priori "each in the same degree". But if one is merely
the schematisation of the other they cannot stand on the 
same a priori footing as forms of knowledge. On the other hand, 
if they are a priori principles "each in the same degree" the 
one is something more than a schematisation of the other. They 
will stand shoulder to shoulder, so to speak on perfect 
equality,each-having an independent root in the mind. Prof.
* M
Otto in one and the same chapter gives them,at first,equality 
and a priori independence, and he goes in quest of some explana­ 
tion of how they have developed together in religious history; 
he then subordines the rational to the non-rational, the former 
appearing as a schematization of the latter. It is this second 
line of explanation which is true to his main position and his 
first intention, for if the rational elements in religious ex­ 
perience are a schematisation of the pure category of the 
numinous it is obvious that the distinction of rational and 
non-rational, with which he starts out § is a distinction in 
analysis only and not in fact. The appearance of the 'new 
'problem 1 upon his path, the problem of how religion becomes 
rationalised, and how the gods become moral beings, a problem 
which he confesses to be insoluble,except on the assumption of gome 
obscure source of knowledge, is obviously due to Prof. Otto's' 
inadvertence in introducing a rift into religious experience * 
when he only meant a distinction of elements within the same 
concrete fact. It is one thing to insist that religion is other 
than philosophical speculation and more than morality; it is
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a different thing to say that religion and morality arise and 
move in essential independence of each other. Once religion
j
and morality are radically separated they cannot be united 
again. If they arise in complete independence they cannot 
"be made one. From pure morality as Kant e.g. explained it, there 
is no way to religion. Equally from Religion, as Prof. Otto 
occasionally understands it,as purely a numinpus on non- 
rational category,there is no way to the moral life. Gods 
born in horror and terror,having only a numinous character 
obviously can never become moralised unless the numinous 
includes already moral elements, as indeed it does for Prof. 
Otto in his first reading of it when e.g. he admits an element 
of fascinans into the mysterium Tremendum. What Prof. Otto fails 
to grasp clearly is the all-inclusive and fundamental character 
of his numinous category. In his anxiety to keep true to 
Kant f s a priori discoveries he is unwilling to detract 
anything from the strictly a priori nature of the categories of 
the understanding and the moral Imperative as Kant understood 
these. He is therefore straining himself to find a link of
*
connection between his own a priori discovery in the realm 
of the non-rational and Kant's perfectly rational categories. 
This is the source of- all his trouble and accounts for his 
vacillation between two different positions and his search for 
one more a priori to get him out of his predicaments. His 
own numinous Category as formulated by hi.u,and his apparent 
failure to relate it to the rational and the moral in religion
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us to suspect that the religious category is really the 
root category of self-consciousness and that once understood 
aright it will yield out of its own treasures, by the force of 
its own logic, the rational and the moral categories which 
to Kant were primary and which Prof. Otto cannot quite 
reconcile with his own category of the numinous .
In his more elaborate discussion of the process of 
schematization which the non- rational undergoes Prof. Otto 
seems to be quite aware of the interdependence and essential 
inner connexion that exists between the non- rational and the 
rational. Discussing the nature of this process he compares 
it \vith the "Association of Ideas", and insists that religious 
ideas and feelings when they are associated with 'rational* 
ideas and feelings are 'conjoined 1 with these rather than 
outwardly connected. They are "necessary connections" to 
be distinguished from "chance connections according to laws of 
"purely external analogy". An instance of the former or 
necessary connection he finds in the connexion of Kant's 
Category of Causality with its temporal 'schema', the 
temporal sequence of two successive events, which, by being 
brought into connexion with the Category of Causality, is 
known and recognised as the causal relation of the two". 
He then adds: "Now the relation of the rational to the non- 
"rational element in the idea of the Holy or Sacred is just
"such a\,one of 'schematization', and the non- rational
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"numinous fact schematized by the rational concepts we have 
"suggested above yields us the complete category of 'holy 1 
"itself richly charged and complete and in its full meaning. 
"And that the schematism is a genuine one, and not a mere 
"combination of analogies, may be distinctly seen from the fact 
"that it does not fall to pieces, and cannot be cut out as the 
"development of the consciousness of religious truth proceeds 
"onwards and upwards,but is only recognized with greater 
"definiteness and certainty", p. 46-47• In other words 
Prof. Otto admits that the non-rational and the rational are 
organically related elements within the one and the same 
experience. The numinous becomes schematized into the complete 
category of the 'holy* by means of the rational elements 
which are essentially bound up with it as an Experience and 
not added on as it were in an external fashion. The rational 
elements are therefore,on his own showing, strictly dependent on the 
non-rational, and are indeed always transfused by the latter. 
Their connexion in concrete and developing experience is not 
due therefore to some third obscure a priori source of knowledge > 
but rather is the result of the logical unfolding of the numinous 
category itself, and the schematization is not an event 
temporally subsequent to the numinous moment of consciousness, 
but that consciousness awakening to an evaluation of the real 
world. Prof. Otto's failure to see this in its bare nakedness 
is probably due to his slavery to Kantian methods. Kant's 
schematizing of the pure forms of the understanding easily
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misleads into the assumption that the a priori and the a
posteriori factors in knowledge are separable moments, that in'
'•',- > 
knowing we first use the a* priori principles and then * apply them
as it were to the data, of sense. That however is not the 
case. Schematization is not a process in time and therefore 
not two experiences; they are "but two moments distinguishable 
in thought only "but not separable in fact. Both are constitutive 
of experience and without either of them .there could be no 
experience at all. If the rational is the schematism of the 
non-rational in religion their connection is not a temporal 
event at all; they are epistemologically correlative and 
organically related. To understand their interdependence we 
must undertake a logical analysis of the religious consciousness 
and its specific evaluations of the real world. This Prof. Otto 
does not attempt, although he clearly assumes throughout his 
book that the numinous category is more fundamental in conscious­ 
ness then the rational and the moral. But he is too good a • 
Kantian to admit the prerogative which he really assigns to 
the numinous category. He will break with his master only to 
the extent of raising religion on to the %a priori level of Kant f s 
categories of pure Reason and of moral obligation. What he 
is really doing is to prepare the way for the logical priority 
of the religious a priori to all the rest, thus turning Kant's 
system upside down, and making it possible to base all activities 
of human thought and evaluations, rational,moral»and aesthetic, 
on the foundation of the religious consciousness. Both the
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history of religious thought and practice,and the nature of 
religious experience will, we would fain believe,bear out the





THE OBJECTIVE GROUND OF RELIGION.
In passing on to our constructive statement we must 
take up again, in accordance with the anticipation at the 
close of the third chapter, Kant's doctrine of the Trans­ 
cendental Unity of Apperception and the nature of self- 
consciousness* This procedure is advisable "both in the 
interest of continuity in our argument as well as for the 
sake of clarity. Up to this point our thesis while in many 
respects boldly and even rashly antagonistic to Kant's 
procedure in his analysis of knowledge, a procedure to which 
we have traced his theological agnosticism, is still based 
on Kant's critical method as alone adequate to the solution 
of the epistemological problems of religion* And we have 
adopted not his method only but his main critical results, 
both as our starting point, and as the main tenet upon which 
our enquiry has proceeded,and will proceed to the end.
In his "Study of Kant"; Prof. James Ward, who accepts 
his analysis of self-consciousness as Kant's central truth, 
points out that the categories are ultimately derived 
"from what the experient subject is and at the intellectual 
"level knows itself to be". "This seems to be the true
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"answer", he adds, "and it is the answer which really underlies 
"the whole of Kant's transcendental deduction in its final form 1*. 
The unity of self-consciousness is "itself the ground and 
"presupposition of all categories, and therefore of these 
"supreme categories - substance and cause", p. 81-2. "In 
"maintaining these categories to be indispensable to the
«
"possibility of any intelligible experience of the world is 
"Kant not really maintaining that the world is intelligible 
"only when it is interpreted in terms of what the experient 
"subject at the transubjective and self-conscious level knows 
"itself to be? On what other grounds can it be assumed that 
"the transcendental object or non-ego, so far from being 
"utterly alien, is verily the ego's own correlate?" p, 83.
Prof* Ward then goes on to point out, what for the 
purpose of our argument is of the utmost importance, that Kant 
interpreted the activity of self-consciousness in the synthesis 
of knowledge much too narrowly, was guilty in fact of abstracting 
from the mind both feeling and conation, leaving the cognitive 
faculty alone to work the miracle of lifting man into self- 
consciousness through the synthetic unity of the object. 
If, as Kant affirms, the unity of self-consciousness in 
knowledge, the individual's awareness of himself is attained 
through, and is essentially the correlate of, the objective 
unity, it follows that the nature of the object, i.e. the kind 
of unity it possesses must have something to do with the
character of the self which the individual experient thinks
of 
himself to have. In other words, the unity/self-consciousness
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being realised in its ease by the objective unity, will also 
be determined in its quale, through the same objective unity. 
There will be a character correspondence between the subject 
and the object. Whereas the active self through its synthesis 
of the manifold imposes its own law upon the objective world 
and through the order and unity thus achieved realises its 
own nature as self-consciousness, the content of that which is 
apprehended in knowledge will naturally correspond to the 
experience of the self-conscious subject and vice versa. iSsat 
the thinking subject finds in the world of objects will 
answer to what he finds in himself. In saying this one is aware 
that we are seriously departing from Kant*s own position. 
The unity of self-consciousness was for him a purely logical 
Unity as was also the unity of the object. Neither was to 
be identified with the concrete unity of the object whether 
outside the mind or within it, that is tojey with the category 
of unity. Both were for him transcendental, and were merely 
discoverable as logical conditions of all knowledge, the source 
of the categories and the ultimate presuppositions of all 
experience whatsoever. But this reading of the nature of the 
ego, which led Kant to his questionable and perplexing 
doctrine of "Inner Sense" is just a defect of his psychology 
now generally admitted. The self that is active in the 
building up of experience is something very different from the 
logical unity which Kant separates from the empirical self. 
Prof. Ward is certainly justified in his statement that Kant
overlooked an important fact of experience viz; - "that the
197-
"activity of the subject is not confined to the synthesis 
"of sense-data, is never merely cognitive but always and 
"from the first conative and reactive as well. In our
"intercourse with the external world we have limbs which the
"Ego controls as well as senses which the non-ego affects"* - p. 83. 
"The fact that we fully realise what energy fKraft) means 
"when we find our own movements inhibited, when the object 
"or Gegenstand, that we perceive:, is also an obstacle or 
"Wideratand which resists - this all-important psychological 
"fact Kant seems to have overlooked altogether", (p. 84). 
And Prof. Ward agrees with earlier critics that "Kant's 
"first concern should have been to ascertain how experience 
"has developed from this centre, (the original synthetic
"unity of apperception) and all that such development from a
"single source implies", p. 84*5*
"The gradually unfolding stem of experience was hidden 
"by its own branches; so much so that Kant seriously doubted 
"if there were a single stem at all, nay, began by asserting 
"that there was not", (pp. 84,85).
Following the lead of Prof. Ward we are justified in giving 
to the synthetic unity of self-consciousness a much more con­ 
crete character than was given to it by Kant himself. The 
origin of the categories of the understanding through which 
the synthesis of the manifold is achieved and experience made 
possible, is not f logomorphic* to use Prof. Ward's term, but
anthropomorphic, not a bare logical unity but a concrete
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psychic centre. Kant's disruption of the mind into cognition, 
feeling and conation, making each of these a subject of three 
independent critiques, and each providing exclusive kinds of 
knowledge can no longer be accepted. We have moved away from 
the faculty psychology prevalent in his day. The synthetic 
unity of apperception is a concrete unity wherein the three 
distinguishable 1 but not separable^aspects of consciousness all 
function,so that the objective world of knowledge^through which 
self-consciousness comes to birth,is not only the intelligible 
realm of matter with which science and mathematics deal,nor the 
realm of ends revealed in the moral consciousness considered in 
abstraction,nor yet the teleological order given in feeling. 
The synthetic unity of self-consciousness,as we know it in 
ourselves, is much richer than any one of these objective orders 
taken singly can account for. The system of objective judgments 
we call knowledge grows out not of a logical figment, an abstract 
unity of which nothing can be asserted except a bare identity 
which is meaningless, but rather from a living, interested 
active, ever aggressive reaction to the manifold presented to 
the individual by his sensible environment. The study of 
instinctive behaviour has greatly helped as out of all 
narrow rationalistic theories concerning the genesis of our 
knowledge of the external world. Although our new doctrine 
may bring us into a new kind of faculty psychology» it has 
clearly helped us to shed the older type, so pernicious to
philosophy. If however we can still hold to Kant's doctrine
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of the objective unity of self-consciousness we must be 
prepared to give to that unity a nature very different from 
that which he gave to it* For a bare logical unity, we repeat, 
is meaningless. The only true unity is that which includes 
within itself diversity and multiplicity.
In pursuing this line of advance it is important to point 
out that we are assuming that Kant's central truth still stands, 
that the unity of self-consciousness stili remains an objective 
unity bound up with the organisation of the matter of sensation 
into ordered and intelligible experience. If we give to the 
unity of the self a concrete character, linking it up with the 
empirical self as closely as possible we are not denying the 
constitutive function of the mind in knowledge. We are only 
insisting that the mind is active altogether in every determina­ 
tion of the manifold of sense t and that the synthetic activity 
analysed in Kant*s three critiques is present^and functions
together in the concrete situations where the Ego and the Non-ego
the 
come face to face. In/realisation of self-consciousness, the
judgment, 'I am I 1 , attainable through the synthetic unity of 
the object ; is something more than a purely logical awakening. 
It is and must be an experience into which other subjective 
or psychic elements enter besides the purely logical unity 
which Kant calls transcendental. We never have a purely 
logical relationship to any object. If and when we do fcpeak 
of such a relationshipjit is only by an effort of abstraction
from the concreteness of experience. We are not at liberty
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therefore, to think of this abstract unity as something alone 
active and independently functioning as the ultimate Condition 
of self-consciousness* It only functions within concrete 
experience through the employment of the categories in the 
synthesis of the manifold. When the unity is taken in an 
abstract way, we can call it nothing else than what Kant himself 
called it - the transcendental unity both of the object and of 
the subject, the one being identical with the other, an "X" 
above and behind the unity of apperception, concerning which 
nothing can be known, a blank identity without differentiation 
or content at all* The bare unity of self-consciousness, not 
distinguishable only but separable from the empirical self, 
must, so long as it retains its transcendental character, 
remain a thing-in-itself and consequently unknown. The unity 
of self-consciousness is however, not a logical unity to the 
experient* For him^it is a concrete unity> realising itself 
as an experience both of individuality and identity> in direct 
and living relationship with the synthetic activity of thought 
working upon the manifold of sense. It is not a transcendental 
but an immanental unity, not logical but experiential, a self 
indeed, which has a definite and concrete content in living 
contact with the objective world. The unity of the self is a 
logical unity and nothing morej only to the philosopher who 
looks on and analyses self-consciousness into its various 
aspects. Kant was perfectly consistent with himself when he 
taught that this logical unity could not be known inasmuch 
as, being the ground of all objectivity, it could never be
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made into an object of knowledge. But as a matter of fact^ the 
self is known in self-consciousness.both in and through our 
experience of the worid,and when the inner life itself is 
made the object of contemplation. Even the affirmation of Kant's 
bare identity * I am I* is, so far as it goes, a kind of knowledge 
of the self. The characteristic quality of self-consciousness, 
which is to be aware of the identity and continuity of the 
self as against the objective world which is known,points to 
the concrete character of the implied unity. If the self is 
conscious of itself, in knowledge,then the self cannot be 
wholly unknown. To fall into scepticism here would be to 
land ourselves in a hopeless contradiction in terms. We 
would.be denying that we were aware of something we were - 
aware of. It would be saving that in self-consciousness we are 
not conscious of self - an impossible position. We would argue, 
then,that the unity of self-consciousness is a concrete unity, 
the immanental unity in fact of the empirical self, aost that in 
knowledge of the world the self is aware of its own experience 
as a thinking active reality, that,in fine,it is the peculiar 
nature of self-consciousness to know itself not as a mere 
logical unity but as an experiencing self, through all objects 
whether in the world outside or within consciousness itself. 
In knowledge the self transcends the object it knows and is 
aware of its own inner workings as well as the object that 
occupies -its attention. True % the Ego and the Non-ego must both 
remain, the subject must be a subject still in all acts of 
knowledge,but this does not preclude the subject from making
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its own experience a matter of contemplation^nor does it prevent 
the subject from being able to rise above itself, at least in 
part, without destroying the subject - object relationship in 
the knowing process.
There are expressions in Kant, hints here and there, which 
show that he was himself not unaware of the new difficulties 
that were raised by his own architectonic and enslavement to 
logical procedure. Concrete experience was seen by him to be 
something more than the sum of the parts into which his analysis 
had reduced it. The Unity of apperception was more than a 
merely logical unity, "The consciousness of my own existence is 
Nat the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of 
"other things besides myself". B. p. 276. "What is this", 
asks Prof. Ward"but the recognition of the duality of subject 
"and object in consciousness, i.e. in experience? How then 
"can the subject alone be called 'the mere form1 of consciousness? 
"p. 160. and again "only inasmuch as I can conjoin a manifold 
"of presentations in one (moment of) consciousness is it possible 
"for me to conceive the identity of the consciousness in these 
"presentations themselves; in other words, the analytic unity 
"of consciousness is only possible on presupposition of some 
"sort of synthesis (i.e. Synthesizing) unity". 16.B. p. 133.
The unity of self-consciousness here, the 'I think 1 is 
definitely existential and not logical. "It states", as Prof. 
Ward points out, "an act, that is.to say, a fact", p. 162. 
This does not imply that Kant's unity of apperception was not
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for him in the last resort a transcendental and logical unity. 
For him no doubt the unity was merely logical but it is clear, 
nevertheless that he easily slipped into speaking of it as 
existential. Prof. Ward also points out that in one place 
Kant actually refers to the Ego as * nothing more than the 
•feeling of an existence ... to which all thinking stands in 
'relation 1 . "Here 11 , comments Ward, "the Ego of apperception 
"is generally defined as feeling. Obviously this could not 
"be said of the transcendental object". "Here, however, what 
"he saw was that the Ego of apperception is neither a definite 
"intuition nor a concept nor yet the mere form of consciousness" 
"Though feeling is never a complete state of consciousness, 
"it is the most central one, as Kant came at long last to recog- 
"nise. Had he at this junction been awake to the considerations
"that dawned upon him in working-out his third Critique, his
1) 
"whole doctrine of the self might well have been different". .
"That Kant became at last dissatisfied with his abstract 
"psychological method and aaw that all the water-tight 
"compartments of the mind according to the faculty psychology 
"which he in the main adopted could not be equated with the 
"concrete character of self-conscious. ; . experience itself, 
"seems clear from the, fact that he thought of writing still
"another Critique "dealing at last with the world as a whole
2) 
"and with man as a whole".
Ward p. 172. 
Ward p. 135«
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Haying reached this point, having got rid of the abstract, 
logical, pure unity of self-consciousness, and thus opening the
•
way for the concrete self to function in knowledge, concrete in 
opposition both to a logical unity and to the merely cognitive 
awareness, can we hold fast to the results of Kant's objectire 
deduction? It is our belief that we can, but with this 
addition that the same proof of the dependence of the unity of 
self-consciousness upon the objectire unity of the world 
which Kant put forth for the cognitive faculty, is valid for all 
self-consciousness in its most concrete and comprehensive range*
4
It is not as a thinking being alone, as a creature of cognition 
pure and simple that man, through the activity of his mind com­ 
bining the manifold of sense into the synthesis of objectivity, 
gains self-consciousness. Now that we have dispensed with the 
pure logical unity of the subject, we must hold that the concrete 
unity, comprising feeling and conation, as well as cognition 
still awakens to self-consciousness in and through the synthetic 
correlation of sense data into the ordered unity of the objective 
world* The concrete subject comes to self-consciousness via 
the object, and can only know itself through the epistemological 
relationship that it holds with the object, i. e . through the 
part it has played>in the building up of the unified object 
it knows. The relationship of subject and object, is throughout 
concrete, and the unity of both is likewise a concrete unity 
living in and informing the multiplicity which is also a 
feature of all experience. when now we accept the
205.
concrete situation, we find that self-consciousness is an ex­ 
perience and not merely a recognition of a logical relationship 
between subject and object. But in experience there are always 
feeling and conative elements• Self-consciousness is most 
certainly an awareness of the self as a multiplicity in unity, 
as a real existent that is, standing in a 1lying relation to an 
objective order which, likewise, is real, a multiplicity in 
unity which is the correlate, in a specific and definite sense, 
of the subject.
/
The manner, then, in which the objective synthesis, the 
combining of sense data takes place, will be seen to be not a 
thought process only but an activity depending upon feeling and 
interest as well. The objective order which becomes the counter­ 
part of the self-conscious subject will be more than a space-time 
order* It will be social also. No doubt the space-time 
relationship will be a fundamental characteristic of all 
objectivity, but it will never stand alone• All objects will, for 
self-consciousness, possess a meaning over and beyond that of 
mere physical existence* Self-consciousness is as much a social 
reality as anything else. TO reach it there must arise for the 
individual a world of other individuals like himself forming 
an intelligent and moral order. It is in relation to Other Mind 
or to other minds through transubjective intercourse, that man 
becomes aware of his own independent existence as a moral person­ 
ality. Something of himself goes over into the physical order too 
for the causal interaction which he comes to know through the cate­ 
gory of causation is, in the last resort, expressive of his own
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experience as an interacting and determining agent. Our objective 
world is, after all, anthropomorphically constructed as well as 
construed, it is built up, for us, by our own impact upon it 
in the urgent business of perpetuating our own existence as 
embodied spirits. Whatever may be said against pragmatism 
there is surely a pragmatic principle at work in the construction 
of our human world.
In pointing out the wider factors underlying our knowledge 
of the world we would not be understood to deny the agency of 
the categories of the understanding. What we do wish to affirm 
is that other categories of a similar a priori character are 
involved also, not subsequent to^but coincident withjthe employ­ 
ment of the former, that the mind contributes more than the cate­ 
gories of Kant to the synthesis which makes self-conscious 
experience possible. The structure of the world is conditioned 
anthropologically more than Kant would allow, and the additional 
principles constitutive of knowledge, and therefore of the world 
known, are as important as those he discovered and must be given 
a place similar to them as epistemological factors underlying 
human self-consciousness.
Our consciousness of self will stilj. be seen to be objective­ 
ly conditioned, just as the transcendental unity of apperception 
was for Kant. The subjective^while conditioning the objective as 
the active factor% and in that sense priort as a source of 
experience^will itself be dependent on the object, and upon all 
that the object is capable of becoming, for its knowledge of its 
own existence,not only as a thinking tut as an active and
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sentient being. Self-consciousness as we know it in personality^ 
is a highly complex reality^ never static but always in flux. 
Conditioning it at every point of its development is the 
objective! physical,moral, and spiritual order ,through which alone 
it can rise to knowledge of itself. If the bare unity of self- 
consciousness requires the pivot of objectivity for its genesis, 
so does the moral personality require a moral society for its 
emergence and support. In the same way the religious personality 
which knows itself related to a divine being and a spiritual
X
world, becomes possible oniy through the discrovery of a 
religious meaning and purpose in the objects of experience* 
Religious self-consciousness cannot be a merely subjective 
phenomenon. It is derived in the first place on the strength 
of the awareness of divine reality in the objective wond. It 
is indeed objectively conditioned from the start. The 
religious conception of the wond is neither a projection nor an 
objectification in the psychological sense. The objectification 
if we must use the term, is an epistemologicai process whereby 
the subject comes to religious self-consciousness through his own 
activity in the building up of experience. The mind does not 
first of all produce religious ideas out of its own entrails, 
like the spider his web, and then transfers those ideas. Man 
does not clothe reality with rexigious significance, subsequent 
to an awareness of the spiritual,subjectively produced, whatever 
that might mean. The whole doctrine of subjectivism here 
is made possible by the assumption that man comes to full
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self-consciousness in the Kantian sense, to the awareness 
of himself as a unity through the judgment, 'I think 1^ independ­ 
ently of any evaluation of the objective world beyond that 
which is achieved through the categories of the understanding. 
For this assumption of the priority^ whether temporal or 
logical of the scientific categories we have no warrant at all* 
The religious character of objectivity as a factor in the develop­ 
ment of self-consciousness is not a surmise but a well-grounded 
fact. As we have already pointed out more than once in the 
course of this discussion t the religious evaluation of the 
objective world is as primitive^© say the least t as any other. 
Every object for human self-consciousness is linked up in some 
way with a spiritual background^and has therefore a religious 
character. Man read the world's meaning religiously before
he began to think of it scientifically in the modern sense.
>i 
He applied religious categories in the building up of experience
from the very start, at least as early as he applied the 
categories of substance and cause. The scientific world was 
not born first, and afterwards the religious. But even were it 
not so, even if historically scientific categories preceded 
the religious, their right to form the basis of metaphysical 
theory as against the religious valuationnE^d not be accepted. 
What is first for us, as Aristotle said, need not be first in 
nature. All that our theory requires is that we should 
acknowledge the a priori and independent source within experience 
of the religious interpretation and evaluation of the world and 
life. But there is every reason for placing religion among the
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most primitive interests of man and as expressing a fundamental 
characteristic of self-conscious personality.
In contending for the objective ground of the religious 
consciousness we do not deny,let us point out,the subjective 
and mental soutrce of religious meanings within experience, 
Uor in maintaining the a priori character of religion are we to 
be understood to be falling into the pit of rationalism. The 
a priori source is not independent of a posteriori factors 
and cannot therefore create experience independently of the 
objective world* Religious experience arises through the 
employment of certain modes of interpretation of phenomena 
derived from the mind itself through which the world is 
spiritually estimated. It is only in and through the discovery 
of such a spiritual value in the world confronting man that he 
attains knowledge of himself as a religious personality related 
spiritually to the divine background of the physical order. 
The subject-object relationship which is fundamental to self- 
consciousness is fundamental also to self-consciousness on the 
religious plane. Man becomes aware of himself as a religious 
creature,whose life is directly related to invisible reality, 
through his experience of the concrete world of objects which 
is the environment of his life. Religion is not a matter of 
abstract thinking. It is an interest born and nurtured and 
exercised on the perceptive level. It gets its concrete nature 
from its birth in the world of objects in contrast to which man 
first knew himself in the presence of a spiritual reality not
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unlike himself. And that objective world is the result of the 
synthetic activity of his own mind bringing together the factors 
of sense into the unity of the object which gains its religious 
character by virtue of the fact that it is fashioned in 
accordance with the categories of religious appreciation issuing, 
like the categories of the understanding^ rom the mind itself. 
The individual becomes a religious personality through the 
religious character of the object^but in thinking it in a 
religious way he is only finding again what he has put into the 
object in the act of knowing it. If this be so, if the religious 
self-consciousness is only possible through the synthesis of the 
religious object, a synthesis which is yet subjectively
conditioned,then the objective validity of religious judgments,
of 
expressive/the spiritual evaluation of the worldv is as well
grounded as the validity of scientific judgments based on 
.eausflcfcion and the Uniformity of Mature. Man is,then,as a
religious being % organic to nature,and subjectivism is ruled 
out in religious knowledge even as it is in science. Our 
religious knowledge is true and valid exactly in the same way*
and for the same reason, as the truth of sTbence, morality and\^-
aesthetics. In all cases it is an insight into the real as it 
is revealed in experience, the experience itself being built up 
through the marriage of subject and object in the act of knowing 
each contributing; an essential factor without which self-con­ 
scious experience would not be possible.
Support for our divergence from Kant's conclusions can be 
found in Canon Streeter's "Reality". "With Kant", he
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H I should hold that in the Categorical Imperative of the voice 
"of conscience and in the appreciation of the beautiful we 
"are directly cognisant of the quality of Reality. But while 
"Kant concerns himself with these as known in internal feeling 
"my emphasis is on the fact that Art and Religion are attempts 
"of life to externalise its consciousness of its own inner 
"quality". "Kant maintained that the qualitative character 
"of Reality is known to us mainly through the 'Categorical
"'Imperative' of ethics. I seek it in the first instance in
1) 
"the objectifications of the inner spirit of Religion 11 .
Here Art and Religion are given priority to morality as avenues 
of revelation of the Real* But Canon Streeter only comes half 
way with us. He speaks of the objectification of internal 
feeling, as if the feelings aroused in aesthetic and Religious 
appreciation were internal and that only. But internal they 
never are in the sense that they arise independently of objective 
facts. Aesthetic and Religious feelings, though more subjective 
than thought,are yet always engendered by perception of what is 
objective and real. "Religious feeling", says Dean Inge, M is 
"only aroused by religious ideas of objective truth and value". 
"Feeling is the mirror which reflects ideas and ideals ......
"It creates nothing; it seems to project ideas and ideals, 
"because it reflects unconscious motions of thought and will.
1) "Reality" p. 114.
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"Feeling in itself is neither good nor bad, true nor untrue. 
"It is simply a fact of the soul and life. Its truth depends
H on the truth of the idea which determines it; its goodness
1) 
"on the goodness of the motive which is bound up with it".
When IFeeling 1 is made the central core of religious ex-
$,perience, as by Scheiennacher, there is a danger of divorcing/*
religion from the objective content of self-consciousness. •
"llsre dependence", is nonsense, unless there is a known object
2) 
on which to depend." . . "The feeling of value is always dependent
on the judgment of value, and all judgment is an intellectual 
process." We do not therefore objectify "internal feeling" 
either in art or Religion. What seems to be objectification 
is not objectification at all; it is the bringing into more 
clear consciousness of the situation which is already bound up 
with our feeling, from the perception of which indeed the 
feeling proceeds. We cannot insist too strongly on the 
priority of cognition to feeling. Even the feeling associated 
with the sense of need^or desire^is not altogether divorced from 
cognitive apprehension of what will supply the want. Ho doubt 
there is often in religious experience an intense awakening of 
emotions that do not seem t at first, to arise from clear intellect­ 
ual apprehension of objective facts or ideas, but that is oniy 
because feeling has a tendency to overflow its legitimate
(1) "Faith and its psychology" p. 67.
(2) Ibid. p. 67.
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boundaries which thought never exhibits* But reflexion reveals 
an intellectual system of things most surely believed to be 
objectively true underlying the emotional experience. Religion 
is entirely grounded on judgments of value made in regard to 
reality, and is essentially objective both in its origin and in 
its development. These judgments are doubtless made in 
association with feeling and conative activity which determine 
in 'large measure the kind of judgments that are made, but
r
cognitive awareness is stilx fundamental in all religious 
reactions to the real world. The true basis of the objective 
validity of religion must, therefore^ be sought in the 
intellectual categories by means of which man is determined to 
think of the world as the expression of a divine and spiritual 
order* Upon the apprehension of such a world rests in the 
last resort, the religious reaction and all religious emotion.
Chapter XI.
THE SUPREME PRINCIPLE OF RELIGION
Our argument up to this point has revealed four main 
lines of advance, lines which converge and yield a clear 
direction for our a priori quest.
(a) Religious self-consciousness, or the awareness of our: 
selves as religious beings, is an awareness emerging in 
immediate experience within the subject-object relationship. 
Its emergence takes place on the basis of the synthetic 
activity of the mind working upon the manifold of sense 
and constructing the objective order in such a way as to 
make that order yield a religious significance. It is through 
the awareness of this meaning in the object that the religious 
self-consciousness comes to birth,and on this its development 
is rendered possible. The human self therefore presupposes 
an objective determination and valuation as a constructive 
factor in experience. The acknowledgment of this objective 
ground of religion renders null and void all theories of 
religion which would make it a merely subjective phenomenon. 
That which requires the determination of an objective world y 
religious in character, as the ground of its possibility
214..
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cannot "be thought of as having no objective validity. Religious 
self-consciousness is the subjective correlate of a definitely 
spiritual and supernatural World-Order, apprehended as
»
objective, and immanent in the world of Nature.
(b) In the religious reaction to, and interpretation of, 
the world all the powers of the mind are active. Cognition, 
emotion and coniiation are all involved. It is the concrete 
self, and not only one part or faculty, least of all a bare
logical unity, that determines and builds up the objectivei •
content of experience. We have insisted on the presence of 
Cognition in the concrete sense, as well as on creative and 
practical interest, in order to correct the tendency, so 
prevalent in some quarters, to base religion on mere feeling. 
The religious a priori principles being fundamental elements 
of the mind, must not be sought in any one faculty or pspect 
of conscious life. As religion comprehends all human reactions 
to the worid,and enters into every human interest, whether 
intellectual, emotional or practical, we are forced to find in 
the initial source of the religious outlook the agency of the 
whole personality.
(c) The religious self-consciousness, we have maintained, is 
not a later growth on the basis of a secular self-consciousness 
supposed to be already attained before man became religious. 
The self and the not-self are elements of one consciousness
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and for that reason the mind when it reaches Self-consciousness 
is dimly aware of a higher Unity embracing both subject and 
object.
This Unity has, we have insisted, a religious character. 
But its nature, its experience value, is constituted strictly 
by the content both of the Self and the Not-Self. Unless the 
object therefore had a i&igious meaning, neither the Self nor 
the Unity grasped in Self-consciousness could have a religious 
character. Unless this Unity contained already, as an impli: 
cate of self-conscious awareness, a religious and spiritual 
significance there could be no way of finding out how it got 
that character.
We must then think of Self-consciousness as essentially 
religious from the first, inasmuch as it implies an awareness 
of the self as a unified reality confronting a world that is 
more than merely physical, a world in fact which, just because 
it is a religious world, is expressive of a wider context 
within which both it and the self find their true being. As 
self-consciousness the finite mind transcends the object it 
knows l and in transcending it % becomes aware of the Unity that 
embraces both Subject and Object. This Unity is a religious
•
Unity for the reason that the objective content of self-
consciousness is a religious content, an awareness of God
as a spiritual being, indwelling all objects and comprehending
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the knowing Self as well.
"The idea of an absolute Unity," says Caird, "which
"transcends all the oppositions of finitude, and especially 
"the last opposition which includes all others - the opposition
"of subject and object - is the ultimate presupposition of
"our consciousness. Hence we cannot understand the real 
"character of our rational life or appreciate the full compass 
"of its movements, unless we recognise as its necessary con: 
"stitufcnts or guiding ideas, not only the ideas of object and 
"subject, but also the idea of God. The idea of God, therefore ,- 
"meaning by that, in the first instance, only the idea of an. 
"absolute principle of Unity which blends in one "all thinking 
""things, all objects of all thought," which is at once the
"source of being to all things that are, and of knowing to all
-^ 
"beings that know - is an essential principle, or rather the
"ultimate essential principle of our intelligence, a principle 
"which must manifest itself in the life of every rational 
"creature. Every creature who is capable of the consciousness 
"of an objective world and of the consciousness of a self, is 
"capable also of the consciousness of God. Or to sum up the 
"whole matter in one word, every rational being as such is 
"a religious being." "The Germ," he adds, "of the idea of God 
"as the ultimate Unity of being and knowing, subject and object; 
"must in some way be present in every rational consciousness." 1'
^ The Evolution of Religion, Vol.1, pp. 67-69}
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Although Caird points out that it was Kant who first 
discerned the presence of these ideas of Reason - the unity 
of the self, of the world, and of God - as the controlling 
forces of the human mind in its search for Unity and order 
within experience, he himself allows to these ideas a formative 
and constitutive function from the first, and not merely regula: 
tive of scientific and philosophical enquiry. "These ideas," 
he says, "are thus at once the beginning ?nd the end of our 
"rational life."
"We cannot say a single rational word without expressing 
"of implying a principle of unity which manifests itself in and 
"through the difference of self and the world; and the utmost 
"goal of all our knowledge, nay we may say, of our whole rational 
"life, is to discover what is contained in that principle. Self. 
"Not-Self, God, - these three ideas, mark out the sphere within 
"which the movement of our spirits is confined; and all that we 
"can attain by the utmost effort of our spirits is to realise a 
"little more clearly what we mean by the Self, by the Wot-Self 
"and by God." *'
The germ of religion lies then in this principle of 
Unity which is an inalienable feature of rational life. And 
this principle is the matrix of the idea of God. "All our life 
"is a journey from God to God." "All our secular consciousness 
"can only be the explication or the differentiation of the primi: 
"tive unity presupposed alike in consciousness and self-conscious:
1) Ibid p.165.
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M :ness, and all that it can achieve by its activity is, so to 
"speak, to furnish materials for the religious Consciousness. 11 1 '
(d). We have further maintained that the object in knowledge 
could not put on a religious meaning unless its constitution 
as an object of knowledge revealed the nature of the mind that 
knows it. That is to say, an object possesses a religious 
character in and through the employment in the building up of 
experience of a specific religious principle of thought. Although 
it is through the object, that is, within experience, that 
that principle reveals itself, its source is and must be mental. 
The objective order gains its spiritual import on account of 
the nature of the mind that is able to know it in that guise. 
And further, the consciousness of the unity that is involved 
in, and which transcends, the subject-object relationship is 
the direct result of the constitutive function of thought in 
the building up of experience. It would be difficult to under: 
stand how thought transcends the opposition between itself and 
the object in knowledge, and attains to self-consciousness > 
except dn the assumption that reason is a constitutive power 
synthetically determining all objects whatsoever. If we denied 
to the ideas of religion, in particular the idea of God, a con: 
stitutiore function in knowledge of the world we could never be 
sure that the transcending Unity overarching the subject-object
Ibid, pp.166-7*
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relationship could "be identified with what in religious experi: 
ence we know as a consciousness of God. What Kant could 
not do because the Ideas of. Reason were not constitutive 
"but merely regulative, Edward Caird, following Hegel, is 
able to achieve. For Caird,the Unity present to Self-conscious 
ness in knowledge is no other than God, and religion becomes 
for him a fundamental s.nd primitive feature of all rational 
minds. This identification is possible for him because he 
concedes to self-consciousness a religious^and not a merely 
secular character, and to reason a power to determine objec: 
tivity in aseligious way. Religious self-consciousness is 
therefore the fundamental form of self-consciousness. Out 
journey is veritably from God to God, right through from the 
moment man became man and began to build his altars of earth, 
up to the Christian Mystic who, intensely aware of the Unity 
that transcends all differences - even the difference of 
subject and object, mounts up on the wings of his meditation 
above all finite antagonism into the bosom of the God who is 
all in all.
Taking our stand then on the religious self-conscious: 
ness, we must ask,what are the conditions implied and the 
factors involved in its constitution? In other words, what 
principles of knowledge must be assumed to "be operative in 
making possible religious experience? How comes it that man % 
in knowing himself as a being confronting the world, seems to
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"be shut up to thinking of that world as the expression of a 
supersensible reality, within which his own life is also lived, 
and outside which he cannot fall, and to which he owes the 
dedication of his life ?
1iv<-
We will tentatively formulate a fundamental episteno: 
logical principle of religion thus:-
Self-consciousness is only possible in so far as I em 
able to find in the object not only a reality other then myself 
"but a reality expressive of Another Mind which knows me through 
my awareness of the object, - or more simply put: - In knowing, 
I am always known. To be aware of myself as a subject wtao 
knows the world outside me, implies that I should confess that 
through the world I know there speaks a voice which apprehends
me even as I am able to apprehend the world. The act of/
self-consciousness in which I know, not only that I am,but that 
I know a reality other than my own life, is always accompanied 
as one of its essential and constitutive features by an aware:
ness of being myself known by Another Mind which cries out to
of my 
me through the object/gtodbxg thought. Knowledge makes all
things articulate; it gives tongue to Nature and makes her 
re-echo the voice of someone who is finding us out, even as 
we come to find out the objective world. Man as a self- 
conscious being cannot stand before dumb objects or a blank 
inscrutable world. If and when he knows,and,through the 
object'becomes aware of his own reality as the subject of
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knowledge and the "bearer of experience, he is also aware that 
the object in some sense knows him in return,or that,in knowing, 
the world he knows drags him into the light of a higher 
intelligence. Man, the Knower, is drawn by every act of 
knowledge into a greater light than he, so to s$eak, "bargained 
for. Like a hooked fish he is lifted out of the stream of 
reality where, without knowing it, he moved freely as the 
stream itself, and is now a"bove the current and in other hands. 
The voice of God is never silent in the garden of knowledge. 
Self-conscious man, aware of himself and his environment, hears 
also the footsteps of the Lord God walking in the Garden. He 
knows that the footsteps are in search of him,and he hears the 
divine Voice calling him. Without this objective presence of 
the divine revealing itself in and through the Hot-Self, the 
Self would not become the human self, the self-conscious bearer 
of human experience.
If it be true that the Unity of Self-consciousness is 
an objective-unity, derived from the mind's own synthetic 
activity in the determination and organisation of the manifold 
presented to it, then it is also true that the concrete Self 
we know, the knowing, feeling, active self of man, is explicable 
only on the supposition that the Not-Self, standing over against 
the knowing subject, must be viewed as possessing a nature 
similar to that of Self-consciousness. IheUnity of the self- 
conscious subject and the Unity of the object are correlates,
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only the correlation is more than the correlation of two 
abstract unities. The Self and the Not-self, subject and 
object, are "both knowing centres. Indeed it is only by 
becoming aware of a Knower in Nature that man becomes aware 
of himself as a self-conscious reality. Involved in human 
experience are two Knowers, the subjective knower and the 
objective. I can only know myself as an intelligent 
existent being in so far as I become aware also that my 
world has a nature similar to my own. The idea of self arises 
in strict dependence upon the idea of the Not-Self,'which means 
that self-consciousness comes to birth in the act of knowing 
the world. But that is not all. Analysis of the idea of self 
will reveal the important fact that it implies a certain Evalu: 
ation of the Not-Self which makes the latter the expression and 
in some sense the bearer also, of self-conscious Spirit. It 
would be difficult indeed to imagine man possessing an idea of 
self as an intelligent reality unless at the same time he was 
aware, in some measure, of another mind as the ground of the 
world which he knows. We must conclude then, as our first step, 
that Self-consciousness is only possible on the basis of an 
objective order which itself expresses a Spirit that knows 
us through the object, even as the object is known by us.
To support this conclusion we may turn to Professor 
Ho eking f s searching analysis in his well-known work "The 
Meaning of God in Human Experience." "It seems to me,"
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he says, "that the original source of the knowledge of God 
"is an experience which $ight "be described as an experience 
"of not "being alone in knowing the world, and especially the 
"world of Nature." (p.236) But he thinks that this amount of 
insight into the character of God would leave man facing an 
oppressive mystery. It would lead to no positive affirmation 
about the possibilities of the world, and man the worshipper, 
although he might fling himself on the Unknown,would still be 
conscious of a great gulf between him and God.
Professor Hocking improves on his first statement of 
the ultimate deliverance of the religious Consciousness. "If
•
"that original experience of the presence of God in the world 
"can reach to some permanent hold on its object, so that it 
"might be expressed *I know not; but He knows,• the entire 
"aspect of religion is altered. The reconciliation of men with 
H such a world is no longer degrading nor disloyal.......Prom
t
"the knowledge that 'He knows* will be inferred the thesis 
"that the Unknown of Nature is Knowable." (p«237)«
The original sources of religion, he finds in "Man's 
"awareness of an other than himself, an Other who may be a 
"companion, but also an enemy more deadly than death, more 
"dreadful than Nature in herself has any image of." (p.238) 
And again, "At the source of all religion, so far as our 
"analysis can discover, we find an experience of God as an 
"Other Knower of our world, already in close relation to self,
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"and also in some natural bond with our social and physical 
"experience." (p.240)
. After thus describing the content of the religious
/ 
consciousness he proceeds to enquire how the mind of man
arrives at an experience of God as an Other Knower. He sees 
that the difficulties involved in this problem are similar 
to those we meet with in trying to explain the origin and 
nature of our social intercourse with other finite minds. 
"We have, he thinks, no direct experience of other minds. 
"Souls, by their own nature, cannot touch each other; cannot 
"experience each other; their relations do not rise to the 
"point of knowledge, they remain excursions, adventures, 
"hypotheses, wonderfully sustained by their results, but none 
"the less, launches from solitude in the direction of an 
"assumed reality; which reality if it exists, is no less 
"solitary." "I have no organ" he adds, "for the experience 
"of other mind; by the nature of other mind, I could have none." 
(p.24f).
According to him, the communications by means of which 
we do achieve social experience - physical signs and symbols 
from gestures to explicit language - do not build us a "veritable 
"experience of other mind." There is communication,but no 
immediate experience. The conviction of the reality of other 
mind is based on an inference - a thought process in fact, - 
and not on direct apprehension. "We can still speak only of
"'the source of our belief in the reality of our fellow men,« 
"not of an experience of that reality." (p.249).
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All these ways of striking contacts with another mind 
which it is sought to prove its reality presuppose that 
the mind is "furnished in advance with an idea of an Other Mind. 
"We are able to read our signs as we do, "because we already 
"expect them to mean something, we have already framed somehow 
"the conception of another mind ..... The conception of the 
"fellow-man, somehow obtained, is necessary before my duty of 
"acknowledging him can be performed, or understood." (p.2^1)
The failure of outward signs to bring me into immediate 
experience of an other mind ( makes it necessary to seek for 
such experience of him, along the only other way open, viz:- 
through the world which he as Knower holds as the content of 
his thought. In knowing his world I shall get nearer to 
knowing him as Knower, and striking real social intercourse 
with him,J "A perfect social experience would require that 
"this present world of Nature should be known as being the 
"World of the Other, precisely as it is my World." "For as it 
"seems to me, this present World 'of Nature is known by me as 
"being, in just this sense, a common World; it seems to me, 
"indeed, that it is not otherwise known - that is, that a 
"knowledge of Other Knower is an integral part of the simplest 
"knowledge of Nature itself." (P.268-9).
The proof which Professor Hocking gives of this implied 
social consciousness in all consciousness of Nature is twofold. 
In the first t place he points out that every attempt to establish
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my own loneliness with Nature implies a setting up of "barriers 
to shut out all intruders. In shutting myself in I am also 
shutting everyone else out. My loneliness is not solitariness, 
therefore, "because it implies the awareness of other minds 
which at any moment may break in upon me. "My negative 
"sociability has a very positive social consciousness at its 
""basis." Underlying my own separation from other minds there 
is a continuous reality which serves aa the basis of all 
possibility of communication. "All actual approach implies 
"a deeper-going presence as an accomplished fact." (p.273) 
Social experience is then something fundamental and has no 
beginning, except the beginning of life itself.
The second line of proof is the contention that we 
could only know our experience to be non-social by contrasting 
it with an experience n&t-ao.^confined, an experience that is 
of a world shared by an Other Mind. If I know that my world 
is mine alone I make that Judgment only because I have an 
Idea of my experience not-so-confined. The Idea of social 
experience is,therefore(logically prior to the idea of a 
world as a world in my experience alone.
But this Idea, so Professor Hocking argues, cannot be 
a mere Idea. It must, as an Idea, arise from actual experience. 
"In any sense in which I can imagine or think or conceive an 
"experience of Other Mind, in that same sense I have an experi: 
"ence of Other mind, apart from which I should have no such
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"Idea." "The only point of view from which supposed social 
"experience can be criticised as incomplete is the point ojl 
"view of social experience itself. The only ground upon 
which this idea can be judged a 'mere idea* is the ground 
of this same idea as not mere, namely as actually "bringing 
me into presence of Mind which is not my own." (p.274.) 
There is nothing from which this idea of a genuine experience 
of Other Mind can arise except from the experience itself. 
It is not an imaginative construction based upon other 
material, whether physical or psychical or both together. 
"To reach the idea from there we must use the special relation 
"of Other-self-hood, which is the idea itself." (p.276). "My 
"idea of social experience is then, of social experience as it is: 
"my ideal and my idea are the same, - they refer me to what 
"I have." (p.277.)
But this idea of Other Mind although it arises from 
and is found within experience, is not derived from any 
impression made upon the mind. "My idea of Other Mind is at 
"the same time an experience of Other Mind." It is an Idea 
which is organic to the idea of Self. "Let me but think what 
"I mean by the Other Mind and there, as I find my Self, I find 
"the Other also. As an idea of a fundamental and constant 
"experience, bound up with my equally permanent experiences of 
Self and Nature, this idea is not prior to experience, but is 
indeed prior to all further social experience, to all such as 
is intermittent and subject to error. This fundamental
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experience, and its idea, deserve from their position in 
knowledge, to be called a concrete a priori knowledge. 1* 
(p. 277-8.)
According to Professor Hocking then, the enquiry 
into our Knowledge of other minda k leads to the conclusion 
that it is only through our consciousness of Nature that 
any immediate knowledge of them is at all possible. The 
knowledge we have seems to be knowledge based on inference 
from outward and bodily expression which only leads to 
belief^and not to immediate experience. Heal experience of 
other minds is, however, something given as a fundamental 
feature of self-consciousness through intercourse with the 
natural world of objects. But this immediate awareness of 
other minds turns out to fee not directly achieved even through 
our consciousness of Nature. What that consciousness reveals 
in the first place is the awareness of an Other Mind not of 
other minds. The awareness of Self implies^as its correlate,
*
an awareness of Other Mind, of God in fact, revealed within 
the subject-object relationship. A self-conscious being is 
constrained by the condition of its awakening,through its 
own activity in the building up of experience^ to think of the 
objective world as known by an Other. "We cannot genuinely 
"conceive ourselves as mentally alone in this Cosmos." (p.278) 
And this awareness of an Other is not first an idea but an 
experience,from which Self-consciousness takes its rise,and 
from which it cannot escape. It is an experience involved in
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the development of the Self from the first, an experience 
arising from the peculiar part that Nature herself plays in 
that development. As I am creative of Nature, so also is 
Nature creative of me. The Not-Self is found to have a 
character that both submits to and controls my mental reaction 
to it as a Given of Experience. But Nature obstinate is also 
Nature Creative, creative of the self which knows her. "Is 
"not that outer activity then essentially creative in its constant, 
"action - creative of me ? My dependence upon Nature, my 
"momentary submission to its independent, obstinate, objective 
"decision of what Pact and Truth shall be, both in principle 
"and detail:- is not this a finding of my own mind? It is here 
"in this momentary (as well as permanent) creation of my Self 
"that I begin, I say, to find Nature taking on the aspect of 
"an Other Mind. For if the full-fledged otherness of that which 
"is thus over against me cannot be doubted neither can it be 
"doubted that this which so immediately becomes Self* makes Self, 
"is already a Self even in its otherness - namely an Other Self." 
(pp. 286-7).
This awareness of an Other Mind is then "our fundamental 
social experience." Our social consciousness ia essentially a 
religious consciousness, an awareness of God as the meaning of 
the world, the universal Knower implied in every act of Knowing.
"This social experience is not an inference but an immediate\
"experience. As simply as Nature presents itself as objective,
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"JJust so simply and directly is the Other Mind present to me 
"in that objectivity, as its actual meaning. I do not first 
"Know my physical world as a world of objects and then as a 
"world of shared objects: it is through a prior recognition 
"of the presence of Other Mind that my physical experience 
"acquires objectivity at all. The objectivity of Nature is 
"its community, not two facts,but one; but the whole truth of 
"this fact ...... - the whole of this fact is Community."
(pp.288-9-)
Here then is definite support for our thesis that Self- 
consciousness is possible only through the determination of 
the objective trcd«r~*s-expressive of a Mind^in the~ sense of a 
Knower who knows the world of objects even as we know it. 
Self-consciousness is essentially a communal consciousness. 
It arises on the basis of an intuitive apprehension of God 
in relation to all objects of experience. But that apprehension 
is made possible through the presence in knowledge of an 
a priori principle of evaluation conditioning experience 
and not derived from it. It is not through objectivity, in 
the physical sense of an object determined by the categories 
of the Understanding,that Self-consciousness arises. There 
is something more fundamental involved. It is the presence 
in all Self-conscious apprehension of the world, of a sense 
of community with an Other Mind. It is this Other Mind as
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present in the object that gives it objectivity, as Professor 
Hocking rightly insists. It could not be • objective* to me 
unless it was known also as the object of an Other Mind. The 
objectivity therefore, which as Kant taught fc&ft condition e 
Self-consciousness is richer than his objective unity; it is 
now a religious object - an object which is known not by me
only but by an Other Mind, that is, by (Jod. My own rational 
Self of which I am aware is, on this showing, a religious Self. 
Its genesis is made possible through a religious determination 
of the Not-self. God is not an inference/therefore > from the 
facts of the world known in a secular way as a world of mere 
physical or even psychical objects. Self-consciousness knows 
no such secular order of Nature. Secularism is, as we pointed 
out earlier, an achievement of the scientific spirit, and an 
impoverishment of the pristine and pure nature of self-conscious: 
ness.
Religion then takes root in the self-conscious spirit 
itself, and without religion there would be no self-conscious 
spirit. As a consequence, religious ideas, especially the idea 
of God,-are an experience on the perceptive level even before 
they become ideas,and since experience is essentially objective 
as well as subjective, the religious evaluation of the world is 
objectively valid, for it is itself the objective garaund of 
self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is a communal conscious: 
ness from the moment cf its genesis. It implies an objective
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order depending on the presence in it of an Other Mind, the 
apprehension of which conditions even objectivity itself. 
Religion therefore claims objective validity, not only on the 
same basis as Science claims it; its claim is prior, for 
without the religious evaluation the objective world would not 
be there at all as it is known in the pure act of self-conscious 
awareness.
Moreover, if the idea of God, of an Other Mind, is thus 
constitutive of experience and not merely regulative, if it arises 
in the mind through the objectivity that conditions self-conscious: 
ness, it is no longer a posteriori, derived from experience; 
it is strictly and concretely a priori* Its source is in the 
mind itself which throws it up through the objectivity by which 
self-consciousness comes to birth. It is not a priori in the 
Cartesian sense, however, but in the Kantian sense as a principle 
of knowledge through which experience, as we have it, is made 
possible. Religion then, is a characteristic of rational life, 
and its valuations are objectively valid and express real 
features of the world we know in self-conscious experience. 
Religion is at least as real as self-consciousness,and God at 
least as real as the world.
Having gained this point we must face certain difficulties 
which so abstruse a matter as this naturally leaves on our hands. 
We have claimed Professor Hocking on our side,and,in so far as 
we have allowed him to be our guide and inspiration,our claim
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will "be seen to "be justified. The quotations already given 
support our a priori thesis in four ways. According to him 
self-consciousness implies community. This sense of community 
* B a priori a constitutive element in self-consciousness and 
therefore is not an inference from anything different from 
itself. It arises in the first place through the world of 
objects which is evaluated in such a way as to be expressive 
of an Other Mind. This Other Mind of which the self has 
experience is in some way bound up with the world of objects 
and my knowledge of Him is not through inference as in the 
case of my fellow men but immediate*
How it is obvious that, although these conclusions help 
us materially, they leave us in severe perplexity regarding 
many things vital to our argument. In on$ particular at least 
the position of Professor Hocking as revealed in our quotations 
falls short of our fundamental a priori principle of religion, 
as we have tentatively formulated that principle. For him the 
Other Hind is experienced,not, as in our principle, as the 
Knower who, in the moment of my self-consciousness knows me 
through my awareness of the world, but only as an Other Mind, 
known to me as another Self knowing and indwelling the object. 
The Community is one-sided* I know the object and the Other 
Mind, but the Other Mind does not necessarily know me in the 
i#xtfcB act of self-conscious awareness on my part. But so 
long as the Other Min^L remains thus ignorant of me, not only
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is he not on an equality with me but he is definitely inferior, 
in that, while he knows the object only^I know both the object 
and him. Self-consciousness therefore, while it implies the 
awareness of an immanent mind in the object, - my other Self 
as the correlate of my true Self, - does not imply, on this 
showing, that the Other Self knows me in my knowing act. 
We are not told that Self-consciousness implies both knowing 
an Other Mind and being known by Him. Until we have reached 
the position when the Other Mind% not only is known by me, but 
also knows me in my act of knowing,there is no real community. 
Unless the Other Mind, which Professor Hocking admits to be 
an implicate of self-consciousness, - rises to the dignity of a 
divine mind f It will not, and cannot, be identified with the God 
of Religion. Our God is but the God of animism of spiritism. 
He must therefore, as the Other Mind, be shown to bear this 
character for self-consciousness, and become the Supreme Being 
who can be identified with the Unity of the self and the Hot-Self, 
th&;; Unity, which Caird found^underlying the oppositions of 
the finite, and present in every self-conscious act. It must 
be shown,then,that in WLng aware of myself I am aware, not only 
of the object and of an Other Mind indwelling it, but also of 
being known by the Other Mind, which transcends the subject - 
object relationship in a more real sense than I do. In other 
words I must be aware that in my knowing,! am known, that in 
fact through all my knowing, the world, because of the Other Mind
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that indwells it, is creating me and knowing itself through me. 
Professor Hocking has already taken us so far as to admit that 
the Other Mind does in some way indwell the object, and not merely 
has it as an object of thought. He has definitely laid it down 
that real social experience is not achieved so long as the only 
link between two knowers, the only common ground of communication, 
is the world which each knows. That is not real community, nor 
does it create real community, unless community is already in 
some way a fact. Professor Hocking clearly sees that real com: 
munity must be immediate, end that the Other Mind must be in 
the objective world in a sense which enables me to hold him
i
as the not-self of my consciousness. So far, he has not told 
us how the truly religious community is reached, how the Other 
Self transcends the subject-object relationship, and comes to 
know me even as in my self-consciousness I become aware of him. 
Until we discover the conditions which will elucidate this
/
backward movement - this return of the other mind upon my 
consciousness - we have not explained the nature of the Religious 
Consciousness in its concrete reality. For the Other Mind is and 
always has been for religion a transcendent reality which lives 
in the world Order as well as in the mind and heart of the 
thinker and the worshipper. The objective Order, therefore, 
through which the religious Self arises, must be shown to reveal:
"A presence that disturbs me with the joy 
"Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime 
M0f something far more deeply interfused, 
"Whose dwelling is the light of setting Suns, 
"And the round ocean and the living air, 
"And the blue sky, and in the mind of man;
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MA motive and a spirit, that impels 
"All thinking things, all objects of all thought, 
"And rolls through all things." 1)
The Divine Reality of the religious consciousness is 
not in the world only but in the mind of man too, as Wordsworth 
saw, rolling indeed through-all things. It implies the power-to 
return upon me from the world I know,and is experienced both as 
an objective Presence and as a living Power within my own life.
•.
The community known to religion is more than community of minds 
thinking the same thought. It is a community of souls, of 
spirit touching spirit, a community which is^what in religion
.*
is known as Communion. This is the supreme task of religious 
philosophy, to show how this communion implied in xeligious 
experience is created through man»s intercourse with nature, 
and how it is implied in the fact of the religious self-con: 
sciousness. Religion is never a fellowship among equals but a 
communion with the Spirit of the Universe, which expresses 
itself both in me as knower and in the world which I know.
- • v- t
In all my knowing,therefore,I am known. The transcendence of 
the subject-object relationship by my religious Self-consciousness 
is not an achievement of my own mind alone. It is achieved 
through the Other Mind's knowledge of me. In so knowing me 
It makes the Unity underlying the subject-object synthesis a 
spiritual and intelligent reality> instead of a bare unity of
1) Wordsworth: "Tintern Abbey."
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knower and known. It becomes a divine Unity because the antithe: 
sis is resolved, not by me only, as the subject who knows the
**
object, but by the object itself which I am constrained to 
deem a Subject who knows me, and creates me, in all knowledge of 
the world.
For religion, God's relation to man is more important 
than his reLa.tion to the world. The fundamental thing in the 
religious consciousness is not the awareness of God as Knower 
or owner of the world; this is secondary and a logical consequent 
of a deeper epistemological fact. The deeper Spirit of religion 
is the awareness that God's eyes are upon us, that He knows us. 
What the religious a priori provides, then, is a consciousness of 
an Other Mind which finds me out, and knows me, in my knowledge of 
the world. For religion,every object is r in some deep mystical 
way, a subject. God not only knows the object I know; He dwells 
in it and from its windows looks out at me. He is, then, mo re 
than I am, He is an Other Self who is more than an echo of my 
Self- He looks down on me, and owns both me and the world. In 
the objects where I find Him, He is active, active in His search 
for me, and all objects are in His hand working his own Will. 
This awareness is, let us repeat, the fundamental deliverance 
of religion, and is the a priori condition of self-consciousness.
The religious consciousness, therefore, is aware not only 
that an Other Mind exists and knows the seme world as the Self. 
It knows something positive about the character of the Other.
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It knows him as Superhuman, who possesses the world and dwells 
in it, and for that reason, possesses also the Self-conscious 
subject too. In other words he is God,"before whom the Self 
falls down in worship. He is the Spirit that indwells the 
objective order, the Unity in a vague sense that over-arches 
the subject-object relationship. Self-consciousness implies, 
then,more than the consciousness of objects, and more than the 
awareness of an Other Knower: it implies a God consciousness. 
It is essentially a idigious consciousness.
But Professor Hocking is on our side even in this demand 
that the other Mind should be more than another mind merely
•
like our own. "That is no genuine social experience," he says 
"which is not known as such by the participants.*1 "Two conscious 
"beings can communicate only if they already have some known 
"point in common, some object known by each as object to both. 
"If I have any genuine social experience at all, then at some 
"point I do actually know the Other Mind in its knowing ......
"that is, in the address of the communication to me." "This,*1
he adds, "seems a great deal to claim of the expeiience of 
"Other Mind in Nature; but I cannot escape these conclusions. 
"And I see clearly that there is in no assembly of fellow minds 
"any conscious reference of Nature to me; as I see that I have no 
"conscious part in presenting my world of objects to them." "In 
"short we are all, whether singly or collectively, empirical 
"knowers of Nature. But if there are none but empirital knowers
g*0.
"in the world there is no social experience. I am only in
"presence of an Other Mind when I have pressed through the\ i
"region of my passivity, and turning its corner, have come upon 
"that which is there actively and intentionally creating me."
"There is no sociality for any knower, so we now discovar, 
"until the objectivity of Nature wins its further meaning and 
"is found as an intentional communication of a Self wholly 
"active." (pp.294-?)
Here Professor Hocking admits the unique character of 
the Other Mind. To gain social experience, "both It and I must 
not only be knowers of the same object but we must both be 
aware of each other f s knowing it. I must know that the Other 
Mind knows me in my act of knowing, both the object and It. 
We must know that we know each other as knowers. But this is 
never given in the relation of empirical knowers. They may 
know the same object, but they need not and cannot know each 
other as knowers. Since therefore, the Other Mind does seem 
to know me, even as I know him, he is veritably an Other Self 
who is active in the world I know^ and who finds me out, so to 
speak, in all my knowing. Bound up then with my self-conscious: 
ness is a consciousness of an Other Self who, because I am known.; 
of Him,transcends me and my world - both subject and object - 
and is not any longer an empirical knower merely. He is the 
active principle of my world, and I recognise in him the divine 
reality. He is more than a "mere That Which, without predicates.
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"Substance is known as Subject: reality from the beginning is 
"known as God. The idea of God is not an attribute which in 
"the course of experience I come to attach to my original whole- 
H idea: the unity of my world which makes it from the beginning 
"a whole knowable in simplicity, is the unity of other selfhood. 
"God then is immediately known, and permanently known, as the 
"bother Mind which in creating Nature is also creating me. Of 
"this knowledge nothing can despoil us; this knowledge has never 
"been wanting to the self-knowing mind of man." (p.296-7)
When Professor A. F. Whitehead *•' defined religion as 
"What the individual does with his own solitariness, " he is not 
expressing the whole truth. The solitariness of the individual 
is not absolute. We do not start with "God the Void" but with 
God the "Watcher of men." "I am not alone," said Jesus, "because 
"the Father is with me." The progress of religion is rather 
from God the Watcher to "God the enemy, and from God the enemy 
"to God the companion." It cannot be from God the Void; from 
the void nothing can come. Self-consciousness implies communion, 
and although its solitariness is "an awful ultimate fact" as 
regards finite relationships, it is not the final basis of the 
Soul. Self-consciousness is God-consciousness.
To sum up: Self-consciousness implies a consciousness 
of an other mind as another knower of my world. The objective
1) Religion in the Making, p.6
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world,through knowledge of which I gain consciousness of self, 
is not a dumb or dead world. As I know it, it expresses for 
me a meaning which,because it is partly independent of my 
knowing act, I-perceive as the object of an Other Mind. But 
the Other Mind is always more than another knower of my world. 
He knows me also as well as my world, for since I discern him 
in the object,He indwells the object and constitutes its meaning 
and reality. He therefore transcends the subject-object relal 
tionship and is the Unity which I recognise as present in every 
act of knowledge. But He is a«lf-conscious Unity sustaining 
both me and my world. He is what we mean by God, and our aware: 
ness of His presence in knowledge is the root of religious 
experience.
But this awareness is immediate and not based on an 
inference. It is an implicate of our knowledge of Self 
mediated through the mind's reactions to the world of sense 
data. The consciousness of God is a concomitant of the con: 
sciousness of self, and apart from the former the latter would 
not be possible. We could have no self-consciousness were we 
not also aware of the world as the expression of the Infinite 
Mind.
At the same time this consciousness of God is a priori 
in character. Though it emerges within experience of the world 
and could not emerge without it, it is not derived from experi: 
ence in the sense that a aalf-conscious experience is first given,
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and then an experience of God "built up thereon. The consciousness 
of God is due to a principle of Evaluation implied in all self- 
conscious experience, and its source must "be attributed, in the 
last resort, to the Mind itself. It is one of the ways of knowing 
the world, and a condition, albeit a fundamental condition, of 
the rise of self-consciousness. And if Professor Hocking is
/
right, as we think he is, the consciousness of God is at once 
the "basic principle of social intercourse, and, as we hope to 
show later, of the moral consciousness as well. Self-conscious: 
ness then implies community from the start as one of its condi: 
tions. But the community is not "between finite minds. It is 
a communion with God, and as communion with God is the very 
essence of religion,Self-consciousness is also everywhere and 
always a consciousness of God.
Chapter XII.
THE METAPHYSICS OF THE RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS.
The epistemological principle of religion which we 
enunciated in the last Chapter and found to "be a characteristic 
of self-conscious mind, is not without a suggestion of novelty. 
For that reason, if for no other, it may "be well to crystalise 
it "by giving it a local habitation and a name.
Obviously Professor Otto's term, "numinous" will not 
serve our purpose. For one thing Otto's term is too subjective 
as being merely a quality of the real world, apprehended by the 
mind without any direct identification of the Numan with the 
Unity implied in all self-consciousness. The numinous category, 
although constitutive b;f experience, and therefore a priori, is 
neither comprehensive of other categories of thought, nor yet 
organically related to them. It is only one characteristic 
mode of self-conscious awareness, parallel to but not condi: 
tioning other categories.
As we saw, Professor Otto, because of this defect in 
his reading of the religion a priori, found it no easy matter 
to discover any essential, organic connection between the
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numinous and the moral consciousness, between religion and morality. 
He could only accomplish the rapprochement by a tour de force , 
by the assumption of a still further a priori principle involved 
in dedxeoHniaadszg: the development of the religious personality. 
What that principle of connection is he does not tell us, nor 
does he attempt to formulate it. As for our principle it has 
become clear that it purports to be the fundamental ground of 
self-consciousness itself, and as such is at once the condition 
both of social experience and of the ways in which the human 
spirit reacts to its physical environment.
It will therefore be organically related to all ?rays 
of knowing, of acting, and of aesthetic appreciation.
Following the Gnostics and Professor Huxley, we will 
make use of the Greek verb which served their purpose so well. 
We will call our supreme principle "Gnosthentic", using the 
passive form,and expressing thereby what we have laid down as 
the chief element in the religious self-consciousness, viz:- 
the awareness of an Other Self who knows me in all mykttoifing. 
Self-consciousness is therefore essentially a Gnosthentic 
consciousness and for that reason every rational mind who 
is capable of the consciousness of self and of the world, is 
also, not only capable of knowing God, as Caird put it, but 
already is conscious of a Divine Mind that knows the knower^ 
and possesses both him and the world he knows, both, that isfto 
say, the Self and the Not-Self. Through the recognition of
246.
this principle as fundamental for self-consciousness we can 
see the way opening before us for the ultimate reconciliation 
of the God of religion with the Absolute of Philosophy, and 
with afcixjcbklo. the supreme end of human conduct. Religion is 
now not the result of speculation or a postulate of the 
practical reason. It is the ground and inspiration of all 
human effort to know the world and to realise the chief end 
of life. As self-conscious beings we begin with God as the 
Unity of all knowing, and as the mediator of all social
•*»
intercourse.
But something more must be said concerning the nature 
of this 'Gnosthentic.' consciousness. If bound up with awareness 
of the Self and of the world,self-consciousness includes also 
an awareness not merely of the Unity underlying Self and the 
Not-Self, but of God who knows both subject and object, we are
forced to revise somewhat our estimate of the act of knowing.
the
Hitherto we hae emphasised/synthetic activity of the mind in 
the building up of a world of objects. Self-consciousness, 
we pointed out, following Kant, is possible on account of the 
Mind's own contribution to the constitution of the object and 
therefore of Experience. Only through the labour of our own 
hands, so to qpeak, is it possible to become aware of ourselves 
as thinking beings. By constructing the object along lines' 
laid down by the categories of thought, I am stole to find the 
objective unity which mediates for me the sense of the Unity
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of my own 
and continuity and separate Existence/ gixixg ftSX life. The
unity of the object in making self-consciousness possible
provides, however, not only knowledge of the Self and the object,
is implied in 
but of the Unity also that/$xwrannbi the subject-object
relationship. It is clear therefore that if self-consciousness 
is Gnosthentic in character the..nature of the object which 
conditions it will give rise to an awareness of a transcending 
Unity having a nature similar to the nature of the object, and 
richer than a mere logical bond of union. Self-consciousness 
is never, except by abstraction, an awareness of Self as a logifc 
cal Unity. This logical Unity is a discovery of metaphysicians. 
It is a pure concept and not to be identified with Reality. 
If there be an objective ground to our knowledge of ourselves, 
that ground is a concrete objective world^and the self which 
is known through it is always a concrete self standing in a 
real environment and facing a concrete situation. The real 
objective ground of the Self must, therefore, be an other Self, 
a concrete intelligent existent. The Unity underlying tt#' giabject 
object relationship in self-consciousness, scud of which the Self 
is aware in every act of knowledge, is a Unity'determined by 
the nature of the object known, for it is the nature of the 
content apprehended in knowledge which, on any idealist doctrine, 
accounts for self-conscious awareness. The Unity of subject 
and object is, then, both concrete and objectively constituted 
and must be understood in terms of the object. This seems to be
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the fact, the fundamental fact of self-consciousness, by which 
all self-consciousness takes on its religious character, as 
its very essence.
Since the Other Mind which is the objective correlate 
of Self-consciousness.indwelling and constituting the world of 
experience,^becomes the Knower of the Self, it also transcends 
the subject-object relationship, only now the transcendence is 
from the side of the object and not of the Self. It is because, 
in the religious consciousness,the transcendence takes place 
from the objective side, that the Unity of the world is, for 
religion,a peraonal Reality, and not a blank characterless 
Absolute. It is more than a formal Unity because the Self- 
consciousness through which we become aware of it is more than 
a mere unity, even as the object is. When once we realise that 
the awareness of the Self is never merely an awareness of a 
subjective Unity persisting and identical in all mental reactions 
to stimuli, but rather of a Self that is concrete and active, 
the bearer of experience, standing in a living real relationship 
with the world, we see that the Unity of Subject-object is also 
a concrete, living unity. In fact when we do speak of 'Unity 1 
in this connection, whether of Self, of Not-Self, or of Go£, we 
are guilty of SS*lb^»lj^an Abstraction. The Unity here is 
but one aspect of a concrete reality. The true nature of Self- 
consciousness does not lie in the Unity but in that which
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constitutes the Unity, which is the concrete thinking or 
experiencing mind.
If now, we are in earnest a^out the Gnosthentic 
principle as the fundamental form of self-consciousness, we 
are naturally driven to accept this awareness of an Other Mind 
as the real Unity in Knowledge, the true form of the Synthesis 
of Subject-and object. To say that, in knowledge, the self trans: 
cends itself and the object that it knows, is not the whole truth. 
What is the whole truth is that the real transcendence of subject- 
object in knowledge is accomplished by the Other Mind,who, because 
it indwells the object and knows the subjective-knower, becomes 
the Subject - the objective Subject - of all predication. But 
that is not all. Because the Objective Subject knows me as well 
as the object, it becomes the Absolute Spirit, the absolute 
Reality, who reconciles and contains both me and my object. 
Within It all finite experience comes to pass. For this reason 
the Unity implied in knowledge is not a subjectively supported 
Unity nor a blank objective Unity. If I think of It as a blank
Unity it is something less than myself, seeing that it hasA
nothing wherewith to enrich my life, nor yet to be communed with. 
It can never inspire worship, for I cannot bow the knee in the 
presence of a characterless Absolute. It is something so vagae 
and so completely lacking in character that, though it may be an 
inalienable feature of self-consciousness, the individual knower 
can live his life in serene indifference to it. It is only, 
after all. an echo of the logical Unity of the Subject and Object
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in the Kantian sense. The subject and the object are the only 
reals that matter. The Unity that binds them is a blank Absolute 
which is not real enough to be even interesting. When the Unity 
implied in self-conscious experience is understood in this 
abstract way as a mere Notion, it is not strange that the God of 
Absolute Idealism is so very remote from the God of Religious *j 
faith, and that the way of their reconciliation becomes so 
difficult.
The truth is, however, that the main support, the 
chief buttress of the bridge over-arching subject and object 
is found, not on the subjective, but on the objective side of 
the relationship. The logical prdo&r and ground of self- 
conscious awareness lies in the objective order; not in its 
Unity merely but in its concrete Otherness, as an All-Knowing 
Not-Self standing over against me. The bridge is thrown across 
from that side,through the Other Mind knowing me. My awareness 
of myself as human personality comes to birth at the moment 
when I am aware that I am known by a Mind holding me through 
the world I perceive. I can have no human self-consciousness 
except on the ground of my awareness of an Other Mind that 
knows me. Some other condition than mere objective Unity is 
required to explain the Self as we know it. This other con: 
dition is the awareness of "being known,** which is the trans:
s
cendental ground of my self-conscious awareness. This 
objective buttress of tfce unity of subject and object in
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knowledge makes that unity real and concrete and intelligent f 
fit to become a true Absolute to be identified with the God 
of religion. The Absolute is now not a Notion but an experi: 
ence. It is the Reality in which H we live and move and have 
our being, M It is not an It at all, for It knows me in every 
act of knowledge on my part. The Absolute is God, known not 
directly as I know the objective world but immediately never: 
theless, as the Supreme Reality who actualises Himself in my 
finite experience. He is more immediate than perceptive 
experience. I experience God more intimately and more 
immediately indeed when I am known of Him % than when I know 
Him. Being known is the only perfect way of Knowing, as 
St.Paul discovered. "Then shall I know even as also I am 
known."
The God of Religion cannot be finally distinguished 
from the Absolute of Philosophy. When the demand is made 
that the latter must be above all relations^wherefcjfe the 
former must imply an external relationship, at least to the 
finite worshipper, we must not hastily conclude that it is 
the God of Religion that must be sacrificed. It may well be 
that the God of Religion is the only Satisfactory Absolute. 
At any rate the Absolute of Philosophy which transcends all 
the relations of human experience, including religious 
experience, remains unsatisfactory. We can never make sure 
that the finite self is real or not, and no Philosophy can
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hope £o stand which compromises the permanent integrity of 
the Soul. Man does not relish a philosophical Self-immolation. 
Hegel was right in insisting that the two are one, and the 
religious consciousness reveals the same logic at work as 
that which he found operative in all self-conscious activity. 
Yet Hegel's Absolute Spirit is far removed from the God of 
religion, so that religion with him passes over into philo: 
sophy. This takes place because he did not realise that all 
thinking is concrete before it is abstract, that self-conscious 
awareness is individual and immediate, that more than logic 
is ^present in the building up of experience, that the uniting 
principle of knowledge has, to begin with, a religious char: 
acter. If this standpoint were cleanly guasped, instead of 
the God of Religion becoming superseded by the Absolute of 
Philosophy, we would ha« the former controlling our meta: 
physic right to the summit of our speculation. Indeed 
Hegel admits that "the form in which in the first instance, 
H God exists for us is the mode of Sense-perception, of ides, 
of ordinary thought," and only "finally in the form of thought 
as such." But there is no reason why this primitive form 
should not yield us the true logic both of the religious 
reason and of dialectic, if we diligently searched for it in 
concrete experience. The logic which determines man to find 
God present in Sense perception may well be the logic which 
is deepest in his nature and v/hich may therefore give him 
the key to the nature also of the Absolute Spirit. Indeed
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Hegel finds the logic of religion to "be identical with the 
deepest logic of Self-consciousness, "but unfortunately he is 
controlled throughout by the logic of the Idea, leaving the 
religious self in tutelage> to the abstract Notion. A few 
extracts will help us to see how near he is to identifying 
the religious valuation with the nature of self-conscious 
activity, although, owing to his abstract starting point, he 
robs the objective ground of religion of its distinctive 
character as the Other Mind.
"Religion as something essentially spiritual, is, by 
"its very existence itself this process and this transition!1 
"(i.e. the passing of thought from the finite object beyond 
**itself to what is other)." In^the case of natural things 
"as, for example, the Sun, we are in presence of an immediate 
"existence at rest, and in the mental picture or idea we form 
"of it there is no consciousness of an act of passing over, 
"or transition. The religious consciousness, on the other 
"hand is in its very essence the parting from and forsaking 
"of what is immediate, what is finite; it is a passing over 
"to the intellectual, or objectively dfllned, the gathering up 
"of what is perishable into its absolute substantial essence. 
"Religion is the consciousness of what is in and for itself 
"true/ in contrast to sensuous, finite truth, and to sense 
"perception. Accordingly, it is a rising above, a reflect: 
"ing upon, a transition from what is immediate, sensuous, 
"individual (for the immediate is what is first and therefore
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"is not exaltation) and is thus a going out and on to an Other. 
"This does not mean however a going on to a Third, and so on, 
"for in that case the Other would "be itself again something 
"finite and not an Other. Consequently it is a progress onward 
"to a Second, but of such a kind thatjthis ̂ progress, this pro;
itself, and this Second
M is rather the First, that 7/hich is truly immediate and unposited 
"or independent. The standpoint of religion shows itself in 
"this transition as the standpoint of truth, in which the whole 
"wealth of the natural and spiritual world is contained ......
"By this demonstration, then, it is made clearly apparent that 
"Spirit cannot stop short at any of those states, nor can it 
"remain there, and that it is only religion which is the true 
"reality or actuality of self -consciousness." ^)
s
Here Hegel insists upon the onward and upward movement 
of the mind from every finite object. But it is not we who 
force this exaltation. That is due to the objective content 
itself. "Therefore it is not our reflection and study of the 
"subject, our judgment, which tells us that the finite with 
"which we begin is founded on something that is true. It is not 
"we who bring forward its foundation. On the contrary, the 
"movement of the finite itself shows that it loses itself in 
"something other, in something higher than itself. We follow 
"the object as it returns of itself to the fountain of its true 
"being. 2 ) ____ :.:.„__
1) Philosophy of Religion, Vol.1, p.!06. (Italics ours.)
2) Ibid, p. 107.
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This process is, according to Hegel, a process through 
the object, through Nature. The Absolute, or unity of subject 
and object is gained via the object. The movement of thought 
is essentially an objective movement through Nature to Spirit. 
"It is the essential character of Nature to sacrifice itself, 
"to consume itself, so that the Psyche comes forth out of this 
"burnt-offering and the idea rises into its proper element, 
"into its own ethereality." (p.109)
The religious consciousness is therefore a seeing in 
the object of a higher reality which comprehends the subject- 
object relationship. . It implies a return to the Self through 
the object and the Spirit which unites them. Hegel is obviously 
dealing here with religion as seen from the heights of his own 
metaphysical theory, but it is significant that he should find 
in the religious consciousness, the awareness of God, a move: 
ment of thought similar to and illustrative of, the essential 
nature of self-consciousness. Religion is for him the true 
reality or actuality of self-consciousness,because self-con: 
sciousness in its native activity passes beyond the physical, 
finite object as by an inner law, not beyond it in the sense 
of leaving it behind, but in the sense of absorption in a 
kigl#rf" synthesis,--And this in obedience to the nature of 
thought as expressive of Consciousness.
The importance of this for our purpose resides in
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the identification of religion with the movement of mind 
towards * tlie transcendence of itself through the object 
into the unity of the absolute. Religion like Philosophy 
is here not a partial interest of man but the expression of 
his self-conscious spirit. The standpoint of religion compre:
-»y.
hands "the whole wealth of the natural and the spiritual world, 
This comprehension is however, primitive and fundamental and 
not, as Hegel seems to imply, an achievement of religion on 
the higher plane of self-conscious life. The true logic of 
the Spirit evolves from a ttO.igiousrra-Kr.iDE; where God is already 
a fact, thedespSBt fact of human awareness. The sciences, 
physical, moral, and aesthetic, and even speculative, are 
differentiatfconsiSf the religious consciousness and the logic 
of the Spirit is in truth the logic of the religious self 
wherein God is not only known by the self but the self is 
also known 6? God. Religion does not then pass over to 
philosophy; its logic is the only true dialetic on our way 
right up to the Absolute.
The ground of the unity of subjiect-obj ect implied in 
self-consciousness is > then, primarily objective. It is also 
subjective, for any awareness of the object is also a bridging 
of the gulf that separates me from it. The Unity, the Absol: 
ute, is then a bridge built in the first instance from the 
object and carrying the materials of that support into itself. 
It is also built from the subjective side but this is only a
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secondary movement. It is Tout passing over a structure 
already there as a framework, the throwing of plsnks for 
the feet of man to tread and pass over. The Other Mind 
"builds the bridge in the first place, and does it from the 
objective side. This accomplished, the Self is enabled to 
return the compliment and go over to the object in full 
possession of knowledge both of itself, the object, and of 
God. But without the Divine Bridge the Self could not go 
over as a Self. This is a parable of what is a logical pro: 
cess, from, first to last, the unfolding of the nature of the 
mind in the act of knowledge. It declares the conditions of .- 
all possible experience, making Self-consciousness fundament: 
ally religious.
The importance of our insistence on the objective 
ground of the Unity of Knowledge, and its concrete character 
derived from the objective evaluation of reality, will be seen 
if we reflect on the inadequacy of a merely logical bond, 
which inevitably issues in a colourless Absolute. All monistic 
systems, whether those of the Elestics, the o.TT'eyaov of 
Parmenides, for example, or those of Spinoza and the Hegelians., 
fail to satisfy the requirements of religion. They are 
reached either by the via negativa, a denial of the reality 
of the finite, or else by a complete transmutation of ail 
particulars in the Universal. In both cases we are left with
258.
a 'lion's den 1 to which everything goes and nothing returns. 
Such a doctrine cannot satisfy the finite self which seeks 
for life and ever more life. All valueSj therefore, are removed 
from finite experience, and instead of being conserved are 
really lost. Against this absorption the religious conscious: 
ness must, and always does, rise up in protest.
"The religious attitude - all that we mean by worship, 
"adoration, self-surrender - is wholly impossible, if the 
"-selves are conceived as telephone wires, along which the 
"Absolute acts or thinks. As it has often been remarked 
"the system of Spinoza has no room in it for Spinoza himself, 
"and the 'intellectual love of God' with which he closes his 
"Ethics. That sublime acquiescence, that ardour of self- 
11 identification with the Spirit of the Universe, is possible 
"only to beings who are more than mere modes of a divine 
"Substance - whose prerogative it rather is to become sons 
"of God." !)
Religion asks that the infinite appearing in Knowledge, 
all the universal elements, together with the infinite 
implied in the Subject-object relationship, shall "be so 
understood as not to cancel out the finite particulars,, and 
among them the finite Self. Metaphysics must therefore 
give due heed to the nature of self-conscious awareness of
1) Pringle-Pattison, "Idea of God," p.291.
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of a Knower confronting every knowing subject. The deliver: 
ances of the religious consciousness must be jealously 
regarded in all metaphysical approach to Reality.
The Infinite present in all acts of knowledge, the 
infinite wherein both subject and object find their subsis: 
tence and coherence must be interpreted in strict accord
v
with the supreme principle of religion. The Absolute cannot 
be less than personal spirit, even if He may be more. 
Philosophy must not destroy Him as the Object of Piety. If 
the religious mind knows God as the intelligent Unity of 
self-consciousness there is no justification for departing 
from such a Divine Presence when we face the supreme task of 
thought in speculative philosophy. The religious man will 
always remain adamant against spy impoverishment of the 
Ultimate Reality. No Absolute can be acceptable which does 
not provide a God at least as warm, and concrete, and personal 
as the God of religion.
On the other hand the finite self, the only true centre 
of experience known to us, must not suffer the loss of absorp: 
tion or radical transformation in the Absolute. Self at least 
must remain real in a genuine sense. God though present in 
our immediate experience is never identical with the self. 
His reality is objective because He is given within self- 
consciousness as the Soul of the world. His being remains
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rooted in the objective order. That fact together with His 
character as the Know'er of the Self makes Him a^Beal Unity 
of Self and Not-Self, at once immanent in the world and present 
to the finite mind. In other words, God is "both immanent and 
transcendent, in organic union with the world and yet above 
it, neither on the one hand robbing the finite of reality, nor 
on the other, passing into a shadowy absolute without any 
inner determination at all.
Philosophers have always found this reconciliation of 
immanence with transcendence to be their stiffest speculative 
problem. They find themselves steering continually between 
the Scylla of an immanent Absolute which destroys the reality 
of the finite^and the Charybdis of a transcendent, deistic 
God, which leaves the finite world where it stood. A straight 
course seems impossible to them,and all their systems, like 
rudderless vessels, are driven, as by an unfriendly Fate, on 
to one or other of these rocks.
Discussion of the nature of the supreme Unity implied 
in knowledge proceeds as a rule on the supposition that the 
subject and the object, the Self and the Not-Self, must be 
treated alike as regards their dependence on the synthetic 
unity that binds them. In relation to God, the finite Self 
as the centre of experience and a finite world of objects as 
the content of thought, are treated as if the dependence were
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of the seme nature in both. If the Absolute as immanent 
obliterates the one it ipso facto obliterates the other. 
On the other hand, as a completely transcendent Absolute, it 
again metes out to them equal treatment. But why this equal 
treatment of subject and object within the unity of knowledge? 
Could not the objective world be sacrificed so long as we 
retained the complete reality of the thinking and experienc: 
ing self ? May not the world we know be no more than appear: 
ance,without implying that the finite Self is appearance also? 
The supreme interest of religion is the conservation and • 
redemption of the Self. No doctrine of God can satisfy man 
which does not provide for this.
How the supreme principle of religion as we have formu: 
rlated it, which is also the fundamental epistemological basis 
of all self-consciousness, while it finds God present in the 
world, retains the independence of the finite self. God f s 
relation to the world is not quite on all fours with Hie 
relation to man. The world is known of God and God indwells 
the world and, if we remain true to our principle, apart 
from God the world has no independent existence or true 
reality. All our knowledge of the world is knowledge of 
God as its ultimate reality. But to the self, Godlike the 
world, is objective, and fcnflLJudUsf; ix&ezf; Self/as the Omnis: 
cient Spirit. His relation to the world is essential, but 
to the Self it is mainly ideal.
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Although as touching the objective world God is "both 
immanent and transcendent, as touching the self his trans: 
:cendence is more obvious than his immanence. Indeed his 
immanence in the knowing Subject is ideal rather than 
actual. He is immanent but His indwelling is in terms of 
the apprehension of Him as transcending the world. Were He
completely immanent, the Self would be but a finite centre'*•• 
of the Infinite's own experience. But the rsality of the
finite Self is religion's basic conviction, which cannot 
be surrendered without destroying moral freedom and all 
real piety. But how then can we read the nature of the 
Absolute without doing violence to the Self? In some way 
God must taketiaefinite centre of experience into Himself, 
for He must be inclusive of all Reality. It were no loss 
to religion, if Nature, as objective, were proved to be mere 
appearance, but the Self must retain its reality at all 
co st B .
Now, God as the Divine Mind which'knows me in every 
act of knowledge is prevented from tricing over into Himself 
the finite thinker. He is prevented for the simple reason 
that He is the objective condition of the Self, and as such 
cannot, we repeat, ever be identified with the finite mind. 
He is too much bound up with the objective conditions of 
self-conscious awareness to be made the Infinite thinker in 
the finite centres of experience. This kind of immanence
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is only possible when God is thought of as the abstract 
unity of the subject-object relationship. As the third 
term, the synthesis only, he is neither subject nor object 
or else He is both. We are thus doomed to a God altogether 
transcendent or altogether immanent, and whichever we choose 
our Absolute is unfit to satisfy the religious need. A 
God altogether above the universe and a God altogether in 
the universe are equally destructive of real religion. 
In the same way neither kind of Absolute, one too abstract 
and the other too concrete, seems to meet the needs of 
Reason.
The religious consciousness alone, as it seems to me, 
can hold out hope of better success. Here God is an 
objective Reality indwelling "all objects of all thought."
By knowing the self He also transcends the objective 
world and stretches across to the subject. In all His 
knowledge the subject is, therefore, under the eye of God. 
On account of this discovery of the All-Knower, of the 
over-arching intelligent mind as the transcendental 
objective condition of self-consciousness^ we are saved 
from identifying God with the finite knowing Subject. We 
are saved because God must remain objective. To make Him 
also the subject is both to destroy God and to obliterate 
the Self. God and the Self instead of being antagonistic 
are mutually implied. Destroy the one and the other goes 
as well.
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Monistic philosophies fail to retain the equal reality\
of God and the finite Self. They are faced always with a 
fateful choice. In order to affirm God they must deny man: 
in order to affirm man they must deny God. If our principle 
1)6 the fundamental form of all self-consciousness we escape 
this dilemma. By affirming God we must affirm also the 
finite Self and vice versa, for God is the objective ground 
of self-consciousness.
What then is the nature of the relationship "between the 
finite Self and God as the unity of knowledge and therefore 
of self-consciousness? God, we must hold, remains objective, 
and fellowship with Him is a fellowship in terms of truth, 
goodness, and beauty. These values are values for the 
religious and not for the secular Self. The world which 
yields them is for ever a world wherein God is immanent, 
not in but to, the mind of man. The world is God's world, 
and all the values are already, and can be nothing else 
than, religious values. Through them does the mind rise to 
an increasing and ever deepening communion with God. And 
this communion is not an advancement only in our knowledge 
of God, it is a fuller realisation also of being known ©# 
God, or of God's omniscience and omnipresence. There is 
a serious fallacy involved in speaking of God as indwelling 
the finite self: We slip easily into thinking of Him on 
the analogy of an electrical charge indwelling a physical
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object. When we do thus speak of Divine Immanence we think 
of the soul as if it were a concrete physical thing.to "be 
seen and handled. All talk of God's immanence in the mind 
of man is purely analogical. The only way into the human 
mind is through the gate of the mind's own awareness. And 
God enters that way too. And He can only enter that way 
without destroying the ethical personality. "Even the 
"divine importunity," says Professor Pringle-Pattison, 
"will not force an entrance."
If we speak of God as thinking in the finite centre 
we know not what we say, for there is no trace of this 
anywhere in experience. It is we ourselves who think, and 
feel, and will, inside our own skins. Our communion with 
God is not a community of thinking but a communion of 
thoughts, and of feeling dependent on thought. We linct Him 
and He finds us in the world of truth and goodness and 
"beauty, and we cannot go any distance into these "Eternal 
Orders" without knowing that we are indeed walking with God. 
For do we not start off in his company? W&s He not there to 
"begin with when we awoke to the distinction of Self and 
Not-Self?
The religious consciousness, as we have expressed it, 
prevents us from identifying God, the absolute thinker, 
with the finite mind. At the seme time, as we have already
1) "Idea of God," p.292
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admitted, all finite centres must somehow be comprehended 
in God, for outside Him there can be no contingent reals. 
Are we then any nearer to a solution of the mystery of the 
indwelling of God juui in the individual Soul? In our 
anxiety to make the idea of God objectively valid have we 
made it impossible to bring Him into organic, existential 
relationship with finite mind itself? Let us hear Professor 
Fringle Pattison again.
"No doubt the creation of beings who are really selves, 
"with this measure of 'apartness' and independent action is 
"the 'main miracle 1 of the universe. It is in the very 
"nature of the case, impossible that we should understand 
"the relation ...... between a creative Spirit and its
"creatures whether as regards the independence conferred 
"or the mode in which the life-history of the finite being 
"still remains part of the infinite experience. Finite 
"beings know one another from the outside, as it were, the 
"knower being ipso facto excluded from the immediate 
"experience of any other centre. But there can be no such 
"barrier, we may suppose, between the finite consciousness 
"and the Being in which its existence is rooted. It must 
"remain open and accessible - it must enter into the divine 
"experience in a way for which our mode of knowing hardly 
"furnishes us with an analogy." •*•'
1) "Idea of God," pp. 292-3
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Such a deliverance as this from so great an authority 
would justify us in not pursuing the matter further. Yet 
its agnostic flavour is "by no means congenial. The religious 
man certainly stakes his life on his communion with God, 
and it would be strange indeed if the religious conscious: 
ness contained no clue to the manner of God's indwelling. 
Perhaps we already possess such a clue in our Gnosthentic 
principle. For if I, am known of God in every act of know: 
ledge, all my thinking, as well as my thoughts are known to 
Him. To Him all my heart is open and all my desires are 
known. His presence penetrates the inner cham"bers of my
<
thinking and experiencing aclf. I am all open to Him as the 
objective ground of my own self-conscious life. God enters 
my experience objectively but His entrance is not arrested 
at the outer Court. He penetrates to the Holy of Holies, 
yet He never takes possession of the Temple. He illumines 
it, and cleanses it but leaves me in charge all the time. 
My very innermost, the Ego itself., is not hidden from the 
light of His countenance. All my experience is therefore 
not mine alone; it is His too, without ceasing to be mine. 
This is possible only in terms of self-conscious awareness, 
so that the distinction between my own finite life and 
God's immanence in ray experience remains unchallenged. 
God's indwelling in the finite Self through the door of 
objectivity shares the finite experience without destroying
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the finite experience itself. The nature of self-conscious 
xKi«i£ awareness determines that all finite experience is a 
social experience and cannot therefore exist in isolation. 
God and the Soul stand or fall together.
What other kind of indwelling of God in man we require 
than this it is difficult to conceive. The notion of the 
Soul as a thinking substance can no longer he justified. 
It is this terminology which has given rise to all the 
difficulties associated with the manner of God's presence 
in the finite centre. It is clearly in terms of experience 
that we must view both God and man, the Infinite and the 
finite, and in this way the manner of God's indwelling must 
"be understood. If, then, our finite Conscious^ selves 
are conditioned as finite centres of experience "by the 
presence of God in all thinking and feeling and acting., 
'tur relation with Him and His relation with us is as 
intimate as we can possibly desire or conceive. It is 
an existential relationship, not on the physical analogy 
of interpenetration "but in terms of spiritual Communion* 
God, without "being the finite self is yet with us and 
within us. Our experience is His experience and only 
Toy "being His experience is it ours as self-conscious 
centres. Yet the separateness though it "be more or less 
distinct is never removed. Even mysticism never succeeds 
in attaining complete identification of the Soul and God*
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nor can sin totally destroy the communion. Indeed true 
piety enhances "both the reality of God and the richness 
of finite experience whfetfi it realises and affirms in 
ever increasing measure the "bond of union. Surely no 
more vital relationship than this,which is given in the 
religious consciousness, could well "be imagined. All 
finite experience is experience in God ; and to God; and 
here 4 if anywhere, is the key to all metaphysical truth. 
It is the metaphysic of the religious soul, where God 
is not an inference "but an experience, the Infinite in 
whom we "live and move and have our "being." To this our 
a priori quest leads us. God who is present to me as 
the content of all my thinking is immanent in me in the 
truest and only sense we can attach to 'immanence* in 
the realm of the spirit.
We do not therefore find God by reflexion on the 
nature of our values^ we find our values in the world 
and in Society where God is already present.
Religious experience is our fundamental experience. 
All ascent into the world of knowledge , every step in 
the realisation of the Good, every thrill engendered 
by the contemplation of the Beautiful is a stage in the 
soul's communion with God. But in this exaltation there 
is no loss of self-consciousness. That cannot Toe, for,
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as we have maintained, God is given in self-conscious 
awareness. The clearer our vision of God the deeper our 
consciousness of self.
On the other hand every secularising tendency in the 
pursuit of truth, every denial of God in Science and in 
moral living, is an impoverishment of self-consciousness, 
a narrowing of the capacity both for vision and for moral 
experience. When God drops out of a man's world something 
drops out of himself as a finite centre of experience, even 
from his own self-respect and sense of his own greatness. 
He takes the path of loneliness and isolation. If God is 
reduced to, and is lost in, a system of ideals.He at once 
becomes impoverished and stands definitely "below the human 
personality. The universe becomes depersonalised^and in 
such a universe the finite self must at the last suffer 
eclipse and destruction. The presence of the Ideal in 
life does not argue that the God of religion exists. That 
is the philosopher's way of speech. Instead we ought to
*
say that the Ideal is God's presence, for it is within our 
God-consciousness that we know our ideals. The quest for 
scientific knowledge does not lead to God as its goal; it 
rather interprets and reveals to us more clearly the God 
whom we already know. Nature is not really Godless to the 
human self, nor is the kingdom of humanity,where moral 
values are generated,itself an object of worship. As a
world of moral ideals it is less real because more abstract 
than the self which knows and experiences social fellowship. 
All social intercourse is conditioned throughout by the more 
fundamental social experience of our God-consciousness.
It may be well here to make it once more clear that when 
the awareness of an Other Mind is made to condition self- 
consciousness we are dealing with the self epistemologically, 
not psychologically. We are not saying that it is a natural 
thing for man to read the world in terms of his own image 
rnd cannot help doing so. We are not talking antnropomorphi: 
cally in the accepted meaning of that term. Our doctrine 
is that men would have no image of himself s.t all wherewith 
to interpret the world, unless the world was already crammed 
with the features of the Divine. The Other Mind is a logical 
condition of the self and is therefore a transcendental 
principle of knowledge. The Other Mind cannot then be 
anthropomorphically created because, apart from it, there is 
no anthropos from which it can spring. There is an anthro: 
pomorphism which is epistemological, as when we speak in a 
fundamental sense, of man as the measure of all things, and 
the key to Reality. It is to this that Professor Ward 
refers when he makes out that Kant's doctrine of knowledge 
was more anthropomorphic than he thought. But there is a 
psychological anthropomorphism by which man sees himself
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everywhere around him, and clothes reality with meanings 
and intentions reechoing his own particular desires and 
passions, and providing answers to the needs which spring 
from his own heart. The philosophy of religion has suffered 
much through the failure to distinguish "between those two 
ways of interpreting the function of mind in knowledge, 
confusing psychology with epistemology. Writers still 
speak of religion and the idea of God as a postulate 
thrown up from the pit of man's utter loneliness and 
impotence to serve as a support for the values of his life. 
To them religious faith is a kind of hypothesis sent out } 
like the dove from Noah's Ark, in search of dry land where 
the treasures of the soul may escape the engulfing waters 
of the great flood of time, and change, and mortality. Thus 
we find Dr Waterhouse still facing the problem of religion 
as if "God were the embodiment of human desire" and tlaax
religious faith nothing more than a postulate to seconcile
of 
the subjective need with the nature7 |teality. He does this
after he has previously admitted it to be a "rather strange 
"notion that the idea of gods is due to the imagination of 
"primitive peopled wistfully seeking comfort in an unkindly 
"world." The proof of the postulate is to be found in 
experience, and it is assumed that though the postulate is
1) "The philosophy of Religions Experience," p.119.
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"bound up with experience, man was a rational creature "before 
he discovered the need of such a postulate. Dr E&#;ard» 
while agreeing in the main with Waterhouse, feels constrained 
to remark that "The religious attitude was almost certainly 
"adopted on far other than experimental grounds ....." 
"I think it most likely that it was adopted and maintained 
""because of the presence of that original numinous element 
"in human experience to which Otto has drawn attention." 1)
This means that the psychological treatment of the 
religious consciousness farces us "back all along the line 
to epistemological cons.lderationswhich must face the 
nature of this human phenomenon as something "bound up with 
the character of self-consciousness. The anthropomorphism 
of religion, let us insist once more, is epistemological 
and not psychological. When therefore we say that awareness 
of Self implies as its condition an awareness of an Other 
Mind that knows the Self in every act of knowledge on the 
latter's part, we do not mean that man projects or o"bjecti: 
fies his own Self, for he has as yet no Self to project. 
What we mean is that the religious evaluation is essential 
to the rise of the human personality itself, and is there: 
fore a transcendental ground of self-conscious experience.
1) "Religious Experience," p.200.
CHAPTER XIII.
RELIGION AS AWARENESS AND FEELING.
It may "be urged, in criticism of the foregoing analysis 
of religious experience, that it makes religion to depend 
entirely on cognitive apprehension. According to our theory 
religion takes its rise from an awareness of a Mind in 
Nature that knows us in all our knowing, - whose presence 
is discernible in close association with the concrete 
objects of sense perception. Our argument seems to have 
proceeded without any regard to the undoubted fact that 
feeling is an essential feature of consciousness, and an 
important element in religious experience. The truth 
seems to be that religion instead of being a cold, intellec: 
tual interest is mainly a matter of emotion, and feeling is 
admittedly a constant and essential aspect of all conscious 
life. Moreover, if we insist on speaking of religion as 
arising from a certain specific and original valuation of 
objective reality then we must remember that values are to 
a large extent, if not altogether, dependent upon our 
feeling attitude towards the world of objects. Does not 
the a priori doctrine shut us up to cognition as alone
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providing the foundation of the religious consciousness and 
will it not also bring us at last to rationalism? It might 
then be urged against oo# position that not only has 
a priori am no place for feeling in the constitution of 
religious experience but that our own quest has completely 
ignored the place of emotion in the religious life.
Let us answer this objection. In point of fact we have 
already admitted to feeling a permanent place in religious 
experience even among the conditions of self-consciousness. 
We pointed out that the self is always a concrete self; 
never a mere unity, that it is indeed an experiencing self 
from the start, implying both feeling and conation. The 
neglect of feeling is really only apparent and nowhere has 
the discussion even suggested that the door is to "be closed 
against feeling as an inalienable aspect of the religious 
consciousness. The way we have handled the subject-object 
relationship has implied,all along,that self-conscious 
awareness is as much a 'feeling' experience as it is any: 
thing else. When we insisted upon a search for the con: 
ditions of self-consciousness,not in terms of the unity of 
the self alone, but in terms rather of the concrete subject- 
object situation, we were preserving for feeling a sure 
place in the constitution of the Self.
At the same time, our method has given to cognition the 
priority among the three aspects of mental life. This 
priority, logical rather than psychological, needs emphasising
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in the philosophy of religion because religious experience 
is very much a matter of emotion, and writers are easily led 
to make feeling the real differentia? of religious experience. 
Doubt regarding the objective validity of religious ideas 
and judgments springs directly from this over-emphasis upon 
emotion. We have stressed the importance of cognition not 
to prejudice the place of feeling,but only to rule out one 
particular theory of religion which would make it a mere 
matter of feeling. We refer to that which would make the 
emotional reaction to the world itself the sole Arigin of 
religious experience. This is what Brofessor Alexander 
seems to do, as we saw earlier. According to him,man is 
not aware of the divine quality or the voice of God in the 
thunder as cognised; he confers that quality on the object 
by virtue of the emotional response itself. First we have 
a perception, then an emotional reaction,and the object 
puts on its religious character only as a result of the 
emotion. Such a theory might be called emotional a priorism. 
but it would seriously imperil the objective validity of 
religious ideas. Indeed it would make them entrenched 
rather in the subject. Rey^idn would be entirely divorced 
from knowledge, and would become mere sentimentalism. The 
religion of feeling understood in this way is not far 
removed from the well-known James-Lange theory of the 
Emotions wherein emotion is deemed to be determined, not
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by the content of the subject's mind but by the organic 
disturbances occasioned by the objective situation. Both
•
leave the feeling element independent of the nature of the 
content of which the subject is aware. In the one case 
it is caused by the physical reaction, in the other by the 
psychic reaction. In neither does the emotion depend 
directly on the character of the object xafc which forms 
the content of the apprehending mind. It is against this 
form of emotionalism that our own emphasis upon cognition, 
as a necessary element in all religious experience, has 
been directed.
The Epistemology of religion, let us repeat, is a 
quest,not for the psychological or temporal origin of 
conscious life,but for the category of thought or awareness 
or valuation within self-consciousness which can explain 
the phenomena of religion without explaining it away. Even 
if we decided in favour of a feeling continuum &s the 
simplest and most primitive form of consciousness, that 
would not oosmit: us to an emotional theory of religion. 
The problem of the philosophy of religion is not the same
*
thing as the problem of genetic psychology. The resultsof 
the latter do not prejudice the inquiries of the former, 
or even influence it seriously. Religion is a character: 
istic not of all conscious life but only of self-conscious 
man. Religion is a feature of self-consciousness and our
a priori doctrine concerns only the prius involved in the 
religious valuation of the wo rid, and the presence in man 
of the idea of God* We must begin with the three aspects 
of consciousness, and cannot, in the nature of things,rule 
out any one of them. All theories of religion go wrong 
when they "base religion on one aspect alone to the exclusion 
of the rest. We give the priority to Cognition only because 
Cognition is more 'objective' in its grasp than either feel: 
ing or conation and the deepest problem of religion appears 
to be that of its objective validity. But the principle we 
have enunciated is not merely a principle of cognition. It 
is equally an affective and a conative principle. As the 
faculty of judgment, cognition seems to be more fundamental 
to the rational self than either of the others, but of course, 
without the others it would never give rise to religious 
experience. Our quest is not for the psychological origin 
but for the logical priority. This we have found on the 
cognitive side as an awareness of a divine background to 
the world of objects, which is also the unity underlying 
the subject-object relation.
Religion then arises from a cognitive awareness of an 
Other Mind confronting the finite subject. It is therefore
•
cognitive in character, and all s&igious experience is sus: 
tained by the percept, the image,or the idea.
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Perceptive awareness is never absent from experience. 
The jaw is always there even at the moment when the tooth 
is being drawn. Love at its intensest holds fast the loved 
one. Indeed emotion never cancels the object, never blots 
out. cognition. Consciousness never can let go its object 
without ceasing to fceitself. When we are conscious we are 
always conscious of something as the object of our awareness. 
But this point need not be stressed here because we have 
insisted all along on the presence of cognition, feeling 
and conation in all religious reaction to the world. It 
will be seen then that our supreme religious principle 
implies the presence of feeling as an essential element of 
religion, and in a striking way accounts for its importancej 
and intensity, in religious experience. For if, in knowledge 
of the world and of myself, I am always face to face with 
an Other Mind that knows me and my world, how can my Soul 
be without some emotional reaction to that Reality? The 
Gnosthentic Consciousness is intensely emotional. It could 
not exist otherwise. If I stood before a dead world, a 
meaningless reality, I could have no emotion of any kind 
towards it. All emotion implies the presence of a reality 
that means something, that has some definite and positive 
relation to my own existence. If the categories of the 
Understanding can be called 'bloodless,' the supreme category
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of religion cannot deserve that epithet. That which brings 
my Soul before God and keeps me living and moving under His 
eye and in His world, is anything but bloodless. It is warm, 
vital, living, pulsating with the deep throb of self-conscious: 
ness. My emotions pre-suppose objects that are in some 
sense alive and able to make or mar my life. We can have 
no feeling attitude towards an object that has never had, 
and never will have, any powder over us.
When religion is seen to grow out of an awareness of 
a Divine Mind to whom all hearts are open and all desires
known, and when this awareness is an inalienable feature of
1 
the human consciousness, we do not leave feeling out of our
/
reckoning. On the contrary we make it the very core of 
religious experience and indeed of all experience. The 
human individual cannot stand unmoved in the presence of a 
God he cannot escape, nor can he, seeing that he is reli: 
gious by his very constitution as a thinking being, view 
the world unemotionally, inasmuch as it is already-for him 
crammed with heaven and every bush is afire with God. What 
our a priori principle will not permit us to do, however, 
is to talk of religion as if it sprang from emotion in the
first place, altogether independently of any specific appre:
i
hension,as a logical precondition of the emotion, of a 
divine reality confronting and surrounding our lives. It 
is of course perfectly true that a particular religious
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experience does seem to arise from an emotional source, as, 
for instance, during revivals, when the emotional excitement
'• i:.
originates the experience. But it would be a mistake to 
conclude that no intellectual factors are involved. We 
must still remember that it is in x&igious surroundings and 
among religious suggestions and intentions that the emotion 
is aroused. The reason we fit on emotion as itself the sole 
root of religious experience is because it is feeling that 
gives colour and intensity to the experience. Peeling is 
also the chief factor in every vivid revival of past experi: 
ence through association, and is mainly responsible for the 
liveliness and glow of memory. But feeling is always condi: 
tioned by a cognitive awareness of meaning,and this meaning 
is there for religion because of an a priori principle of 
judgment present in all self-conscious awareness. The demand 
that real religion should be and always is a matter of 
emotional experience does not mean that, if we are to have 
reality in religion, ideas and beliefs must be discounted, 
and thrown on the rubbish heap. It only means that emotion 
must be*present, and not that ideas must be absent.
"Peeling is quite as much an objective consciousness as
H is idea: it refers always to something beyond the present
« 
"self, and has no existence save in directing the self toward
"that object in whose presence its own career must end."
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"It is true that ideas apart from feelings do no work; but 
"it is also true that a feeling does no work apart from 
"its guiding idea. 1* "All positive feeling reaches its 
"terminus in knowledge. All feeling means to instate 
H some experience which is essentially Cognitive." And
f «
again, "Cognizance and feeling are but different stages 
"of the same thing." 1}
If self-consciousness implies confronting $od, it 
implies also and for that reason, an emotional experience 
of a specific and unique kind. We are no longer free to 
'manufacture 1 religious emotions from simpler elements 
that are 'AnatttBal' to man, as Professor McDougall seems 
to do. 'Reverence,' which he calls the religious emotion 
par excellence, Professor Mc^ougall finds to be really a
*
compound of simpler primary emotions all of which, like 
awe and gratitude, belong to man in his natural relations 
to tie world and human society. Although he does refer to 
a religious object as having something to do with the 
highest forms of awe and reverence he seems to take it for 
granted, as others of his school certainly do, that all 
religious emotion is only 'natural* emotion intensified 
by the difference in the nature of the object or situation 
in relation to which it is aroused. If our 'Gnosthentic 1 
theory is well founded and God is already a 'given 1 of
1) Hocking, pp. 66-68.
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self-conscious awareness we can no longer be content to 
see in religious feeling nothing more than 'natural 1 
feelings added together. We must now be prepared to seek 
for a specified emotional reaction made possible by the 
experience of God, an emotion whibh is: a primitive and 
inalienable constituent of all rational consciousness. 
As there is a Divine supernatural quality bound up with 
the objective ground of self-consciousness, so there is 
also a specific emotion present in, and experienced by, 
all men, and answering to the consciousness of God. Otto 
we found admits both an a priori religious awareness of 
the numinous and a specific religious emotional reaction. 
In this he is fully justified by the facts. All the saints 
could testify to the presence of a peculiar element in their 
experience during their religious exercises which they do 
not have in secular connections and activities. Our own 
principle brings us to re-affirm,with Otto, a specific 
religious emotion bound up with self-conscious awareness, 
and known of all rational creatures. The capacity for 
reverence, or at any rate for the primitive feeling that 
lies at the root of religious reverence, is universal. The 
Other Mind, the Knower of all knowing, the Owner of me and 
my world, the Divine Unity underlying all things, God in 
fact, determines for me all my emotional life and without 
Him I could have no emotion. He is an ever present reality
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to my consciousness. We cannot here specify the nature of 
religious emotion, nor can we indicate the law of its 
evolution. Otto has done much to help us and we accept, in 
a general way, his analysis.
We must go on, however, to point out that our religions 
a priori renders void all attempts to analyse religious 
emotions.into their so-called natural elements, and for this 
reason. Since man is religious by his rational nature, all 
his heritage of feeling capacity handed down to him from his 
subhuman ancestry is no longer found in him as it was in them, 
His religious Self, emerging not from without as an accretion 
or addition, externally attached to his soul like a wing to 
a house, but from the psychic centre of his consciousness, 
leaves not one of his emotions unaffected in their quality. 
As a self-conscious being, aware of a living Universe, all 
his emotional life undergoes at once "a sea-change into 
something rich and strange." Even fear is no more simple 
fear as the animal experiences it. Man's fear is already 
in a sense the fear of God: and so with other 'natural' 
emotions. His shame is a new shame, his sorrow a deepened 
and a sacred sorrow. In man all 'natural' emotion is 
already tinged with a fresh hue cast throughout his soul,- 
floor, ceiling and walls,-by his God-consciousness which 
is an essential part of himself.
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This religious element in self -consciousness, affecting 
as it does all feeling capacity and the nature of all emotion, 
accounts for the possibility of what is called the process 
of sublimation of the instincts. Modern psychology, which 
finds in instinctive tendency with its emotional accompaniment, 
the true foundation of character, is left between the Scylla 
and Charybdis of a fatal choiee. On the one hand it demands 
that instincts should not be repressed but rather gratified. 
Repression breeds confusion, and disorder sets in among the 
emotions. On the other hand, instincts must not be gratified
and allowed to function as nature sfeeira to have ordained.
Direction 
All instincts must be under the ftrtf£#$$Vto3 of moral ideas.
And yet it is moral idealism that calls for repression, and 
is, indeed, responsible for almost all our emotional conflicts. 
The way out of this dilemma is, as a rule, a call for what 
is known as sublimation, which means the linking up of an 
instinctive urge from below with a moral ideal from above. 
Let the instinct be forced into moral channels, and let it 
spend its energy in that way.
But sublimation as thus demanded does not solve the 
problem of character, because the modern doctrine of instincts 
makes these more fundamental, and more deeply rooted in human 
nature, than the moral consciousness. The way instincts are 
spoken of leaves us with the impression that they must have 
a place in life, and must be allowed to function, because, if
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not, they will have their revenge. And besides, each of the 
instincts ham a foreordained end, and only that particular 
end can actually gratify it as an impulse of life. It is 
difficult to see how, if sex, for example, with its attendant 
emotion is a fundamental instinct, you can turn the instinct 
into another channel at all. By so doing you compromise the 
individual's happiness and you impoverish the personality. 
The instincts as the raw material of life and as the channels 
through which the primordial urge of life flow.s must, by the 
definition that is given of then^find adequate expression. 
As Nature's own products they cannot be suppressed,nor, indeed, 
turned out of their courses. When either method is employed 
with them they have their vengeance by demanding an outlet 
beyond the territory of the Will. Unless human nature in 
its sublimating demand gets its authority from another 
instinct more deeply rooted than the animal instincts, their 
sublimation is really impossible. Unless the religious and 
moral consciousness is understood in a way that will make 
it, not only as fundamental but more fundamental than the 
instincts in'man, sublimation can be nothing better than a 
device of the discursive reason to hoodwink nature in order 
to make her serve an end not set by herself.
When, however, we find that self-consciousness is 
already a God -consciousness, man can only be true to himself 
in the deepest sense by bringing all his instincts into the
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service of religion. Through the new door thus open to 
the life impulse within him all the instincts must pass. 
Religion is now the door keeper of the Soul's palace, and 
it will not matter very much if some instinctive impulses 
are turned back and not allowed to enter at all. The 
religious consciousness implies a new t orientation for all 
life and impulses. Whereas the animal is not destroyed or 
even impaired by obeying its instincts,man, if he does this, 
is immediately laid in the dust. He is bound, through the 
inner constraint of his religious self, to relate all his 
instincts to God who claims him by the very constitution of 
his human self-consciousness. And because the Bac&ohto: unique 
quality of his mind has emerged, as a result of "Emergent
> *
Evolution",to use professor Lloyd Morgan's term, from the 
mystic fount of the elan vital, the source of man's psychic 
energies can drain off into itself, so to speak, the sources 
of all instinctive impulses. Thus and only thus is subli: 
mation possible, because now pernicious repression is avoided, 
and any one instinct can "beturned back without loss to human 
character and happiness. Either the religious consciousness 
is something deeper in the nature of the Soul than the 
instincts,or else sublimation is psychologically impossible 
and biologically indefensible. For sublimation requires, not 
suppression merely, nor even discipline, but a redirection of
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impulses
into ethical and spiritual channels. This is only
possible if self -consciousness is already, by its own law 
and its own constitution, moral and religious, aware at the 
moment of its birth, of a spiritual and moral reality immanent 
in the world and life. Religious a prior ism, it will be 
readily seen, makes sublimation both possible and real, 
and man, to attain perfection as a rational animal, need 
not allow all his instincts to function. He can turn the 
streams away from the lesser waterwheels, and allow them 
to stand still, without in any way affecting the one great 
turbine which turns .unceasingly the mills of God within 
the soul of man.
After this slight digression let us return to the 
relation between cognition and feeling as elements of the 
religious consciousness. Schleiermacher's definition of 
religion as the "feeling of dependence*1 has inspired many 
thinkers to find in feeling alone the core of religion. 
It is fairly certain, however, that Schleiermacher himself 
did not intend his definition to mean that in the "feeling 
of dependence" no cognitive elements are present to support 
the feeling. "Such a separation of knowledge and piety, 
and of action and piety, do not accuse me of making." 
Schleiermacher»s protest all along was not against the
1) Selections from the Literature of Theism. Caldecott & 
Mackintosh, p.264.
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cognitive element in consciousness but against the know: 
ledge of God through Science and Philosophy, supposed to 
be attainable in detachment from immediate experience of 
the world where feeling is always a.n important element.
*
His polemic was against the banishment of feeling from 
religion, not in behalf of feeling as alone,and independ: 
ently of all cognitive apprehension and valuation, the 
basis of religion. "What Schleiermacher means is no 
"ecstatic rapture but the emotional consciousness of the 
"fiafinite as awakened through the finite, i,e, a warm and 
"intimate awareness of an eternal essence and significance 
M in all Tadng and becoming around us. 11 i)
At the same time he contrasts feeling as the source 
of religion with perception and activity as the organs of 
Science and morality respectively. Perhaps we would be 
near to his main intention if we said that the religious 
consciousness,though largely independent of scientific 
thought and practical life in a secular sense, is yet 
dependent on cognition and conation in a vital way, only 
without feeling it cannot exist at all. What he emphasi: 
sed was the concrete consciousness, the reaction of the 
whole personality to the world in immediate experience 
where feeling predominates.
1) Ibid, Note, page 2?0
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In other words, the consciousness of God is given in 
and through an immediate experience where feeling is the 
element through which in particular the God-consciousness 
arises. "The whole world is the mirror of the individual 
"afcjrit, and the "being of God is involved in the very idea 
"of personality. The soul, through meditation and self- 
" contemplation, enters into union with the Eternal. This 
"union is an act, not of will or of intellect, but oif 
"feeling, and it is in this feeling, or consciousness, 
"that religion consists. 11 1 ^
If we take his definition as it stands, it is not 
difficult to see that it cannot be understood as exclusively 
a religion of feeling. The sense of dependence, though a 
feeling attitude, does not imply a very deep emotional 
experience. Otto, correcting Schleiermacher, found fault
«
with it for this reason, and wished to state the experience 
as a feeling of "nothingness," a "dust-and-ashes" feeling. 
But clearly, the feeling of dependence is a dependent feeling
- t
after all. .Before I can "feel" myself altogether dependent 
on God I must be aware of the situation which creates the 
feeling. If I am dependent I must know that I am so placed 
before I can also "feel" the fact.
"In Schleiermacher's famous reduction of aiigion to the
.1) Selbie. Encyclopaedia $f Religion and Ethics, Vol.XI,
p.238.
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"feeling of dependence," writes Hdffding, "he does not 
"sufficiently emphasise the point that this dependence is 
"conditioned by an activity, and that it appears at the 
"limits of this activity. Nor does he make it sufficiently 
"obvious that this dependence makes itself felt in the 
"struggle for those values which appear to man to be the
"highest." x )
The condition of the dependence is, however, seen not
in the finite world but through the awareness of God. The 
positive ground is presupposed in the negative.
Schleiermacher 1 s definition as it stands is in no way 
therefore inconsistent with an a priori doctrine of religion,
v
Indeed it clearly points that way.
Tie challenge of his definition is seen, however, when 
we ask in what way is this sense of Being dependent awakened 
on its cognitive side? Does it arise in the mind through 
patient reflexion on the outer facts of life and the world, 
through knowledge gained by observation and experiment and 
experience? Or is it an awareness taking place as a moment 
in all self-conscious life? In other words, is it the result 
of a process of inference from the facts of life, or is it 
an immediate experience bound up with every self-conscious 
act? Whether we can claim Schleiermacher on our side or not 
depends on this choice. If he meant the feeling to be
1) "Philosophy of Religion," p.llj.
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immediate, as something man cannot escape Just because he 
is self-conscious, then his doctrine is not far removed 
from a priori am. This beyond doubt is what he meant. His 
whole polemic was against those who thought that God was 
found by a philosophical search for Him. His emphasis on 
feeling, though it naturally led to subjectivism, made religion 
of necessity a matter of immediate experience and direct 
contact with God. The 'dependence 1 which he meant was, 
then, something that arose from the nature of man as a 
complete self and not one-sidedly as the result of his 
intellectual labours whether as Science or Philosophy. 
His position if almost equivalent to an emotional a priori sm. 
a religious valuation of the world made possible by man's 
feeling capacity. And yet if the 'dependence 1 was also an 
awareness of God through finite things, his doctrine is not 
far removed from and almost implies a cognitive a priori sen. 
Schleiermacher 1 s difference from the ^position we are 
maintaining lies in this, that whereas his doctrine places 
the religious valuation of the world through which God is 
experienced, primarily in the feelings.whilJe assuming a 
corresponding cognitive apprehension, our theory finds the 
religious valuation in cognitive awareness expressing a 
unique category of thought 1 and conditioning and awakening 
the feelings distinctive of religion. A few quotations 
will help us to see how, if,- instead of emphasising the
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feeling element he had stressed rather the "dependence" 
side of his definition he would have found a deeper basis 
still for what he wrote. Religion would have been not 
only independent of, and other than, science, philosophy
and morality, but comprehensive of them all, and a basal
%
implicate and final interest of all self-conscious and 
rational beings.
"What we feel and are conscious of in religious emotions 
"is not the nature of things, but their operation, on us. 
"What you may know or believe about the nature of things is 
"far beneath the sphere of religion. The Universe is 
"ceaselessly active and at every moment is revealing itself 
"to us. Every form it has produced, everything to which, 
"from the fulness of its life, it has given a separate 
"existence, every occurrence scattered from its fertile 
"bosom is an operation of the Universe upon us. Now 
"religion is to take up into our lives and to submit to be 
"swayed by them, each of these influences and their conse: 
"quent emotions, not by themselves but as a part of the 
"Whole, not as limited and in opposition to other things, 
"but as an exhibition of the Infinite in our life."
"The sum total of religion is to feel that, in its 
"highest unity, all that moves us in feeling is one; to 
"feel that aught single and particular is only possible by
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"means of this unity, to feel that is to say, that our 
"being and living is a being and living in and through God."
"A sense of the Whole must be first found, chiefly 
"within our own minds, and from thence transferred to cor: 
"poral nature. Wherefore the spirit is for us not only the 
"seat of religion but its nearest world. The Universe 
"portrays itself in the inner life, and then the corporeal 
"is comprehensible from the spiritual. If the mind is to 
"produce and sustain religion it must operate upon us as a 
"world and as in a world."
"The Infinite is near to everyone, for whatever be 
"the object you have chosen for your deliberate technical 
"working, it does not demand much thought to advance from 
"it to find the Universe. ...... The only way of acquiring
"what lies outside the direction of the mind we have 
"selected, is to enjoy and comprehend it then as a whole, 
"not by will as art, but by instinct for the Universe as 
"religion." 1J
1) Ibid, pp. 274-8.
CHAPTER XIV.
RELIGION AS THE GROUND OF MORALITY.
Turning now to the relationship between morality and 
religion,we see that our Supreme principle which conditions 
Self-consciousness,throws an interesting light upon this 
age-long problem. If self-consciousness implies a God- 
consciousness, an awareness of an Other Mind which is also 
the All-Knower and the intelligent unity of knowledge, then 
instead of morality conditioning religio^we have religion 
as the social atmosphere within which all moral action and 
thought and feeling must develop. All relationship with 
our fellowmen is determined and informed by a fellowship 
with a transcendent reality we know as God. The sense of 
God is prior to, and conditions,the sense of duty. Though 
it may be true, as Kant said, that to believe in the existence 
of God is no part of moral obligation, yet we could have 
no knowledge of moral obligation unless we already believed 
in God's existence, the voice of duty was, and is,first of 
all the voice of God; it was the voice of God before Socrates
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fashioned the concept of virtue, or Plato formed the idea 
of the Good,or Kant taught that duty must be done for 
duty's sake, and that nothing is added to Goodness but 
everything taken from it if our moral motives rest on 
something beyond the Good. In history, morality has always 
been associated with religion. This much is freely con: 
ceded on all hands. Let us quote Professor McDougall only. 
"It has been contended by some authors that religion and 
"morality were primitively distinct, and that the intimate 
"connection commonly obtaining between them in civilised 
"societies arose comparatively late in the course of social 
"development.
"This contention which is opposed to the view of 
"religious development sketched in the foregoing pages, is 
"true only if we attach an unduly narrow meaning to the 
"words "religion 1 and 'morality.' ......... We must admit
"that religion from its first crude beginnings was bound 
"up with morality in some such way as we have briefly 
"sketched; that the two things, religion and morality, were 
"not at first separate and later fused together; but that 
"they were always intimately related, and have reciprocally 
" acted and reacted-upon one another throughout the course 
"of their Evolution." 1)
Our main concern in the philosophy of religion is,
"1) "Social Psychology,
cp. Bosanquet: Value and Destiny, pp. 236-7.
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however, not with the historical association but with the
logical dependence of religion and morality as facts of
the 
consciousness. If our a priori doctrine is valid/religious
consciousness is more fundamental in man than his morality.
Indeed the latter is logically dependent on the former.
sraiy 
The 'Good 1 is'a concept formed by abstraction from the
facts of experience, and the sense of duty, when taken
only 
alone, is/an aspect of concrete self-consciousness.
It is quite true, as Kant taught, that we must will 
the Good for its own sake, that there is no standard higher 
by which it can be judged than Goodness itself. Let us 
freely admit that, if morality is to retain its true character 
as obligation, and the Good Will its final worth, then the
Good must itself be the Moral End and must be chosen for its
the
own sake* In/toral consciousness, the Categorical Imperative 
of Duty can stand on its own feet, as an a priori principle 
of human life,quite independently of religion, just because 
the Good is an End in itself, and is its own justification 
and authority. $& doubt Kant was right in his claim that the 
moral life is independent of theology, and can survive the 
partial eclipse of religious faith. The moral consciousness; 
as expressive of a final End can be treated also, and must 
be treated, as an important basal fact for philosophical 
speculation.
But why has the Good this quality of finality? Surely 
it is because goodness is found to be an ultimate quality
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of Reality as revealed in experience, and therefore,as a 
quality of reality, there can "be nothing beyond it for the 
Will to lay hold on. But that does not mean that Reality 
jjsjip_thing more than the Good, - nothing more for human 
Self -consciousness than an ethical ideal. Though we must 
confer reality, objective validity within experience, to 
moral Goodness the moral nature of man does not exhaust 
Reality as it is known to self-consciousness. We touch 
reality too in science and in aesthetic appreciation. As 
a moral being man cannot go beyond the Good,but that does 
not mean that Reality may not be known in self-consciousness 
in a more direct and .immediate way and even more fully, 
breastforward, as it were, than in obedience tro athe Good, 
and in a way that shall be inclusive even of the moral 
consciousness. Indeed, though the Good be chosen for what 
it is, and not for some other end, at t&e same time the 
self-conscious individual, when he does so choose, finds 
that the Good he accepts is more than moral Value. 'Its 
choice brings him into fellowship, not with Society or the 
physical world only, but with the Supreme Unity of the Self 
and the Not-Self. In other words, the Good is always found 
in God. It brings man into fellowship with the totality of 
things. And this happens not because morality leads to 
religion and impels man to push beyond the moral Values 
in order to conserve them, but because his moral choice is
*• •* «• ^m mm mm ^» *• •• ̂ * ••* •• •• ••• •• mm mm mm mm ^ •• mm ^ ̂m> •• •• ^m mm mm mm. fmi mm
1) cp Bosanquet: Indiv. and Value, p. 17.
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a choice not of the merely moral self, but of the religious 
Self which already holds God firmly within its grasp.
The mind then has a direct access,over and above the 
way of moral choice to gsfrn knowledge of Reality, even in 
terms of the morally Good* He already possesses the 
religious Good which is God,as an original endowment of
his self-conscious life.
• 
The Sense of Duty and the idea of the Good, taken in
their bare abstractness, do not cover the ethical sweep of 
personal life. The moral consciousness qua moral may be 
free from theological implications, but qua consciousness 
it certainly cannot be. The whole moral self is surely 
not exhausted in what appertains to man's relation to man 
as a member of society* The knowledge of good and evil 
and the call of Duty implied a demand upon a Reality that 
is not yet made actual in the world that is. Morality 
hangs upon an ideal, and touches a world other than that 
wjaich is known within concrete experience at any one moment. 
As we saw earlier, morality does not "guarantee the persis: 
:tence of its values nor can it state the Ultimate Good in 
a satisfying form." It always goes beyond itself, not in 
the sense that there is something beyond the Good, but that 
the Good of the moral consciousness tabernacles with a wider 
spiritual reality which is known to self-consciousness and
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which self-conscious personality demands for its complete 
satisfaction. In other words, moral goodness is but one 
string on the lyre of life. There are others, and although 
each string produces an ultimate tone which is its own 
standard,yet the musician already knows the music of the 
whole instrument ,and of each string, as an element in the 
whole effect. And this total effect is what he knows in 
the first place. His knowledge of each note characteristic 
of each of the strings is gained through abstraction and 
isolation, but this particular knowledge is never accepted 
as equivalent to the, full and rich harmonies of the harp. 
It is this rich music of all the strings that religion 
knows, and the real meaning of each separate note is derived 
from the wider setting and each string is tuned accordingly.
If, now, self-consciousness is already an awareness of 
God, and if this awareness is the condition of all social 
experience, as we have contended, then the moral consciousness 
the sense of duty, is something which must be logically 
dependent on and implied in the religious consciousness. 
The root of morality is then, in religion and the sense of 
duty an implicate, not a postulate, of our sense of the 
presence of God. Man may, by an act of intellectual 
abstraction, isolate the specifically moral and narrowly 
social aspect of this sense of personal and religious 
obligation to God as the Unity of the Self and the Not-Sel£,
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but the moral consciousness thus isolated and formulated
will always "bear upon it the stamp of abstractedness. It
human 
will not be the whole round of the circle of taWfl life
but a segment only, and religion must be brought in to 
complete the circle. This means that moralism is always 
obliged to give the Good a setting in Reality wider than 
by its own nature it can occupy, though not of course in a 
way that will compromise its own final character.
This recourse to religion, or to metaphysics, to complete 
morality, to round it off, is itself a witness to the intel: 
lectual abstraction underlying the ethical philosophy which 
exalts the moral consciousness above the religious.
The self-assentiveness of Ethics as our chief instructdir- 
and final authority in the spiritual interpretation of the 
world, and its claim to ascendancy over religion, even to the 
point of descrediting the latter> is never satisfactory and 
cannot be justified. This modern tendency is based on an 
unwarranted extension of the meaning of morality and a 
misunderstanding of religion. "It is plain,*1 writes 
Professor Galloway, "that the quarrel of Ethics is not with 
"Heligion as such, but with its defective or unsatisfactory 
"form. The demand of the moral Consciousness is for a 
"purification of the old faith; it has no thought of offering 
"itself as the substitute of Religion. And we can understand 
"why it has been so. For Religion is older than Ethics,
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and under its sheltering shadow the virtues have grown up."
Let us repeat that the mason why we are obliged to 
carry morality over to Religion is because the Moral 
Imperative., though a priori, is not an adequate expression 
of what we find in a spiritual personality, even of what 
we find in the way of awareness of obligations. We are 
forced back to religion in order to make good the broken 
arc of life which morality leaves on our hands, just because 
in our endeavour to arrive at the moral Imperative pure and 
simple, we have broken up the whole round of self-conscious: 
ness. When we go to Religion to guarantee the validity of 
moral idealism and to provide a satisfying formulation of 
the true End of Life, we are but returning to our starting 
point. The child, the moral Imperative, is but returning 
to the mother, the religious consciousness which gave it 
birth. The reality of Conscience, for instance, is not 
covered nor accounted for, by the moral Imperative. It 
reflects,not a world of moral ideals merely, but in a very 
sure and clear way the face of God. Moral guilt is always" 
more than a breach of an obligation to act in a certain way. 
tt is invariably a sense of alienation from fellowship with 
God, as well as from fellowship with man. Moral Guilt is 
always religious Sin, a placing of ourself in opposition
1) "Galloway - Studies in the Philosophy of Religion,"
p. 47.
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to the Divine Reality that encircles and owns our lives. 
Man obeys the moral Imperative by the force of his will 
only; but he obeys God as a necessity laid upon him by his 
thought and the constraint of his feeling attitude towards 
the whole of life. Sin and Guilt and the feeling of the 
need for atonement, as these are known in religion, do not 
arise'from, and cannot be explained by, reference to the work 
of the reflective reason arguing its way from the fact of 
the physical world and moral experience, and within the 
limits of the categorical Imperative of Duty, upwards to 
God. These momentous facts of the Soul of man were here 
before philosophy, and the moral consciousness taken alone 
has nothing to say in explanation of tabu and the bleeding 
altars of primitive society. They point to a deeper 
spiritual and moral nature in man than is expressed either 
in Science, morality or aesthetics. Man's sense of obliga: 
tion has always been and still is something that reveals 
to him more than a call to moral action as a member of 
Society, and the Good he seeks is always more than the 
Good of social intercourse. But man does not first discover 
the insufficiency of the voice of Duty and the Social Good 
to claim him and satisfy him, and then, on account of that 
failure, postulates a God behind the voice, and a heaven,where 
morality and happiness converge and blend. He does nothing 
of the kind. His spiritual nature has trafficked with the
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Ultimate Reality, and heard a Divine Voice>from the dawn of 
self-consciousness. He has always felt the need of a salva: 
tion which morality cannot furnish and the world cannot give. 
Sabatier, although he does not come with us all the way, has 
put this point finely, - MThe synthesis and reconciliation 
"can only "be found in the consciousness of something superior 
M to self and the world on which both of them depend. This 
"synthetic and pacificatory consciousness is the consciousness 
"of universal and sovereign Being; it is the sense of the 
"presence of God. To escape from his distress man has 
"never had any but this means of salvation ..... He needs a 
"Universal Being on whom he feels himself to depend and on 
"whom he may equally make to depend the whole universe. In 
"uniting himself to Him, he affirms and confirms his own 
"life; he feels God to be active and present, in his thought 
"under the form of logical law, and in his will under the 
"form of moral law. He is saved by faith in the interior 
"God, in whom is realised the unity of his being. It is 
"therefore true to say that the human mind cannot believe in 
"itself without believing in God, and that, on the other 
"hand, it cannot believe in God without finding Him within 
"himself." ^
Out contention is that the Universal Being through
/ / V
1) "Outline of a Philosophy of Religion," pp. 290-1.
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which man affirms and confirms his own life, is already a 
Presence in self-consciousness. Man is aisle to believe 
in his moral values and their relation to the real world, 
only through the immediate certainty he has of God within 
him who holds both Value and Reality, as it were, in the 
hollow of his hand.
No Xfes treatment of the relationship between Ethics and 
Religion can well ignore the writings of Professor Hdffding, 
who in his "Philosophy of Religion" has argued cogently 
for the logical priority of Ethics. "If we study the 
"relation between religion and ethics," he says, "in its 
"historical development, we shall find a constant process 
"of action and reaction going on between them, so that not 
"only does religion influence ethics, but, conversely, the 
"ethical development of man reacts on the character and 
"content of his religion. Moreover, when we come to speak 
"of basis and justification, we shall find that, in the 
"long run, it is religion which is based upon ethical ideas, 
"and not - even in the classical ages of religion - vice 
"versa. The value and significance which are attributed to 
"religion have, as their logical presupposition, certain 
•"ethical ideas, to the precise formulation of which the 
"religious consciousness does not feel itself impelled." ^
In support of this position Hdffding lays emphasis 




"forms of it with which we are acquainted religion cannot 
"be said to have any ethical significance. The Gods appear 
"as powers on which man is dependent, but not as patterns 
"•f conduct or administrators of an ethical world-order." 
Here ethical as applied to religion is equivalent to 
a certain standard of moral conduct understood to prevail 
at any one time in the life of a community. No doubt 
primitive Gods were not highly moralised,any more than 
society was and they were, moreover, in the nature of things, 
thought of as exalted to some extent above the moral standards
•
obtaining in the social life of man. But this does not mean 
that the Gods were non-moral, nor that they did not stand 
in a moral relationship with man. The Gods were always 
more than powers; they were moral beings more or less 
interested in human conditions but never quite disinterested. 
Surely the Gods of religion have always had an ethical char: 
acter; at least among themselves; and the relationship 
between them and the worshipper was, in a vague way, personal, 
and therefore both intelligent and ethical. The gods of 
primitive religion were never 'things' nor mere 'beasts 1, 
though they were often represented by both. Professor H0ff: 
ding is here confusing two meanings of ethical* 
He is confusing the 'capacity for moral co'nduct', with 
'obeying a certain moral code.' But gods could not be
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moralised in the second sense unless they were moral in the 
first sense, but if they were moral in the first sense, thexir 
they were not at any time mere Nature deities and nothing 
more. But Professor Hflffding admits that "even nature 
"religions have their ethic, for they make definite claims 
"on man. He must show respect and obedience to the divine 
"powers who demand ceremonies and sacrifices in their honour." 1 ' 
But if so, the distinction between Nature religions and 
ethical religions, on which Professor Hdffding lays so much 
emphasis, is of small importance. What we have is religion 
less ethical and more ethical, the one passing continually 
into the other.
Professor Hdff ding's second point is that the moral! sat ion 
of the gods could only proceed through man's ethical evalu»i; 
tion as a member of society. "Ethical feeling develops in 
"the struggle for life; in the struggle of the individual, 
"but more especially in the struggle of the family, of the 
"clan and of the nation for existence." "Hot till men have 
"discovered ethical problems in practical.life and have 
"developed ethical feeling ..... not till then can the 
"figures of the gods assume an ethical character." 2)
But though this may be perfectly true, it in no way 




we know that moral knowledge cannot be acquired without 
experience; a posteriori factors are as necessary as the 
a priori principles which condition all moral judgment.
t
In the same way the religions consciousness, and the appear: 
anga of gods on the human/horizon, could not emerge apart from 
an objective world,and could not develop without human society. 
But the necessity of experience as a condition of knowledge, 
whether religious or moral> proves n6thing regarding the 
inner relationship within self-consciousness of moral and
r
religious judgments. Whatever view we take of the matter 
it is through experience of the world and of social inter: 
course that the development of both must take place. Our 
problem is not whether experience is necessary, but what are" 
the principles that condition both moral and religions 
experience, and how these are related,as expressive of the 
nature of self-conscious mind.
When Professor HOffding expresses the axiom of religion* 
its root principle, as "faith in the conservation of value" 
he is taking religion as something that "grows out of life 
itself," and "springs out of the basal mood of man in his 
"struggle for life, out of his resolution to hold fast, under 
"all circumstances, to the validity of that which he has 
"learnt from experience to be the highest value." "If the 
"religious ideas are to have any significance at all," he
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adds, "it can only be in serving as symbolical expressions 
"for the feeling, the aspirations, and the wishes of men 
"in their struggle for existence; thus they are secondary 
"not primary both in significance and origin." !)
The logical and the historical relationship of morality
i
and religion are.therefore,one and the same. First comes 
morality with its creation of value; then follow religions 
ideas to serve, in a utilitarian way, as a means whereby 
moral value shall be conserved. Man grows into religion 
because he finds that his moral mlues are not safe, for., 
although nothing can add to the nature of these values, the 
Good being good for its own sake, yet their relation to 
what exists, to the world of real entities, is seen to be 
contingent.
In order therefore to give to moral Goodness a sure 
place in the scheme of things, some knowledge must be got 
of the "relation between what seems to us men the highest 
"value and existence as a whole." Faith in the conservation 
of value is, then, the supreme axiom of religion. Religion, 
instead of being an end, is really a means. The end is morel
value.
To see the inadequacy of this reading of religion we 
have but to ask why man should demand this faith at all. If 
he went on creating moral value without this faith in its
1) PP- 92-3-
3io.
conservation^why could he not continue doing so without 
worrying himself over the problem of religious faith? For 
this principle of religion does not help the creation of 
value but only its conservation. Creation could then go on 
independently of religion, except of course in so far as 
the hope of possessing what you gain is itself part of the 
stimulus to create. But this motive only operates in regard 
to material things. The good of morality is not stored,and 
cannot therefore be acquired and laid aside for a rainy day. 
Conservation of moral value is the same thing as its creation, 
It can only be conserved as moral lalue by being recreated 
continually. But Professor Hdffding could not very well make 
religion to mean faith in the possibility of the creation of 
value because man was, according to him, already a creator 
before he developed religious faith. For to hixr^morality is, 
in every sense, prior to religion. We are then faced with 
this dilemma. If religion is only faith in the conservation 
of value already gained and enjoyed, then it has nothing at 
all to do with the creation of that value, inasmuch as the 
value is a moral not a religious lvalue. It is therefore 
difficult to see why man ever felt the need of religion at 
all. Let him go on creating his moral values for they exist 
or not according as they are created anew. The only Good is 
the good will.
But if religion has anything to do with the creation of
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value, then of course morality is not sufficient unto 
itself; it becomes grounded in a faith which already unites 
the moral and the natural orddr as elements in the whole. 
When faith helps to create value it is only because faith 
is already in possession of the 'whole' and informs the 
human spirit of the promising possibility of moral creative: 
ness and advance, saying to him that the world of Reality 
will yield, to moral adventure, a rich and unending harvest. 
If religious faith is of this nature, if its essence is to 
reconcile value and reality, and this reconciliation is a 
demand which morality makes, then to make religion come in 
as an afterthought at a certain level of advance, is quite 
arbitrary.
This distinction between iriLue and reality is, however, 
not valid in any discussion of the relationship between 
morality and religion. It is relevant, and is raised > only 
when the problem of the ultimate Reality is dealt with in 
total disregard of, and apart altogether, from the facts of 
the religious consciousness. Hflffding's faith is not a 
religious but a philosophical faith. Religion is already, 
at every point in its evolution, an interest which will not 
acknowledge the distinction of value and Reality. It is, 
b£ its very nature, an affirmation that these are reconciled 
already because they are never separated. If morality
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really demands this reconciliation, and if this is what 
Hdffding's principle implies,then aligion,whose nature it 
is to affirm the union of the two, is the ground of morality. 
The moral man goes on creating values "because he believes 
in them as values; "but this "belief already implies that 
the values are values also in the scheme of Reality. For 
how indeed can any quality of life be deemed valuable if 
that value is not understood as a value for the whole 
universe?
Strictly speaking,self-conscious man has no 'values 1 
he can call merely moral. All his moral values are personal 
values, and he estimates them in relation to himself as he 
stands confronting, not social life and the world only, but 
also the Whole which embraces both himself and the world 
including society.
"The moment of religious consciousness starts from 
11 self-valuation, but it broadens into the concept of the 
"world as a realm of adjusted values, mutually intensifying 
"or mutually destructive. The intuition into the actual 
"world gives a particular definite content to the bare 
"notion of a principle determining the grading of values. 
"It also exhibits emotions, purposes, and physical conditions, 
"as subservient factors in the emergence of value." ^)
A. IT. Whitehead: "Religion in the Making," p.49.
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In all fefce moral TOLuation the consciousness of 
Reality as a whole is always present. Maig seeks values 
and cultivates them not as a member of society taut as 
an individual centre of experience in which the pulse of 
the whole universe beats. It is within this unity that 
he lives his moral life and seeks his moral goods. The 
unity and harmony of value and Reality are never absent 
from his consciousness, for as a self-conscious being, he, 
in all his striving,is a part of that greater whole. In 
other words,man is already religious in all his struggle 
for the values of life. And what in religion he seeks and 
wants to conserve, isa not value> but himself. The principle 
of Religion is not faith in the conservation of values, 
a faith which philosophical reflexion might well provide, 
but a faith in the possibility of moral value, and in the 
conservation of the self and the world within the unity 
of both. Self-consciousness implies an awareness of this 
higher synthesis as a condition of its own functioning,and 
it is within this Whole, that the moral life is lived.
"I:; find in the love of God," says Lord Balfour, "a 
M moral end which reconciles other moral ends, because it 
"includes them ...... It implies loyal service to One
"who by His essential nature wills the good of all." And 
he adds, - "At no time has the mass of mankind treated
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"morals and religion as mutually independent. They have 
"left this to the enlightened; and the enlightened have 
"(as I think) been wrong." ^
It is not the consciousness of value, therefore, that 
determines what the self shall think or demand regarding 
ultimate Reality; it is rather consciousness of self and 
of its value which decides what ought to "be deemed valuable
%
for the Self. The valuation of the Self as the Subject of 
experience is prior to all valuations within the moral 
relationship, and the quest for life or for self-preservation 
already amounts to, and impl&e^feich a valuation of the Self. 
The fact, acknowledged even by the principle of the conser: 
vation of value, the fact namely of man's restlessness as a 
creator and bearer of moral value, points to some quality 
in self-consciousness from which the demand for the conser: 
vation arises. And when we remember that the moral self 
operates as a demand for the ideal, for what is not yet a 
possession, the moralqgast presupposes a reference to the 
'whole f, and involves a faith that its demand will be met. 
But this faith is religion, and springs from something 
deeper than the moral nature of man. It springs from a 
deeper centre of self-consciousness which knows the Self 
and the Bot-Self as moments in the all embracing Reality.
The supreme principle conditioning self-consciousness 
as we have formulated it, the awareness of an Other Mind
as the Unity of self and the world, provides the ground for
1) Theism and Humanism, pp.127-8,
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the moral consciousness itself. It does so in two ways. 
On the one hand it gives to mtti a moral fellowship, a 
personal relationship with God in the first place, for 
in all his actions he is Knowm/ and therefore not alone. 
He, is a citizen of a moral Universe within which all his 
values, what ever they be, must fall. On the other hand, 
he has confidence and faith that this world of his moral 
adventure and his quest for moral values, will not betray 
him, but will rather respond, though it may be through much 
disillusionment and tribulation, to courageous and consistent 
endeavour. All the time he has tfcx God to look to for help.
Of course the development of his religious consciousness 
and his moral life will not always proceed pari passu. Thene 
will be oscillation and serious discrepancy between the two, 
one developing apace and the other lagging behind. But the 
inner correspondence will never cease to operate. Man's 
fellowship with God will be affected by his moral experience; 
his theology will be fashioned by the results of his experi: 
ments in moral living. His moral feeling also, as it becomes 
enriched,will enrich his religion and determine the nature 
of his piety. But this moral evaluation will go on in 
organic connection with his God-consciousness whence,in 
turn, he will draw his inspiration and his faith. By his 
religious thought and feeling his moral endeavour will b-e 
guided along the high road of advance, because piety will
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always be correcting his self-centredness, in-asmuch as his 
world whether of things or of men will be envisaged as 
God's world. He will possess a conscience to admonish him 
and direct him into ever wider and deeper fellowship with 
his fellow men. The religious experience of mankind bears 
eloquent testimony to the presence in the Soul of a spiritual 
power, quite other than that derived from human fellowship, 
which brings an inward enrichment of its own touching all 
the sides of personal life. Whether we call this power 
spirit, or grace, or love, it enters the Soul from the Godward 
side of experience and not from worldly or social sources. 
The effect of this 'religious' experience is direct and 
unmistakable throughout the moral life, but it is over: 
looked almost entirely by those writers who, like Matthew 
Arnold, think of religion as'morality touched with emotion. 
A more clear insight into, and appreciation of, this side of 
religious experience would give serious pause to all who 
will persist in treating religion and theology as nothing 
more than an intellectual faith, Supported by a certain 
amount of moral feeling,brought forth to sustain and round 
off the moral life.
What Professor Otto could not do, because his analysis 
of self-consciousness left him with religion and morality 
developing along parallel lines with no organic relationship 
controlling their evolution, we can do, in the light of our
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principle. For him, "both religion and morality sprang from 
distinct a priori sources in the mind, and he could only 
explain the'ir concomitant development and co-ordination by 
postulating a third st priori principle which he did not, 
and could not, formulate. His problem was created for him, 
as we saw, by his initial sundering of religion and morality. 
What man thus puts asunder even God, except as a Deus ex 
machina. cannot join together. Professor Hflffding retains 
the organic union of the two by making religion grow out of 
morality, and dependent throughout upon it. Otto, by making 
them independent in origin and principle,failed to find any 
inner connection. The only alternative open to us is to find 
morality, though capable of retaining an a priori character 
as a sense of obligation, dependent on a religious a priori
i
that can be so expressed as to include the principle of 
morality within itself. This our Gnosthentic principle of 
self-consciousness endeavours to accomplish. All moral 
obligation is bound up with the consciousness of a religious 
obligation arising from the senee of the presence of God 
as the objective ground of self-consciousness. Moraltty 
and Religion are interdependent, and must develop in organic 
relation,because all social intercourse presupposes a 
religious fellowship with God as the Unity of Self-conscious: 
ness. This morality, implied in faith^ controls the morality 
actualised in social relationship.
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"My current social experience," writes Hocking, 
"the finding of any fellow finite mind, is an application 
"of my prior idea of an Other; in a sense, an application 
"of my idea of God. It is through the knowledge of God 
"that I am able to know men; not first through the knowledge 
"of men that I am able to know or imagine God." *'
Morality is therefore something deeper than moralism, 
and conscience, though operating as a moral determinant, 
springs from a deeper strand in self-conscious awareness 
than the sense of abstract obligation. The fact of Con: 
science is explicable only as the meeting place of morality 
and religion, and points to the religious consciousness as 
expressing the fundamental nature of all self-consciousness.
In life, morality and religion are never separated. The 
separation is the work of thought whose conceptual weapons., 
instead of attacking the enemy, are so readily employed in 
beating the air of abstractions. Religion is not morality 
touched with emotion. If that were true we ought to find 
morality existing in its own right in concrete living, but 
this *K we never meet with. We must say rather that morality 
is religion in terms of intercourse of man with man. It is 
an extension of the higher' social intercourse with God to 
include social intercourse with man. It is divine Communion 
becoming human Community. Without morality religion would
not be it self,_ and^e^uallj^ withput_r_eligion morality would 
1) The Meaning of God in Human Experience p, 297.
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not exist. We have no ground for thinking that the moral 
imperative of duty would be known to a self not already 
aware of a Religious Imperative. The 'ought' of morality
is born of the 'is' of religion. What man seeks to attain
promised 
on earth in human fellowship is already :&otab£fflg&k^ him in
his fellowship with God. He works out in the former rela: 
tionship the salvation already gained in the latter. 
And yet religion, no less than morality, must be progressive, 
for although in religion man finds God it is God alone who 
is perfect; both the religious individual and society remain 
imperfect. In the light of our supreme principle of religion, 
we find that the moral life can never be wholly transcended 
by, or lost in, the religious consciousness. So long as man 
is man., and God is God as known in piety, the 'is' and the 
'ought' never really coincide. The disappearance of the 
antithesis essential to morality can never take place, and 
absolute Idealism is ruled out forthwith. The 'ought' of 
the one is preserved within the 'is' of the other; morality 
remains itself throughout all possible stages in the evolution
*
of the religious Self. A Theistic philosophy alone seems, 
then, capable of satisfying the requirements of self- 
conscious personality.
"Religion," says Bradley, "is more than morality. In 
"the religious consciousness we find the belief however
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"vague and indistinct, in an object, a not-my self; an. 
"object further which is real. An ideal which is not real, 
"which is only in our heads, can not be the object of 
"religion; and in particular the ideal self, as the 'is to 
"be 1 which is real only so far as we put it forth by our 
"Wills and which as an ideal we can not put forth is not 
"a real object and so not the object for religion."
"Religion, we have seen, must have an object and that 
"object is neither an abstract idea in the head nor one 
"particular thing or quality, nor any collection of such 
"things ar qualities, nor any phrase which stands for one 
"of them or a collection of them. In short it is nothing 
"finite. It can not be a thing or person in the world; it 
"can not exist in the world, as a part of it, or as thie •••> 
"or that course of events in time; it can not be the 'All, * 
"the sum of things or persons, - since if one is not divine 
"no putting of ones together will beget divinity. All this 
"it is not. Its positive character is that it is real; 
"and further, on examining what we find in the religious 
"consciousness we discover that it is the ideal self 
"considered as realized and real. The ideal self, which 
"in morality is to be, is here the real ideal which tffuly i
1) "Ethical Studies," pp.316, 319.
CHAPTER XV.
CONCLUSION
It will be evident to the reader of the foregoing pages 
that "WaK there is a close resemblance between the theory we 
have outlined, and that of Professor Otto in 'Das Heilige. 1 
Indeed we have indicated our agreement with him in no uncertain 
terms. In particular we have insisted with him on the a priori 
nature of Religion as a human interest which has a foundation 
of its own in the mind. The idea of God and all the great 
ideas that are characteristic of religion, together with 
religious emotion, are not derived or inferred. They are in 
some way unique and original,and enter as organic elements 
into the very constitution of experience.
When we have said this, our agreement* though important, 
seems to end. To trace the points of the divergence in 
detail would however lead us far beyond the limits of this 
essay. We will content ourselves therefore with recalling
Otto's category of the numinous. Although he derives the
•
term from the Latin •Numen 1 it is the adjective which he 
employs not the substantive, and all along the luminous 1
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ifi for him a quality of the real. It expresses a principle 
of valuation just as our own Gnosthentic Category does. 
But Otto f s 'numinous* remains a quality throughout, and is 
never more than adjectival, a predicate attached to the 
world as subject. For that reason the category yields no 
more than a qualitative determination of the real world. It 
does not bring us face to face with God as the subject of 
all predication, as the ground of every other determination 
and characterisation of all object s, including the Self. It 
never becomes the unity of the subject-object relationship, 
nor is the numinous expressive of a principle conditioning 
the reality of self-conscious awareness. In other words, 
it is not, as Otto explains it, a transcendental principle 
of knowledge. His treatment is more psychological than 
epistemological. This accounts, as we pointed out, for his 
failure to relate religion to morality in any organic fashion.
Our own principle, it will be seen, takes a deeper root 
in knowledge than Otto f s numinous. If, in every act of 
knowing, we are known of an Other, all our judgments are 
religiously conditioned. The religious principle becomes 
the root of all the categories, and God, as an intelligent 
and Infinite Being, the ultimate Subject of all predication. 
Even the category of Substance and Causality, as well as the 
moral Imperative, are logically dependent on the supreme 
principle of Religion. For the self-conscious individual,
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God is the ground of the permanent element in the real world
and the source of all activity working in the causal series
and in all change. He is at once the eternal "background and
the energy of the universe, and also the voice behind the
j
moral law. As knower in all knowledge,he remains for ever 
distinct from the individual,and cannot be lost in the world 
which He conditions. Our Gnosthentic principle can therefore 
yield a Theistic philosophy wherein the individual and the 
world are endowed with permanent reality, and the moral life 
allowed to retain both its freedom and the assurance of 
unlimited and certain attainment towards perfection.
As Professor Otto turned.to the Bible and the literature 
of religion to find illustrations of the category of the 
numinous functioning, so can we, with more reason, cite, not 
peculiar passages as in Das Heilige, but the profoundest 
expressions of the religious mind, even the whole mass of 
human literature. For our principle affirms God to be the 
inescapable, the all-besetting God, from whose presence there 
is for man no escape. God is with us even as we are with 
ourselves and the world, and the religious history of mankind 
is the story, not so much of man looking for God, as of man 
trying to break away from Him, or else rediscovering Him, or 
rather being rediscovered "ty Him after an attempt at conceal: 
ment from His presence. Our journey is, indeed,"from God to God." 
What we find is only what we once had, though we find anew.
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No one remembers stumbling across God for the first time. 
When we meet Him, it is not we that find Him; it is rather 
He that finds us. Every apprehension of God is an appre: 
hending of us by Him. Discovery here is nothing else than 
being re-discovered. But with the rediscovery there comes 
a deepened conviction that escape now is impossible.
The real justification of our Thesis is the existence 
of religious literature itself, and the religious element 
in all literature. If religion is natural to man, then the
«
presence of God will overshadow all the deeper utterances 
of his experience. This is what we find. Pew indeed are
f
the poets and philosophers who have been able to speak or 
write as if the reality of the God of religion were not 
known to them. The thinkers, and singers, and the world's 
great men of action, have not been Atheists. None has 
thought himself to be a lonely traveller on the cosmic 
highway. God has always moved across the heavens among the 
starry hosts, and His Voice has ever been heard in the 
silent place of the soul. The story of man, and the words 
with which he has uttered the thoughts and experiences of 
his heart, bear ample testimony to the presence of God 
within him. Let us hear two great witnesses to the 
inescapable Divinity, both of them men who sought to fly 
from God's presence, only to find that no place could hide 
them from Him. Here is the psalmist:-
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"Whither shall I go from thyyspirit? 
M 0r whither shall I flee from thy presence? 
"If I ascend up into heaven, thou are there: 
"If I make my bed in hell, behold thou are there. 
"If I take the wings of the morning, and dwell in the
uttermost parts of the Sea, 
"Even there shall thy hand lead me, 
"And thy right hand shall hold me. 
"If I say, Surely the darkness shall cover me; 
"Even the night shall be light about me. 
"Yea, the darkness hideth not from thee: 
"But the night shineth as the day. 
"The darkness and the light are'both alike to Thee."
But the psalmist's immediate sense of the divine presence 
is more fully expressed in the opening stanzas:-
"0 Lord, thou has searched me, and known me, 
"Thou knowest my downsitting and mine uprising, 
"Thou understandest my thought afar off. 
"Thou compassest my path and my lying down, 
"And are acquainted with all my ways. 
"For there is not a word in my tongue, 
"But lo, 0 Lord, thou knowest it altogether. 
"Thou hast beset me behind and before, 
"And laid thine hand upon me."
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And this God-Consciousness is for the psalmist not the 
conclusion of a search. It is knowledge which he possesses
•
yet cannot understand. It is within him, hut also above him. 
"Such knowledge is too wonderful for me. It is high, I 
cannot attain unto it." -(^salm 139. )
In the whole range of literature, there is no more 
adequate or profound an expression of the inescapable God 
than that of Francis Thompson in "The Hound of Heaven." 
The poem begins, not with man's search for God, but with 
man's effort to flee away from Him. Man escapes and God 
pursues.
"I fled Him, down the night and down the days; 
"I fled Him, down the arches of the. years; 
"I fled Him, down the labyrinthine ways 
"Of my own mind; and in the midst of tears 
"I hid from Him, and under running laughter. 
"Up vistaed hopes, I sped; 
"And shot, precipitated 
"Adown Titanic glooms of chasmed fears, 
"From those strong Feet that followed, followed after, 
"But with unhurrying chase 
"And unperturbed pace, 
"Deliberate speed, majestic instancy, 
"They beat, - and a Voice beat
jMore instant than the Feet, - 
M A11 things betray thee, who betray est Me. w
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The echo of the voice which falls periodicaly on the 
ear of the fugitive soul declares the insufficiency and 
incompleteness of the Godless life.
"Naught shelters thee, who wilt not shelter Me."
"Lolnaught contents thee, who vcontent'st not Me."
"LoJ all things fly thee, for thou fliest Me."
Separated from God,the Soul moves ever in the land of 
shadows, and carries within it a sense of need which only 
God can satisfy. And this be cause, when God is found again, 
the Self refindsits own lost chord,and the music of life 
is once more restored. The broken arc is replaced to 
complete the round. A Godless Self is like a wandering 
star adrift from its orbit,and obeying no central Sun. It 
regaine,^ its true freedom, its light and its life, only 
when it passes once more under the governance of its original 
Source , whence it took its rise.
"All which I took from thee I did but take
"Not for thy harms,
"But just that thou might'st seek it
"In My arms.
"All which thy" child 1 s mistake 
"Fancies as lost, I have stored for thee at home:
"Rise, clasp My hand, and come."
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And so, when God is found, and His fellowship experienced, 
the Soul is homeward bound. But the home it finds is no 
other than that which it knew before when it broke away from 
God. Its return is to the place of its birth where "heaven 
"lies about us in our infancy." "Except ye turn and become 
"as little children, $e shall in no wise enter into the 
"Kingdom of heaven." Surely "Thou hast made us for Thyself 
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